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Summary
Name: Alia Aghajanian
Title: Social Capital and Conflict: Impact and Implications
This thesis explores the relationship between social capital and conflict in two different
contexts, by answering the following two questions:
How does exposure to violence affect social capital in urban Maharashtra, India?
How does returning home affect social capital amongst internally displaced persons and
returnees from Nahr el Bared camp in North Lebanon?
This thesis then goes on to look at the labour market implications of returning home to
Nahr el Bared camp, exploring the role of social capital (amongst other mechanisms) in
this relationship. The following paragraphs are abstracts from the three empirical chap-
ters that address these questions.
The first empirical chapter explores the relationship between exposure to riots and
social capital in urban Maharashtra. We exploit a panel dataset collected by the au-
thors and apply a random effects model with lagged covariates to estimate an exogenous
relationship between neighbourhood exposure to riots and four forms of social capital:
membership in a group or organisation, trust in neighbours, participation in community
discussions and participation in community festival preparations. Consistent with Bellows
and Miguel’s study of conflict and social capital (2009), we find that households living
in neighbourhoods that experienced a riot are more likely to be members of groups and
organisations. On the other hand, we find that these households are less likely to join
community discussions, which lends more to the hypothesis of fragmented post–conflict
societies with a damaged social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). We explore various
mechanisms behind these results and find that the increased membership in organisations
is greatest in diverse neighbourhoods that have not experienced recent changes in com-
position. However, riots reduce trust and the likelihood of participation in fragmented
and polarised riot–affected neighbourhoods. Riots also decrease participation in festival
preparations in neighbourhoods where out–migration has been low. Our analysis suggests
that individuals and households instrumentally use social capital to their advantage, a
type of insurance to protect against potential communal violence in the future. However,
riots can have adverse affects on different forms of social capital that go beyond the surface
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level of social networking to feelings of trust and sense of community.
The second empirical chapter studies the effect of returning home after conflict induced
displacement on social capital, compared to remaining displaced. I have collected a house-
hold survey of displaced Palestinians from a refugee camp in Lebanon, and this chapter
assesses the impact of return on the different dimensions of social capital based on a diverse
and rich set of questions. An instrumental variable is used to model the return decision in
one part of the camp, and the exogenous nature of return is exploited in another section
of the camp. Results show that return can improve social capital if households return
within one year of the war ending and with their friends and family. If households have
been displaced for too long, then social capital is decreased upon returning home. This
indicates that social capital is not simply carried over from displacement to return, but is
rebuilt in a process that takes time and effort.
The third and final empirical chapter studies the effect of returning home on labour
market outcomes. Theoretically the effect of return is ambiguous, depending on changes
in both the demand and supply of labour. I empirically study the effect of return on four
labour market outcomes: participation in the labour force, working, wages and number
of days worked. I analyse a dataset of individuals originally from Nahr el–Bared camp in
North Lebanon, displaced within Lebanon after a war in 2007 between the Lebanese army
and Fatah al–Islam. I use an instrumental variable and exploit the exogenous nature of
the return process in order to estimate a causal effect of return. The results show that
return increases the likelihood of working by 117 percentage points. This effect is greatest
for those who have returned within two years, reaping the benefits of greater aggregate
demand as the market increases. Women returnees are more likely to be working compared
to the displaced, but there is no difference in employment between men who have been
displaced and those who have returned. This could be because women possess skills that
are adaptable in labour markets, working in cottage type industries from home, as opposed
to the more specialised skills that men tend to possess.
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This thesis answers three research questions of utmost relevance in our world today, in
which the level of civil violence and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons
(IDPs) has reached levels not seen since World War II (UNHCR, 2014). My first research
question is “How do households change their investments in social capital in response to
experiencing a riot and communal violence?” My second research question asks “How
does returning home after conflict–induced displacement affect social capital?” And my
last research question asks “What is the impact of returning home after conflict induced
displacement on individual labour market outcomes?” As I explain in the following, these
research questions are insufficiently addressed by current academic literature, and this
thesis contributes to filling this academic gap, with important implications for the growing
world–wide refugee and IDP crisis.
The first part of my thesis is situated in Maharashtra, India. Riots in Maharashtra
bring back memories of the extensive violence that took place between 1992 and 1993,
following the demolition of Babri mosque in Uttar Pradesh. Nine hundred people lost
their lives, thousands were injured, and thousands more fled from the violence and looting
in the streets (Srikrishna, 1998). Today, riots are still prevalent and endemic in urban
Maharashtra. In 2010, one in five households in the sample under study reported at
least one riot taking place within their neighbourhood, 12.6% of the sample report being a
victim of a riot, with some suffering physical and economic damage as a result (Gupte et al.,
2014). Chapter 3 analyses how experience of a riot in a household’s neighbourhood can
affect social capital, and in addition we consider how this relationship can be conditional
on certain neighbourhood level variables. We exploit a panel dataset collected by myself
and co–authors, and apply a random effects model with lagged covariates to estimate
an exogenous relationship between neighbourhood exposure to riots and forms of social
capital.
The second part of my thesis takes me back home to Lebanon. Here the context is
Nahr el–Bared camp (NBC), a Palestinian refugee camp set up in 1949. In May of 2007,
fighting broke out in the camp when members of Fatah al–Islam stole money from a bank
near Tripoli, and hid in apartments in the area. Fatah al–Islam is an Islamist militia
who was able to reside in NBC due to the absence of Lebanese security and intelligence
within the camp. The Lebanese armed forces raided these apartments killing several
militants (Ramadan, 2009). In retaliation, members of Fatah al–Islam attacked an army
base outside the camp, brutally killing ten Lebanese soldiers. The Lebanese army then
began shelling the camp, and a three–month long war ensued. 47 civilians were killed, 95%
of buildings in one part of the camp were completely destroyed or damaged beyond repair,
and the majority of households were forced to flee from their homes. The neighbouring
Beddawi refugee camp hosted a large number of the ‘internally displaced refugees’, and the
remaining families were displaced to various parts of the country, the majority remaining
in North Lebanon. Since the initial displacement, 22.54% of households had returned
home at the time of this study. Chapters 4 and 5 use an instrumental variable and exploit
the exogenous nature of the return process to estimate the impact of return on social
capital and labour market outcomes.
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In both Maharashtra and Lebanon I was involved in the data collection of two household
surveys that were collected in order to answer the research questions under study. The
data collection is further detailed in chapter 2. In the following paragraphs I summarise
the results of each of my empirical chapters.
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between exposure to riots and four forms of social
capital: membership in a group or organisation, trust in neighbours, participation in com-
munity discussions and participation in community festival preparations. In accordance
with Bellows and Miguel’s study of conflict and social capital (2009), we find that house-
holds living in neighbourhoods which experienced a riot are more likely to be members
of groups and organisations. On the other hand, we find that these households are less
likely to join community discussions, which lends more to the hypothesis of fragmented
post–conflict societies with a damaged social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). We ex-
plore the various mechanisms behind these results and find that the increased membership
in organisations is greatest in diverse neighbourhoods which have not experienced recent
changes in composition. However, riots reduce trust and the likelihood of participation
in fragmented and polarised riot–affected neighbourhoods. Riots also decrease participa-
tion in festival preparations in neighbourhoods where out–migration has been low. Our
analysis suggests that individuals and households instrumentally use social capital to their
advantage, a type of insurance to protect against potential communal violence in the fu-
ture. However, riots can have adverse effects on different forms of social capital that go
beyond the surface level of social networking to feelings of trust and sense of community.
Chapter 4 studies the effect of returning home after conflict induced displacement on
social capital, compared to remaining displaced. Results show that return can improve
social capital if households return within one year of the war ending and with their friends
and family. If households have been displaced for too long, then social capital is decreased
upon returning home. This indicates that social capital is not simply carried over from
displacement to return, but is rebuilt in a process that takes time and effort.
Chapter 5 studies the effect of returning home on labour market outcomes. Theoret-
ically the effect of return is ambiguous, depending on changes in both the demand and
supply of labour. I empirically study the effect of return on four labour market outcomes:
participation in the labour force, working, wages and number of days worked. The results
show that return increases the likelihood of working by 117 percentage points. This effect
is greatest for those who have returned within two years, reaping the benefits of greater
aggregate demand as the market increases. Women returnees are more likely to be working
compared to the displaced, but there is no difference in employment between men who
have been displaced and those who have returned. This could be because women possess
skills that are adaptable in labour markets, working in cottage type industries from home,
as opposed to the more specialised skills that men tend to possess.
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1.1 Contributions of thesis
This thesis contributes two new datasets, one collected in Maharashtra, India, as a second
wave of a panel survey, and the other collected amongst Palestinian refugees from Nahr
el–Bared camp in North Lebanon. These two datasets contain invaluable information
on social capital and household economic characteristics, including contributions to the
labour market, household expenses and household assets. In addition to these datasets,
here I outline the academic contributions of the three empirical chapters, in terms of
contributions to at least five bodies of literature.
1. The effects of return after conflict induced displacement:
The current gap in this literature is due to a lack of available data — displaced house-
holds are by nature difficult to locate and there is a potential selection bias involved when
dealing with displacement and subsequent return (Deininger et al., 2004). Some studies
have tried to find a way around this challenge, by comparing returnees with ‘stayers’, or
those who were never displaced to begin with. Fiala (2015) and Verwimp and Mun˜oz Mora
(2013) have found that returnees lag behind stayers in terms of calorie intake, poverty and
household welfare. In contrast, Kondylis (2008) finds that returnees actually outperform
stayers in agricultural productivity, but this could be a short term impact of returnees
trying to catch up. By comparing households who have been displaced to ‘stayers’, the
impact of return is not isolated, but confounded with the displacement effect. In order to
better evaluate the return policy, returnees should be compared to those who are still dis-
placed, rather than those who were never displaced in the first place. Bozzoli et al. (2011)
are able to avoid this confounding effect and find that returnees, compared to IDPs, are
less likely to work in trading and more likely to make handicrafts and participate in a
wider range of activities. However, their empirical strategy relies on the household head’s
experience of conflict, another factor which has been confounded with the return effect.
Chapters 4 and 5 vastly improve on current datasets and identification strategies by a)
utilising a unique dataset that is representative of all households prior to the displacement
and b) causally estimating the impact of return through the exogenous nature of the return
process. Because the residents of NBC were originally registered with a UN agency, it was
relatively easy to track down households who were displaced around the country (the
details of the data collection are explained in the next chapter). In addition, as the
movement of Palestinians in Lebanon is restricted to within the country (as was their
displacement), I am certain of capturing a representative sample of households living in
NBC prior to the war. I am also able to causally identify the impact of return by exploiting
the exogenous return process in section A and an instrumental variable (the damage level
of the original dwelling) in section B of NBC.
Most importantly, previous studies have not estimated the effect of return on social
capital, a key factor for post–conflict peace–building and reintegration (Varshney, 2001).
In addition, while Bozzoli et al. (2011) compare the activity choices of returnees and
IDPs, there is still little understanding of how return can affect labour market outcomes,
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in particular participation in the labour force, finding work, wages and number of days
worked per week. Chapters 4 and 5 will contribute to this gap in the literature.
2. Effect of displacement on labour market outcomes:
Understanding how labour markets are affected by displacement is an emerging lit-
erature in the conflict research. Kondylis (2010) found that displaced Bosnians are less
likely to be working than Bosnians who were not displaced. Caldero´n et al. (2011) show
that forced displacement in Colombia improves women’s participation in the labour force,
as IDPs find themselves in unfamiliar urban settings where women are more likely (than
men) to possess the necessary experience for low–skilled urban work. Caldero´n and Iba´n˜ez
(2009) study the effect of forced migration on labour market outcomes in Colombia and
find that immigration flows produce a negative impact on wages and employment op-
portunities for all workers (both displaced and “native” workers), and especially so for
low–skilled workers. The informal sector expands as a result. Ferna´ndez et al. (2014) find
that households living through certain shocks of violence and conflict increase their labour
force supply as a coping strategy. Specifically, they find that men take most of this respon-
sibility, and while time spent in agricultural work decreases, time spent in non–agricultural
markets increases. Bozzoli et al. (2013) find that an increase in net displacement leads to
an increase in the probability of becoming self–employed in Colombia. Self–employment
is seen by the authors as a last resort, one that migrants turn to because of their limited
social and professional networks.
This literature has not been able to identify the mechanism that causes a change in
labour force outcomes, nor do they look at what happens to individuals once they return
home. This is a large gap in the literature which has been insufficiently addressed so
far. While testing the impact of returning home after conflict induced displacement,
chapter 5 draws from the current state of the art by improving the instrumental variable
approach of Bozzoli et al. (2011); empirically testing the mechanisms and hypotheses put
forward by Kondylis (2010) and Bozzoli et al. (2013); observing heterogeneity by gender,
as in Caldero´n et al. (2011) and Caldero´n and Iba´n˜ez (2009); focusing on skilled labour
similarly to Caldero´n and Iba´n˜ez (2009); and looking at the supply of labour as a coping
strategy, as described by Ferna´ndez et al. (2014).
In addition, chapter 5 includes a contribution to the literature that studies the rela-
tionship between social capital and labour market outcomes. This literature started with
Granovetter’s seminal study on the importance of weak ties (Granovetter, 1974), and there
has since been an abundance of literature that shows how social networks and social cap-
ital improve the chances of finding work and increase wages (Montgomery, 1991; Munshi,
2003; Calvo´-Armengol, 2004; Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Wahba and Zenou, 2005;
Buerkle and Guseva, 2002; Knight and Yueh, 2008). Chapter 5 finds that while social
capital plays a role in the probability of working, wages and number of days worked per
week, it is not the channel behind the change in labour market outcomes upon return.
3. The formation of social capital:
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This thesis also makes an important contribution to the literature on the formation
of social capital (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Gambetta, 1988;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002). Chapter 3 shows how social capital
in urban areas depends on the context under which different populations live. Notably,
social capital is shaped by the exposure of households to violence in their communities
and to community levels of polarisation, fractionalisation and out–migration. In chapter 4
I show how the formation of social capital takes time and effort and is not simply carried
over during displacement and return.
4. Diversity and social capital:
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on the provision of public goods in ethnically
diverse societies. Several studies have shown that collective action that sustains the provi-
sion of public goods is more challenging in heterogeneous societies (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Vigdor, 2004; Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel and Gugerty,
2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007). We show that social polarisation and fragmentation also
affect the relationship between riots and social capital in informal settlements. Largely,
riots reduce social capital in diverse neighbourhoods.
5. Social capital and conflict:
Finally, I contribute to the emerging literature that explores the relationship between
social capital and conflict. On the one hand this literature has found that conflict can
destroy the social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000), decrease civic association (De Luca
and Verpoorten, 2011) and create mistrust (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2011; Rohner et al.,
2013; Cassar et al., 2013). On the other hand, older children exposed to conflict behave in
more egalitarian ways (Michal et al., 2011), individuals exposed to civil conflict have higher
civic association (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009), are more altruistic (Voors
et al., 2012) and display more pro–social behaviour (Gilligan et al., 2014). A distinguishing
feature of this thesis is that it unpacks social capital into different dimensions based on a
diverse and rich range of social capital indicators. In addition, I explore various potential
mechanisms that could explain how social capital changes, particularly how it is built up
over time and depends on others in the social environment. In these two ways this thesis
provides much needed insight into the complexity of the relationship between social capital
and conflict, lending evidence to an exciting debate.
As a common thread to all empirical chapters of this thesis, social capital deserves to
be discussed further in the next section.
1.2 Social capital
There is no doubt that conflict and violence are destructive to those involved: young lives
are lost, assets destroyed, families displaced and livelihoods shattered. However, there is
another aspect that researchers and practitioners in the conflict field often ignore, although
probably it is most essential in understanding the dynamics of conflict and preventing any
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further turmoil. Conflict is either caused by, or brings about, drastic changes in the
underlying social relationships between members of a community involved in the conflict.
As aid flows to post-conflict areas, rather than being a priority in order to prevent further
escalation of conflict, social capital is often ignored.
Social capital allows us to understand certain economic phenomena that are not driven
by classical economic theory. For example, strong social ties allow us to achieve goals that
involve the cooperation and inputs of more than one player, leading to more effective out-
puts such as public goods, institutions, and community-level investments (Habyarimana,
2009), all of which are essential for economic development. When it comes to income
shocks, social capital can be seen as a vital household coping strategy, not only in terms
of financial support, but also in terms of solidarity and emotional support. Mutual in-
surance networks are common amongst households that are susceptible to income shocks
(Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Other studies have empirically shown the advantages of
a more cooperative society: public institutions and public policies are more productive
(Putnam et al., 1994b), growth rates increase (Fukuyama, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 1997),
human productivity is greater (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2002), high school drop–outs
decrease (Coleman, 1988), and financial investments and networks increase (Harker et al.,
1990). There are other benefits to cooperation and strong community ties, some less mea-
surable, like personal satisfaction gained when greeting your neighbour as you leave your
building, benefits that Sobel (2002) describes as valuable intrinsically.
In the context of conflict and post-conflict settings, a strong social fabric is even more
crucial. Varshney (2001) shows that in multi-ethnic societies, if civic engagement (across
two different communities or ethnic groups) is not present or weak, conflict is likely to
flare up. Black and Gent (2006) explain that without proper reintegration into the former
community, return of former refugees or IDPs is not sustainable, and can lead to further
conflict and displacement.
As the importance of social capital has been realised, some recent studies on the conse-
quences of violence and conflict on social capital have emerged, with contradictory results
(see Bellows and Miguel (2009) and De Luca and Verpoorten (2011) for an example of two
contrasting studies). This contradiction is mainly due to the different measures of social
capital, the lack of differentiation between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, and the
questionable exogeneity of the variable that measures conflict.
Here I provide an overview of social capital, section 1.2.2 discusses the literature on
social capital and conflict, and finally section 1.2.3 concludes with lessons from the current
literature that have been applied to this thesis.
1.2.1 Overview of social capital literature
Classical economists saw land, labour and physical capital as the only three assets that
generate income and foster economic growth. During the 1960s, the notion of human
capital was also added to the mix (Becker, 1962; Portes, 1998), as education, training and
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experience were found to increase productivity. However, the ‘embeddedness’ of social
relations in economic relations was still not acknowledged.
This lack of acknowledgement brought to light a clear distinction between the way so-
ciologists and classical economists view individual actors. Sociologists tend to lean away
from the individualistic element, believing that individual behaviour is formed by society
around him/her, through social norms, rules and obligations. On the other hand, classi-
cal economists view individuals as rational beings seeking to maximize their own utility
without any regard for others, leading Granovetter (1985) to accuse economic studies of
relying on the ‘under-socialized concept of man’.
However, in more recent decades there has been a surge in popularity of social capital,
as economists have realised that we cannot rely on physical and human capital alone, nor
overlook the ‘social embeddedness’ of man. For example, aid channelled to physical capital
such as roads, irrigation systems, and public facilities could turn to crumbling ruins in the
absence of the social capital which is needed to maintain it Gibson et al. (2005). Or,
the best education and training possible will still amount to nothing unless an individual
has colleagues, clients, employees, and employers around him/her to discuss, disseminate,
learn from, and assist his/her work (Woolcock, 1998). Societies that have emerged from
conflict will find it difficult to reconstruct and redevelop without communication between
warring parties.
Social capital can now be considered a third (after physical and human capital), and
equally important, capital that provides tools and training to enhance productivity. “The
core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver
(physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase productivity (both
individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and
groups (Putnam, 2000).” However, as social capital has interested scientists from an array
of disciplines, this has led to an emergence of many different interpretations of the topic.
Nevertheless, researchers have still been able to show that social capital, however defined,
has an impact on development outcomes (Colletta and Cullen, 2000), be they education,
household welfare, or crime rates, keeping social capital high up on the development and
economics agenda. Here I try to uncover the origins of social capital, how they are analysed
in the contemporary literature, and the problems associated with social capital.
The term social capital has been coined independently at least six times by academics
and practitioners over the twentieth century (Putnam, 2000), meaning that not only is
the definition of social capital debated, but its origins too. The earliest citation of social
capital was in 1916, when Lyda Hanifan wrote a report on rural schools in West Virginia,
claiming that in order for a school to be successful social capital is necessary. According
to Hanifan, social capital is “those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily
lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the
individuals and families who make up a social unit (Hanifan, 1916).” Hanifan must have
had good foresight, as this definition includes many of the different forms that have been
labelled as social capital by researchers over the years. However, Portes (1998) asserts that
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the general meaning of social capital is even older, and can be traced back to Durkheim’s
advocacy of group life and its benefits (Durkheim, 1915) and Marx’s mobilized and effective
‘class–for–itself’.
The first systematic analysis of social capital was brought by the French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu, who defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to a possession of a durable network of more or less institution-
alized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu, 1986).” Lacking a
proper systematic explanation, this definition paved the way for the vague concept that
we use today. Bourdieu’s definition decomposes social capital into two elements: firstly
social relationships, and secondly the resources that these relationships offer. His focus
on the latter could be a way of trying to make the concept popular amongst economists,
however this has led to one of the most important challenges that social capital theorists
face today: separating social capital from the resources that it offers.
Next to tackle the subject was James Coleman, combining influences from two differ-
ent fields, sociology and economics, to understand the relationship between educational
achievement and social inequality. Coleman offered the following definition, “[social capi-
tal is] a variety of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of
social structures, and they facilitate certain action of actors whether persons or corporate
actors within the structure (Coleman, 1988).”
Unlike Bourdieu, Coleman does acknowledge the fact that social capital can be harmful.
Also unlike Bourdieu, Coleman saw the creation of social capital as an unintentional
process, i.e. social capital arises out of activities meant for other purposes, and not for
the sake of social capital itself. And while Bourdieu tended to focus on the social capital
created by elitist groups, Coleman did not constrain social capital to this. However,
Bourdieu and Coleman can both be faulted in that they failed to differentiate between the
resources made available through social capital and social capital itself.
Offering a more systematic analysis than Bourdieu, Coleman explored several different
forms of social capital: obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and
effective sanctions, authority relations, appropriable social organization, and intentional
organizations. Coleman also offers us different examples of social capital: the lack of
formal insurance in a wholesale diamond market, student activist groups who have evolved
from study groups, a mother feeling that it is safe for her children to play on the streets
unwatched, and a market in Cairo where a system of obligations means that a fruit vendor
will be able to sell leather (or point in the right direction).
Alongside Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman, Robert Putnam is considered the far-
ther of contemporary social capital studies. Putnam can be credited with making social
capital popular not only in the academic arena, but in the policy arena too, with former
US president George Bush senior making references to Putnam’s work in a presidential
speech. Putnam defines social capital as “the connections among individuals social net-
works and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam,
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2000).” One of the more important contributions of Putnam’s work is differentiating be-
tween bridging and bonding social capital. Whereas the former refers to social capital
that brings together individuals from different and diverse social backgrounds, the latter
refers to social capital that forms from the basis of these social backgrounds, such as a
bible reading group. Bonding social capital brings people together and encourages certain
norms and strengthens identity, whereas bridging social capital can blur social divisions,
as well as allow for better linkage to external assets and diffusion of information. Having
strong bridging social capital is an important peace-building mechanism and is crucial in
post-conflict or multi-ethnic societies (Varshney, 2001).
Robert Putnam’s work drew a lot of criticism, mainly in that his definition of social
capital was limited to organizational affiliation. While it is an important aspect, it is not
the only form of social capital, and various other forms also need to be explored. Although
membership in organizations might have decreased in the US (Putnam, 2000), individuals
can also resort to other forms of social capital, such as social media, networking, and
cooperation.
While these three main players created the stage for social capital, a number of the-
oretical analyses and definitions have since emerged. Loury et al. (1977) claimed that
prohibiting racial discrimination in the work place could not completely eliminate racial
inequalities, rather the legacy of a lack of connection of minorities to the job market and
information about opportunities would remain. In short, it was the lack of social capital
and not employers that was causing a discrepancy in salaries. Baker (1990) defined social
capital as “a resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to
pursue their interests, it is created by changes in the relationships among actors”. Schiff
(1992) defines it as “the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations among
people and are inputs or arguments of the production and/or utility function”. Moving
more towards the idea of social networks, Burt (2005) defines social capital as “friends,
colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your
financial and human capital”. Burt also emphasizes the importance of ‘holes’ in social net-
works, or the ‘strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1974). Grootaert and van Bastelaer
(2002) differentiate between cognitive and structural social capital, the former referring
to generally accepted attitudes and norms of behaviour, shared values, reciprocity, and
trust; and the latter to the visible forms of social structures such as networks, associations,
and institutions, and the rules and procedures that they embody similar to the defini-
tion offered by (Uphoff, 2002). Sobel (2002) defines social capital as circumstances where
individuals can use their membership in certain groups and networks to secure benefits.
At this point it is clear that the analysis is plagued by a number of problems. First,
there is a convenience and tendency in equating outcomes of social capital with social
capital itself, leading to tautological statements where “a successful group succeeded be-
cause it had social capital, but the evidence that the group has social capital is its success
(Sobel, 2002)”. This has caused a disagreement as to whether social capital refers to
the infrastructure that builds social capital, such as associational membership and social
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networks, or the norms that result from it, such as trust and reciprocity.
A second concern with the usage of social capital — that seems to have mainly irked
economists — comes from the term itself. Is social capital really a capital? In order
for social capital is to be a ‘capital’ it should have characteristics in common with other
forms of capital (physical and human capital) such as depreciation with use (Ostrom,
2001), deliberate sacrifice in the present for future benefit (investment) (Arrow, 2001),
and fungibility. Firstly, social capital does not depreciate with use, in fact, as social bonds
become older, the accessible resources become larger. For example, an old school friend
might be more likely to go the extra mile to help out. However, if social connections are
severed, does social capital then depreciate through disuse? Secondly, investment in social
capital need not be a ‘sacrifice’. While social capital can be a rich resource that provides
numerous economic benefits, the value of social capital is intrinsic (Sobel, 2002), in most
cases it is accumulated for the joy it brings. Lastly, social capital is not easily transferable,
as it is difficult to put an economic value on it. In addition, unlike physical capital, social
capital requires the input of more than one player.
I would argue that many of these objections also apply to human capital. For example,
skills and knowledge will only increase with use, as ‘practice makes perfect’; while if not
practiced or used these skills will become rusty or forgotten. Also, individuals might invest
in human capital for the intrinsic value that education and knowledge brings, rather than
future profits. And lastly, some of the benefits of human capital will not be realized
without the involvement of others; for example, there is no benefit in learning a new
language while living in a community that does not speak this language.
The last problem relating to the analysis of social capital is that of its definition. As
evident above, the definition of social capital has slowly mutated from its original meaning
to become a vague term that often encompasses so many concepts that its distinct nature
is no longer distinct (Portes, 1998). Despite this ambiguity, “the consensus is growing
in the literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by
virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures (Portes, 1998).” As
different scientists have explored social capital they have added on different concepts and
forms to the mix, from collective action to norms of trust and reciprocity. Dasgupta
and Serageldin (2002) and Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) have advocated the multi-
faceted nature of social capital, as the different dimensions of social capital can have
different effects on outcome variables, and it is important that we explore each of these
dimensions independently. This is the approach used in this thesis.
1.2.2 Conflict and Social Capital
The relationship between conflict and social capital is ambiguous. On the one hand, we
would expect that conflict increases social tension and decreases trust. As reports of
violence are spread, individuals will be wary of others, cooperation is likely to decrease,
and community members become divided (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). On the other hand,
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we could expect conflict and violence to force individuals to rely and depend on each other.
Social ties and capital might be formed on the basis of solidarity in the face of an external
threat. For this reason, while bridging social capital might decrease, bonding social capital
will increase (Gilligan et al., 2014). I.e. members of the same neighbourhood, village,
ethnic group or religion might show more inter-group social capital but less out-group
social capital.
The literature on social capital is quite new and the debate is still ongoing, with studies
reaching contradictory results. Some research has showed that the experience of violence
and conflict increases forms of social capital, while others have suggested negative causal
links between conflict and social capital. These contradictions are due to the different
measures of social capital under study, as well as various challenges to the independence
of the conflict variable.
For example, De Luca and Verpoorten (2011) find that during times of conflict in
Uganda, associational membership and self-reported trust decreases, but there is evidence
for recovery. This might not necessarily reflect a deteriorating social fabric, rather the
fact that during times of conflict, transportation to meetings will be difficult, clubs and
organizations might have to discontinue due to security issues, and individuals are too
preoccupied with the situation around them. The authors also measure trust with one
simple question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you must be very careful when dealing with people?” This is not a robust enough
variable to measure trust, the question should be asked with subtlety, and several questions
revolving around trust should be included rather than just one in order to decrease any
problems cause by measurement error and noise. Also, this question does not reflect the
fact that while members of the Lord Resistance Army might trust each other, they might
not trust members of the Allied Democratic Forces, for example. This could potentially
ignore a fundamental problem in the social fabric of this post-conflict society. Similarly,
Muller and Vothknecht (2011) find that participation in certain organizations decreases
in areas that are affected by conflict.
Using two comparative case studies, Colletta and Cullen (2000) show that violence
weakens social capital and the social fabric of a community, divides community members,
undermines interpersonal trust and collective action, destroys norms and values, and if
not addressed can lead to more communal strife. Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) show
a similar story with qualitative evidence. Using a household survey and experimental
games in post-war Tajikistan, Cassar et al. (2013) show that exposure to conflict decreases
trust and perceptions of fairness within communities, as well as willingness to engage in
impersonal exchange, and reinforces kinship based norms.
Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) use a sample of ex-combatants to evaluate a dis-
armament, demobilization and reintegration programme (DDR) and find that previous
participation in abusive military factions during the civil war in Sierra Leone make it
more difficult for ex-combatants to reintegrate. Unfortunately, the authors are unable to
solve the problems of spill-overs of the DDR programme, selection bias into the programme
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and sampling bias of ex-combatants.
However, a greater number of studies is pointing in the direction of violence and conflict
improving social capital, rather than destroying it. This research is motivated by the fact
that a number of African countries have witnessed a rapid post war recovery not predicted
by Solow growth models, which envisage per capita income slowly returning to its steady
state. Social scientists have attributed this growth spurt to a societal reform and a change
in social capital caused by conflict itself.
In fact, psychologists have found that when an individual faces thoughts of death,
a chemical called neuropeptide oxytocin is produced, which could cause individuals to
identify with their group and group values (Michal et al., 2011). Early scientists such as
Charles Darwin thought that conflict caused certain societal reform, and Cramer (2006)
claims that “violence destroys but is also often associated with social creativity.” Although
conflict might cause societal reform, this contributes to bonding social capital, rather than
bridging social capital. For example, Michal et al. (2011) show that older children who
have been more conflict aﬄicted are more likely to act in an egalitarian way towards
members of their own group.
Similarly, Whitt and Wilson (2007) use experimental games to determine whether
ethnic bias might affect attitudes on fairness in post-war Bosnia. They find that there is
preferential in–group treatment, but the outward bias is not as large as expected, and a
norm of fairness still exists. This article does not provide a direct or causal link between
conflict and fairness, as we do not know how out-group bias and inter-group preference
was before the war, or how it could change depending on an individual’s experience of the
war.
The remaining studies discussed below have failed to differentiate between bonding and
bridging social capital, but have found a positive relationship between conflict and social
capital. Bellows and Miguel (2009) find that individuals who directly experienced violence
or conflict during the Sierra Leone civil war were more likely to participate in community
and political groups, attend community meetings, vote in local elections and contribute to
local public goods. The authors use a representative sample which includes self-reported
victimization reports, information on the socio-economic situation of the household, as
well as data about individual political engagement. However, despite several tests, the
authors cannot completely rule out the fact that individuals who are more likely to be
politically active, i.e. individuals who are opinionated or even aggressive, were more likely
to be victims of conflict. This would bias the coefficient upwards, making it seem as if
there is large effect of direct conflict experience on political and communal participation
in later years.
Using experimental games, Voors et al. (2012) find that individuals who have been ex-
posed to conflict are more altruistic towards their neighbours, risk seeking, and impatient.
However, it is very difficult to isolate altruism from other social norms such as egalitari-
anism and fairness from the social value orientation experiment which offers participants
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certain allocations of money between them and an anonymous partner. In order to address
the endogeneity of exposure to violence and altruism, the authors instrument exposure to
violence with the community’s distance from the capital and its elevation.
Blattman and Annan (2010) show that former abducted child soldiers, compared to
non-abducted children in Uganda, are significantly more likely to vote in later years, be
community organizers, and hold a political leadership position. The case of Uganda is
unique in that recruitment is exogenous, child soldiers were recruited in a haphazard
and unpredictable manner. Because the counterfactual to ex-combatants is non abducted
children, the authors cannot provide an impact of the war, rather the added impact of
being recruited during the war. This does not decrease the importance of this study, as
it has provided us with useful lessons concerning the reintegration of child soldiers into
society after a conflict.
Also arguing that experiences of war in Nepal are unpredictable and thus exogenous,
Gilligan et al. (2014) find that participants in experimental games who have had greater
exposure to violence and conflict during Nepal’s war are more likely to exhibit higher levels
of social capital, as measured through trust and public good games. The authors also delve
deeper into the mechanisms behind this change in social capital and find this difference to
be explained by institutional adaptation and not a change in individual preferences and
behaviour, as communities who have suffered conflict adopt more pro-social norms.
However, various articles have looked at how exposure to violence and traumatic events
can change individual preferences and behaviour, often with long-lasting effects. Individ-
uals who have experienced a trauma or tragic event, such as health problems, divorce,
or financial losses, are less likely to trust others (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002); football
players who originate from a country of civil war receive a larger number of yellow and
red cards than football players from peaceful countries (Miguel et al., 2011); people living
in areas that experienced damage and destruction by hurricane Mitch are more altruistic
and cooperative in the ‘Dictator game’ (Castillo et al., 2011); and children who have been
exposed to war report lower levels of happiness and a constant fear of losing their home
and family (Dyregrov et al., 2002).
1.2.3 Lessons from the literature
The first important lesson is that one cannot incorporate all forms of social capital under
one heading, rather we need to separate and narrow down our measurements to achieve
meaningful results. In addition, we need to differentiate between bonding and bridging
social capital. An increase in bonding social capital can be dangerous, and combined with
a decrease of bridging social capital it is a recipe for further escalation (or re-escalation) of
violence (Varshney, 2001). In chapter 3 we study the effect of riots on four social capital
variables: membership in groups or associations, trust in neighbours, participation in
community discussions, and participation in community festival preparations. In addition,
we study how this relationship can be dependent on the fractionalisation and polarisation
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of the neighbourhood, as well as uncover the salience of social identities through vignette
analysis. In chapter 4, I combine a range of social capital variables using factor analysis.
This results in four dimensions of social capital: general trust, bonding social capital, non–
institutional social capital and weak social capital. In both of these chapters, the different
dependent variables are affected differently by riots and returning home, validating the
need to study different forms of social capital.
Secondly, the variable that measures conflict or violence must be exogenous. It is
very likely that individuals who exhibit high levels of social capital also become targets
of violence. This could be because they are political community leaders, or because they
are more trusting and easily led into dangerous situations, or they are well known so
perpetrators of violence would like to make an example of them. At a more macro level,
communities with high levels of bonding social capital are less likely to result in conflict,
but if bridging social capital with another community is low this could lead to violence
and conflict. All these are valid reasons to believe that there might be a relationship
between social capital and conflict that heads in the other direction, i.e. social capital
causes conflict, and researchers need to address this issue carefully. In chapter 3 we use a
neighbourhood random effects model with lagged neighbourhood level experiences of riots
to estimate an exogenous effect of riots. In chapter 4, I exploit the exogenous nature of
the return process and employ an instrumental variable to ensure causal effects.
Related to the issue of endogeneity of social capital, in chapter 5 I use social capital vari-
ables that are unlikely to be caused by the dependent variable (labour market outcomes),
namely family size, so I can test whether social capital affects labour market outcomes and
if it causes the effect of return. The focus of the exogeneity of the identification strategy
in this thesis is an important contribution to the social capital and conflict literature.
Finally, there is a clear gap in the literature on social capital and conflict. The literature
has not been able broach one of the most fundamental consequences of forced displacement,
and one that affects millions of refugees around the world and their choice of returning
home: How does returning home affect social capital? Nevertheless, return policy is
advocated under the assumption that returning home will re-establish lost social capital
(UNHCR, 2014). Also, once displaced, does social capital amongst refugees or IDPs
become stronger because of solidarity and the fact that they have been through such
a traumatic experience together? Studying communities of refugees that escaped the
conflicts accompanying the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Loizos (2000) finds that these
communities are able to create and develop social capital solely based on the common
factor of being a refugee. This relationship has not yet been studied in a quantitative and
rigorous manner, an important contribution of chapter 4.
Since economists and social scientists have realized the importance of social capital, it
is only natural that this concept has been introduced into the conflict literature. Conflict
brings about a change to the social fabric of a community and individual behaviour, so it is
important to address these changes as part of the peace-building process. Unfortunately,
the research on social capital is plagued by several different problems, and adding conflict
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and violence to the mix only exacerbates these problems. Future research will need to
differentiate between social capital’s resources and outputs, as well as social capital itself;
unpack the different forms and measurements of social capital; specify an exogenous vari-
able that measures conflict and violence; distinguish between bonding and bridging social
capital; and capture both individual and community levels of social capital.
With this in mind there is much scope for further research, particularly in areas on the
drivers of conflict, as well as research concerning the reintegration of refugees and IDPs
once they return home. As post-conflict aid and relief reaches countries and communities,
the complex relationship between conflict experiences and social capital needs to be un-
derstood, as strengthening the social capital of a community (particularly bridging social
capital) is necessary to avoid re-escalation of hostilities.
1.3 Outline of remainder of thesis
Chapter 2 details the data collection in Maharashtra and Lebanon. Chapter 3 explores
the relationship between riots and social capital in Maharashtra India. Chapters 4 and
5 study the effect of returning home after conflict induced displacement on social capital
and labour market outcomes respectively. Finally chapter 6 concludes by tying together
the conclusions from these three empirical chapters.
Chapter 2
Field work and data collection
30
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This chapter describes the data collection efforts that I was a part of during the first
two years of my PhD. In Maharashtra, I was exposed to field work for the first time, and
worked with a group of talented survey coordinators from MaRS Monitoring and Research
Systems Private Limited, alongside my supervisors Jean–Pierre Tranchant, Jaideep Gupte
and Patricia Justino, as well as my colleague Yashodhan Ghorpade. In Lebanon, the
training wheels were off. I collaborated with a local NGO, Lebanon Support, who helped
me hire a team of data collectors and field supervisors. Both field work experiences were
eye–opening to the challenges and perils of data and data collection, and being a part of
the process has given me much respect for the people and faces behind the numbers.
2.1 Maharashtra
The first wave of this household survey was collected in 2010, two years before I started
my thesis. The details of the sampling strategy employed are discussed in chapter 3.
With the aim of re–interviewing the same households from the first wave, we went to the
field with an amended and updated questionnaire, household tracking information (the
address, landmarks, name of household head and family members, and where possible a
phone number), and detailed maps that were hand–drawn during the first wave (see an
example of this in figure 2.1 in the appendix).
The field teams were split in two, one that covered Mumbai and Thane districts, and
the other team covered the rest of Maharashtra. This was not only because of the larger
number of households sampled from Mumbai and Thane, but also because of the difficulty
interviewing respondents in these busy mega cities. I attended the three–day training for
both of these teams, but travelled with the second one around Maharashtra for one month.
Once we arrived to a field site, we typically spent two days interviewing respondents
from around 24 households. The field supervisors usually set out to the field first, trying
to trace households from the first wave. This was not an easy task, given the vagueness of
recorded addresses, but we located 80.4% of the original sample. The analysis in chapter
3 accounts for this attrition using a Heckman selection procedure.
Great lengths were taken to find the original households. If we found out that they
had moved to another dwelling in the same neighbourhood we tried to track down these
households at their new address. If no–one was at home, we waited as long as possible for
their return, keeping in mind that our budget would not allow us to stay for more than
two days in one field site. If we were not able to locate the household, we replaced this
household with a new one from the same neighbourhood.1 If replacement occurred, we
gathered as much information as possible from neighbours and friends regarding the old
household and their reasons for unavailability.
Each interview lasted around one hour using tablet PCs. At the end of each data
collection day, the data was transferred to Excel format and validated by myself and
1Because we exploit the panel data in chapter 3, replacement households are not part of the analysis.
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colleagues from the Institute of Development Studies. We looked out for outliers, as well
as inconsistencies and these were cleared up with the data collector and/or respondent the
very next morning.
After more than one month of travel and forty–five field sites visited, we collected a
survey of 1,089 households, 874 of whom were traced from the first wave.
2.2 Nahr el–Bared camp in Lebanon
I conducted a household survey with the help of a local NGO, Lebanon Support,2 in Jan-
uary of 2013. I collected a 590 household dataset, stratified so that a representative sample
of households residing in each of the different residential areas was obtained. The dataset
was collected through face–to–face interviews with one member from each household using
a pre–determined questionnaire programmed into tablet PCs.
2.2.1 Sampling Strategy
The target sample size was 600 households, which we fell short of by ten. The sample
was drawn from a database provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Collected soon after the 2007 war
and over the following year, the aim of this database was to register and trace all dis-
placed households from Nahr el–Bared camp. As displaced families approached centres
throughout the country to receive aid and rent subsidies, UNRWA social workers gathered
concise demographic information on the members of the households, the addresses of the
household, and if possible, a contact number. This information is updated each time rent
subsidies are disbursed to displaced households — which at the time of the survey was
three times per year. The version of the database which was used to create the sample
for this household survey was last updated in December of 2012, i.e. one month prior to
fieldwork.
Using this database, different geographical strata were firstly identified through certain
areas that had a high percentage of households from Nahr el–Bared camp (NBC old
camp, NBC new camp, Beddawi camp) and then by grouping areas with a relatively small
number of households and in close geographic proximity together (Bourj el–Shmali and
al–Rashidiya are identified as Tyre). Applying a stratified sampling strategy, the sample
is independently selected at each stratum to be 10% of the population, as shown in table
2.1. This method guarantees more precision in estimation if we expect characteristics to
differ across the strata (Cochran, 1977).
2http://daleel-madani.org/about-lebanon-support
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2.2.2 Data Collection and Tracing Households
The field work team consisted of thirteen data collectors, two field supervisors, and one
data coordinator. The data collectors and supervisors were local residents of either Bed-
dawi Camp (where the majority of displaced persons were located) or Nahr el–Bared
camp, with previous experience in either household survey data collection or social work.
A consultant with extensive prior experience in data collection and training was hired to
facilitate a two–day training workshop.
Data collection occurred simultaneously in Nahr el–Bared camp and Beddawi camp
over two weeks. Once these collection efforts were completed, the data collection team
moved on to the remaining areas in Lebanon.
Interviews were conducted with one member of the household, a less costly method
compared to interviewing the entire family, but more importantly it is also intuitive to
this case study. In this context displacement was a household shock; 89% of households
in the sample were displaced together. In the cases where household members were not
all displaced together, 96% of household members that had stayed behind followed soon
after. Except for cases where household members married and started a new household,
it is likely that returning is (or will be, if the household is still displaced) also a household
event.
The data collectors interviewed an available household member if he/she was above
15, and if two household members were available, they were told to choose the female
head of the household as she would be more likely to provide correct information about
the household budget. The respondent answered certain questions about all household
members (e.g. the levels of health and education), certain questions at the level of the
household (e.g. household expenditure on food), and certain questions related to the
respondent him/herself (e.g. How many times have you visited a friend over the last week
to socialize?).
After setting the sampling target within each geographical strata and then defining
the household, we needed to be certain that households were selected randomly within
each geographical strata, thus providing a representative sample. Two strategies were
employed for this: randomised selection at the field site and tracing households from
the database of Nahr el–Bared residents. As we used a stratified sampling methodology,
different sampling strategies can be used for each strata (Cochran, 1977). The application
of the two strategies are summarised in table 2.2.
At Nahr el–Bared camp, Beddawi camp, and the surrounding areas of Beddawi camp
households were selected at the site using the right hand rule, as explained below, rather
than traced from the database.
On the day, sectors of the camps and Jabal Beddawi were further divided into rect-
angular zones, with boundaries clearly defined by certain landmarks and boundaries, for
example the sea, a graveyard and a school. Each data collector was assigned to a zone
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and started at one corner. The data collector then entered the first dwelling and located
a household. If the household accepted to participate in the survey, this household was
interviewed, if not, the data collector moved to the household after this. Once the first
interview was completed, the data collector counted eight households and interviewed the
eighth household. This number was calculated by dividing the number of households in
the sample by the total population and allowing a margin for refusals and unavailable
households. To be certain that a dwelling was indeed occupied by one household (and not
unoccupied or with more than one household living in one dwelling), the data collectors
confirmed this with the interviewed household and nearby neighbours.
Whenever data collectors reached an intersection, they took the lane on their right–
hand side and completed the route by turning to their right until they reached the main
route again. In this way all areas of the camp were covered. Within Beddawi camp and
Jabal Beddawi this method was altered slightly in that data collectors either asked neigh-
bours or directly knocked on the doors of dwellings to enquire as to whether households
were originally from Nahr el–Bared camp. This was because Nahr el–Bared families live
alongside families from Beddawi camp in these areas (and more recently alongside Syrian
refugees), and the number of non–Nahr el–Bared households could have inflated the num-
ber count. There are two reasons for choosing the right–hand method in Nahr el–Bared
camp, Beddawi camp, and Jabal Beddawi, as opposed to tracking households from a list.
Firstly, due to the large size of sample households, we felt that this method would be more
efficient. Secondly, and more importantly, it was not advisable for us to enter the camps
with a list of names and enquire about certain households. Understandably, members of
the team did not feel comfortable doing this, and it was not worth drawing extra attention
to ourselves in a tense and unstable environment.
On the other hand, tracking households from a list was necessary in areas outside Nahr
el–Bared camp, Beddawi and Jabal Beddawi due to the small target number. In this case
a target sample was set for each geographical stratum, and households were randomly
selected from each geographical stratum using the sample command in STATA and the
sample target number. A list of extra randomly selected households was also made for
each stratum, in case households refused to be interviewed or we were not able to track
them.
In addition to using the addresses of households (and if available their phone numbers),
before heading to the field the supervisors met with various key informants, such as the
Palestinian popular committee for relevant camps, the relevant camp services officer, local
NGOs who had provided aid to displaced persons, the Palestinian scouts group, notable
media persons, and notables of Palestinian political parties, in order to locate the randomly
selected households and set up interviews with them. Fortunately the field supervisors were
well connected to these relevant persons, contributing to a smooth facilitation of meetings
and an acceptance and good reception of the research project. The significance of the
supervisors’ social connections for this research project further demonstrates how crucial
social capital is in this context.
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In case households were unavailable, or we were unable to track them given all the
information that we had, we moved on to the extra randomly selected households. In the
event that this list of extra households was also exhausted, we returned to the database
and once again pulled a list of randomly selected households.
Unfortunately this list was also exhausted in a few cases, either because households had
since returned to Nahr el–Bared camp or some households had returned but remained on
the displaced list in order to receive rent subsidies. Similarly, some households registered
themselves as living in two separate dwellings so that they could receive two rent subsidies,
but are in actual fact living in one dwelling.
2.2.3 Using tablets for data collection
The main advantage of using tablet PCs was the fact that data was entered once only, as
opposed to the case of using paper and pencil interviewing (PAPI), where responses are
first recorded on paper and then entered in digital format into a computer. In the case
of PAPI, entering the data twice increases the likelihood of data entry error, especially
when written responses can be illegible or misinterpreted – even more so if the data is not
entered by the same person who wrote the responses, as is usually the case. Using tablet
PCs also sped up the data collection process by skipping the data entry stage, which in
the case of a 600 household survey was estimated to have taken up to two weeks.
Another benefit of data entered immediately onto the tablet was that we were only a
simple step away from observing the data. At the end of a day of interviewing, the data
was transferred from the tablet PCs to my laptop and then compiled into an Excel sheet.
Once I had the Excel file, I looked for outliers among the variables. I also looked out for any
logical inconsistencies, such as those concerning education levels and age, or employment
status and age. At the end of each day I prepared a report of these inconsistencies and
met with the teams early the next morning before setting out for the next day of data
collection.
The questionnaire used for this household survey was quite complicated as the sequence
and inclusion of questions depended on the response to a previous question. Fortunately,
the skip code could be automatically programmed into the questionnaire. Data collectors
saved time as they did not have to carefully think about which question to ask next. In
addition, mistakes where data collectors miss a question or ask the wrong question were
avoided.
A justifiable concern prior to fieldwork was that respondents, or potential respondents,
might be intimidated by the electronic devices. While several respondents initially asked
if they were being recorded, data collectors did not feel that respondents were intimidated.
Interestingly, respondents were quite curious to know more about the devices and how they
would be used in the interview. This curiosity served as an icebreaker in many interviews,
and in others a starting point to explain the research project.
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Being heavily involved with validating the household selection process, as well as the
data collected, guaranteed that the quality of the data high. The use of tablet PCs
enabled us to verify and correct data the day after an interview was conducted, while the
interview was still fresh in the minds of the data collectors. The intensive data validation
and quality assurance allowed for a simple procedure of cleaning and structuring the data
for the analysis.
2.3 Conclusion
Being part of the two data collection efforts for this thesis allowed me to make the con-
nection between the sometimes abstract world of academic research and the communities,
households and individuals under study. Researchers struggle with being outsiders of one
form or another because they might belong to a different country, language or class. Ini-
tially, I was worried about being able to connect across the differences that separated me
from my research communities.
The data collection in Maharashtra was a great training experience. I learnt how to
programme the questionnaire for use on a tablet PC, how to manage a team of data
collectors, how to efficiently organise and manage data and most importantly how to react
to little crises that crop up on a daily basis.
However, when starting the household survey in Lebanon, I was eager to not repeat
one experience from Maharashtra. I did not want to be the ‘white foreigner’. I have
grown up in Lebanon, with a Palestinian father and English mother. My Arabic accent
is tinged with a hint of foreignness, as is my appearance. I hold a Lebanese identity card,
which I used to enter and exit the refugee camps, a privilege denied to Palestinians living
in Lebanese refugee camps in Lebanon but given to some for various political reasons.
I contemplated dying my hair or covering up in a Hijab, but I was pleasantly surprised
by the welcoming attitude of those living in the communities that we visited. I was not
necessarily ‘one of them’, but I was treated with respect in addition to curiosity. In fact,
some of the fieldwork team and respondents went out of their way to remind me of my
Palestinian roots.
The team of data collectors were kind and eager to let me into their world, as well
as learn more about mine. One of them was engaged to a Lebanese man and would be
applying for Lebanese citizenship, something she wanted to learn more about. The field
supervisor was completing his Masters in Sociology and wanted to learn more about my
readings on social capital and Pierre Bourdieu. Someone else was applying for a visa to
visit her sister and family in Germany and wanted to learn more about the way of life in
Europe. Despite the barriers of class, religion and nationality, we found common ground.
Most of those living in the communities that we visited were also eager to cooperate
with us. Some were interested to learn more about the tablets that our team members had
and who we were. One lady said that she had just refused to be interviewed by UNRWA,
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but would love to answer my questionnaire because I was a Palestinian and a student.
I was invited into the homes of many to drink tea and coffee, smoke cigarettes and eat
meals while other household members were being interviewed in another room.
This is not to say that all feedback was positive. A few potential respondents did not
see a need for such a survey and viewed it as a waste of time. Similarly in Maharashtra,
we were chased out of a field site by a woman who remembered the survey team from
the first wave. “Nothing has changed since the last time you were here,” she shouted at
us, “so don’t waste our time.” The burden on respondents is great and too often this is
forgotten.
Researchers in the field of economics or those engaging with quantitative research often
miss the chance to experience the connection between their research and the lives of people
who make up the subjects of their research. While the great burden placed on respondents
is often forgotten in the academic literature, my experiences indicate that taking the time
to interact with the real people involved on the ground can enrich the experience for both
respondents and researchers. In my case, I was able to learn how to navigate relationships
in Maharashtra from the perspective of a white foreigner who could never be an insider, and
in Lebanon, I was able to move between insider and outsider because of the different facets
of my identity as Palestinian, Lebanese, British, Christian, Arabic speaker, and English
speaker. It was my sense that these connections enriched the experience of participating
in research for the teams and respondents, but it also affirmed my sense of self, helping me
integrate the sometimes conflicting parts of my identity and helping me become attuned
to the impact and workings of research in complex contexts.
In the following appendix I have included some photographs from my fieldwork in
Maharashtra and Lebanon.
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Appendix: Figures and photographs from the field
Figure 2.1: Hand drawn map of sample neighbourhood in Jalgaon–Jamod, Buldhana
district
Figure 2.2: Dhule, Maharashtra
(a) Entrance to a field work site
(b) Exploring the boundaries of a field
site with the field team
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Figure 2.3: Field supervisor asking current residents information about the previous resi-
dents
(a) Navigating the complex streets of Beddawi
camp
(b) Reconstruction in section A of Nahr
el–Bared
Figure 2.5: Graffiti in Nahr el–Bared camp which translates as, “Smile, we have returned
to you Nahr el–Bared.”
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Appendix: Tables
Table 2.1: Population and sample size by strata
Area # households # households # households
in population in sample interviewed
NBC old camp 332 33 33
NBC new camp 3734 365 365
NBC surrounding areas 140 14 7
Beddawi camp 886 84 84
Beddawi surrounding area 739 72 72
Tripoli city & surrounding area 77 9 8
Beirut 104 10 10
Saida 84 8 6
Sour 40 4 4
Beqa’a 9 1 1
Total 6145 600 590
Table 2.2: Sampling strategy at strata
Area Selected randomly Traced from
at site database
NBC camp Yes No
NBC surrounding areas No Yes
Beddawi camp Yes No
Beddawi surrounding area Yes No
Tripoli city & surrounding area No Yes
Beirut No Yes
Saida No Yes
Sour No Yes
Beqa’a No Yes
Chapter 3
Riots and social capital in urban
Maharashtra
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Abstract
This chapter explores the relationship between exposure to riots and social capital
in urban Maharashtra. We exploit a panel dataset collected by the authors and apply a
random effects model with lagged covariates to estimate an exogenous relationship be-
tween neighbourhood exposure to riots and four forms of social capital: membership
in a group or organisation, trust in neighbours, participation in community discus-
sions and participation in community festival preparations. Consistent with Bellows
and Miguel’s study of conflict and social capital (2009), we find that households living
in neighbourhoods that experienced a riot are more likely to be members of groups
and organisations. On the other hand, we find that these households are less likely to
join community discussions, which lends more to the hypothesis of fragmented post–
conflict societies with a damaged social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). We explore
various mechanisms behind these results and find that the increased membership in
organisations is greatest in diverse neighbourhoods that have not experienced recent
changes in composition. However, riots reduce trust and the likelihood of participation
in fragmented and polarised riot–affected neighbourhoods. Riots also decrease par-
ticipation in festival preparations in neighbourhoods where out–migration has been
low. Our analysis suggests that individuals and households instrumentally use social
capital to their advantage, a type of insurance to protect against potential communal
violence in the future. However, riots can have adverse affects on different forms of
social capital that go beyond the surface level of social networking to feelings of trust
and sense of community.
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3.1 Introduction
Social capital, including social cooperation and social trust, is central to how societies and
economies develop (Akerlof, 1976; Coleman, 1990; Durlauf, 2006; Easterly et al., 2006;
North, 1990; Gardner et al., 1990; Putnam et al., 1994b; Woolcock, 1998). Strong social ties
allow us to achieve goals that involve the cooperation and inputs of more than one player,
leading to more effective outputs such as public goods, institutions, and community–level
investments (Habyarimana, 2009), all of which are essential for economic development.
Social capital is also used as an important coping strategy when households are faced with
a myriad of shocks (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Other studies have empirically shown the
advantage of a more cooperative society: public institutions and public policies are more
productive (Putnam et al., 1994b), growth rates increase (Fukuyama, 1996; Knack and
Keefer, 1997), human productivity is greater (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2002), high school
drop outs decrease (Coleman, 1988), and financial investments and networks increase
(Harker et al., 1990). There are other benefits to cooperation and strong community ties,
some less measurable, like personal satisfaction gained when greeting your neighbour as
you leave your building, benefits that Sobel (2002) describes as valuable “intrinsically”.
While much has been written about the importance and formation of social coopera-
tion and social trust, there is limited knowledge about the dynamics of these important
social phenomena in areas affected by social instability. This is despite the fact that in the
context of conflict and violence, a strong social fabric is crucial. For instance, Varshney
(2001) argues that in multi–ethnic societies, if civic engagement across two different com-
munities/ethnic groups is not present or weak, conflict and communal violence will flare
up. These factors are likely to be particularly important in cases of informal settlements
in large cities made up of diverse social groups, where population movements are constant
and violence affects much of the lives of their inhabitants.
This chapter brings a major contribution to this literature, which has thus far ignored
the subtle intricacies and complexities involved in the formation of social capital, particu-
larly in fragile and conflict affected settings. This research also contributes a rich dataset
collected in urban Maharashtra within riot and non–riot affected neighbourhoods. The
detailed information on the household’s experience of a riot as well as their social capital
allows us to uncover a nuanced finding: The effect of a riot on social capital is dependent
on the social make-up of the community, as well as the stability of the community in terms
of out–migration. Experiencing a riot can bring people together, but this turns out to be
more instrumental than other facets of social capital that have been damaged by riots
and communal violence. By correcting for reverse causality and confounding factors, this
chapter also presents a vast improvement from the social capital and conflict literature,
which struggles to address these biasing factors.
Today, more than half of the world’s population live in urban areas. Two–thirds are
predicted to do so by 2050 (UN, 2015). Cities are the centre of rapid economic and
social progress in much of the world. Urbanisation is often associated with improved
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access to jobs, goods and services (Becker et al., 1992; Huriot and Thisse, 2000; Glaeser
et al., 1995). But not everyone benefits from this process of urbanisation (Benabou,
1993). Over 850 million people across the world live in informal urban settlements (slums)
(UN–Habitat, 2015), characterised by overcrowded conditions, economic vulnerability, and
limited access to services, water, sanitation and legal protection (UN–Habitat, 2003). This
number is estimated to rise to 2 billion by 2030 (UN–Habitat, 2003). These are also areas
often characterised by high levels of crime and violence. For instance, in India, urban
areas accounted for an overwhelming 96.4% of deaths as a result of communal violence
between 1950 and 1995 (Varshney, 2001), leading scholars to label rioting in India an
‘urban phenomenon’ (Varshney, 2004).
The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the effect of exposure to violence on
social capital among slum communities in Maharashtra. We are particularly interested in
how two key features of urban slums —social diversity and out migration —may shape the
relationship between violence exposure and social capital. We exploit a panel dataset col-
lected by the authors and apply a random effects model with lagged covariates to estimate
an exogenous relationship between neighbourhood exposure to riots and social capital. We
measure social capital in terms of participation in civic groups and organisations (such
as women’s groups, cooperatives, neighbourhood groups . . . ), participation in community
discussions, participation in community festival preparations, and trust of neighbours.
The main results show that riots exert different impacts on different indicators of social
capital. Households that experience a riot are more likely to join an organisation, but the
likelihood of their participating in community discussions is decreased. Households that
experience a riot are not more or less likely to trust their neighbours or participate in joint
festival preparations.
We inquire further by investigating how the social make-up of the neighbourhood plays
a role in either worsening or improving the effect of rioting on social capital. In neighbour-
hoods with low polarisation riots decrease membership in organisations, but the opposite
effect is observed in highly polarised neighbourhoods. There is an increase in trust when
a neighbourhood with low fragmentation is exposed to a riot, but a decrease in trust as
fragmentation increases. Riots decrease the likelihood of being part of community dis-
cussions in highly fractionalised and polarised societies. The negative effect of riots on
festival preparation is greatest in non-polarised neighbourhoods, but the negative effect is
still significantly present when polarisation is high.
We postulate that the household’s standing in their community, i.e. whether they
belong to the minority or majority religious/caste group, affects how riots impact their
social capital. We find that households in the minority group are less likely to trust their
neighbours if there is a riot in their neighbourhood, but no other significant effect of riots
on social capital is observed.
We also explore the importance of religious/caste group identity through the use of
vignettes. Respondents are asked if they would loan money to a member of their commu-
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nity, and the name of this individual is given to represent one of three main religious/caste
groups. This allocation of the name is randomised across respondents. We find that if the
respondent matches the identity of the character in the vignette, they are more likely to
loan money to them, but this result vanishes when we look at individuals exposed to a
riot.
Finally, we find that the effect of riots on social capital are greatest in stable neigh-
bourhoods, i.e. when levels of out–migration are low. Riots still increase membership in
organisations, but by an even larger amount when out–migration is low. We also see the
riots decrease trust in neighbours and participation in discussions and festival preparation
in these neighbourhoods of low–level migration. In fact, when out–migration is high, riots
have a positive effect on trust towards neighbours and significant effect on participation
in discussions and festival preparation. This can be explained by new members arriving
to the neighbourhood and investing in social capital. They are unlikely to be affected by
riots that have impacted the rest of the community. In addition, those who were most im-
pacted by riots could be those who have since migrated, a form of disinvestment in social
capital. These two factors will cause the impact of riots on social capital to diminish in
neighbourhoods of high out–migration, as our results show.
These findings suggest that households behave instrumentally and deliberately when
it comes to investments in social capital, and this decision is a function of the household’s
relation to its community as well as threats to the stability of the neighbourhood. House-
holds also seem to invest in different forms of social capital for different reasons. For
example, experiencing a riot might make households try to build new networks through
membership in organisations, hoping that these networks will protect them in times of fu-
ture instability. On the other hand, households from riot affected neighbourhoods spend
less time participating in community discussions because of deteriorating payback from
discussions with fragmented and divisive groups of the community.
This chapter entails important contributions to at least three bodies of literature. The
first is an emerging body of literature on the effect of armed conflict on social capital
including participation in local civic organisations (Bellows and Miguel, 2009), voting
(Blattman, 2009), reciprocity (Michal et al., 2011; Gilligan et al., 2014) and trust (Voors
et al., 2012). The chapter extends this literature to analyse the role of low–intensity
violence (in the form of riots) on social capital. The second contribution is to the literature
on the provision of public goods in ethnically diverse societies. Several studies have shown
that collective action that sustains the provision of public goods is more challenging in
heterogeneous societies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Vigdor, 2004; Alesina et al., 1999;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007). We
show that social polarisation and fragmentation also affect the relationship between riots
and social capital in informal settlements. Largely, riots reduce social capital in diverse
neighbourhoods. The chapter also makes an important contribution to the literature on
the formation of social capital (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bowles and Gintis, 2011;
Gambetta, 1988; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002), by showing how
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social capital in urban areas depends on the context under which different populations
live. Notably, social capital is shaped by the exposure of households to violence in their
communities and to community levels of polarisation, fractionalisation and out–migration.
3.2 Conceptual Discussion
There is an implicit assumption in the literature that dimensions of social capital, such as
social cooperation and social trust, are destroyed in areas affected by violence. However,
recent research in conflict–affected areas has found that the relationship between instability
and social cooperation and trust may be more complex than is often assumed. Notably,
recent empirical studies have revealed that exposure to violence may in fact result in
stronger forms of social engagement and cooperation (Michal et al., 2011; Bellows and
Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Gilligan et al., 2014; Wood, 2003; Voors et al., 2012),
particularly among those from the same community, if not necessarily between different
communities (Michal et al., 2011; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). But while there is a substantial
literature on the formation of social cooperation and trust in peaceful and stable settings
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Gambetta, 1988; Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002), we have limited systematic understanding of how
the various dimensions of social capital may change in more unstable slum areas, where
violence can be part of daily life and populations move rapidly, constantly changing the
social and demographic composition of neighbourhoods and communities.
The effects of exposure to urban violence on social capital is a–priori ambiguous. On
the one hand, it is possible that urban violence destroys forms of social cooperation and
social trust. This is particularly true when violence involves different social groups (for
instance, Muslims and Hindus in the case of India) who live in the same communities.
But it is also possible that exposure to urban violence may increase social capital, as
reported in the recent literature on civil wars. This could be because individuals are drawn
to each other in the face of adversity or because individuals instrumentally engage in social
capital as protection in case of future conflict.
The net effect of violence on social capital may depend on a number of mechanisms that
shape the relationship between the two variables. The first mechanism is social diversity.
Urban slums are areas of large social diversity where people of different classes, castes,
cultural, ethnic and religious groups live in close proximity. Some levels of heterogeneity
between groups may facilitate collective action and social capital, particularly when elites
benefit from the collective good (Olson, 1995). But in general, high levels of heterogeneity
within groups tend to reduce group cooperation at the local level (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Bardhan, 2005). However, internally homogeneous groups
may also be characterised by forms of ‘parochialism’ (Bowles and Gintis, 2011, 2004)
when inequalities between groups are significant, and lead to suspicion and discrimination
against ‘other’ groups. In these cases, social capital may be high within these groups —
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what is referred to as ‘bonding social capital’, but low between different groups — what
is referred to as ‘bridging social capital’ (Putnam, 2000). Bonding social capital brings
people together and encourages certain norms and strengthens identity, whereas bridging
social capital can blur social divisions, as well as allow for better linkage to external assets
and diffusion of information. Having strong bridging social capital is an important peace–
building mechanism and is crucial in post–conflict and multi–ethnic societies (Varshney,
2001). Anti–migrant attitudes and violence against non-native groups are examples of this
phenomenon of high bonding social capital and low bridging social capital — what was
described elsewhere as the ‘dark side of social capital’ (see (Schelling, 1969; Hoff and Sen,
2006)). Phenomena such as this result in reductions in inter–group cooperation as different
social groups drift apart (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Hoffman et al., 1996; Kranton, 1996).
The second mechanism is the large variation in population movements. In general,
social capital formation is studied in areas that are fairly stable. Popular perceptions
indicate that slum areas are highly unstable because of demolition threats and ambitions
beyond informal settlements in slums. However, it is worth noting that despite perceptions
that slums are temporary arrangements, this has rarely been the case in most developing
countries where slum population growth has risen constantly over decades and millions of
households live in urban slum for generations (Marx et al., 2013). Nevertheless, there is
a wide variation in levels of out–migration across neighbourhoods in our sample, ranging
from no households migrating to 26% of households migrating between 2010 and 2012.
If riots destroy social capital, then migrating (and investing in social capital elsewhere)
may be less costly than staying. The newcomers who replace those who left will likely
be closer in characteristics to existing neighbours, and will probably be willing to invest
in social capital as soon as they join the neighbourhood. If this is true, then we will see
a smaller effect (or no effect) of riots in neighbourhoods where out–migration is high, as
most of this effect is embedded in households who have since left.
If riots undermine the returns to social capital, but not so much that it offsets the costs
of out–migration, then households will choose to stay in their neighbourhood but invest
less in social capital. In this case we will find a negative relationship between riots and
social capital when out–migration is low.
The subsequent sections provide an empirical analysis of the effects of violence exposure
on social capital in urban areas of Maharashtra and investigate how social diversity and
migration movements affect that relationship.
3.3 Context
Riots have been endemic to urban areas in India (Varshney, 2001; Wilkinson, 2005, 2004;
Brass, 1997), the reason for the urban focus of this study. The urban population in India
is now growing faster than the rural population, and more than 31.16% of the population
live in cities and urban areas (UN-Habitat’s Global Urban Observatory, 2016). Extreme
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poverty and lack of economic opportunity have forced Indians out of rural areas and into
the city, in search of a more prosperous and fruitful life. However, what awaits is unplanned
infrastructure, economic markets that are fully saturated with low skilled workers, and an
unequal divide between the wealthy and poor slum dwellers (Mazumdar, 1987; Deaton
and Dreze, 2002).
Of the urban inhabitants in India, almost 110 million people live in slum areas. In
most cases slum settlements are illegal, and inhabitants face threats of eviction and unan-
nounced demolitions by the government (Ramanathan, 2006). The state of Maharashtra
hosts the largest registered slum population in India — upwards of 11 million people
(Census Organization of India, 2011), mostly within the state capital of Greater Mumbai.
In Maharashtra, riots bring back memories of the extensive violence that took place
between 1992 and 1993, following the demolition of Babri mosque in Uttar Pradesh. 900
people lost their lives, thousands were injured, and thousands more fled from the violence
and looting in the streets (Srikrishna, 1998). Today, riots are still prevalent in urban
Maharashtra. Figure 3.1 displays the number of riot events together with the number of
deaths, injured and arrests between 1950 and 1995. One can see two major peaks of riot
activity in 1970 and 1984, whereas the most deadly years were 1970 and 1992/93. Apart
from these particularly violent years, it is also clear that riots break out nearly every year,
revealing the endemic nature of civil violence in Maharashtra.
To paint a picture of what riots in urban Maharashtra look like, this section descrip-
tively analyses data from a dataset prepared by the authors which scanned local newspa-
pers for riot events.
As part of the preliminary investigation into riots in Maharashtra, a Marathi speaking
research assistant was hired to scour the Maharashtra edition of the Times of India in
addition to a leading Marathi news site, the Loksatta. The research assistant searched
for the use of keywords such as riot, violence, Bandh3 and Raasta roko4. The research
assistant then entered the information of any events that were considered to be riots, and
included a brief description of the event (translated from Marathi to English), as well as
pulled out some further variables, such as number of civilians injured, duration of the
riot, location of the riot. After reviewing this dataset, we ruled out any events that were
clearly personal disputes that did not involve the larger community, and classified the
events further to include the modality of violence, whether a curfew was enlisted, and
whether there was religious or communal element to the riot, amongst other variables. In
total, according to this dataset, 225 riots took place from the 1st of January 2008 to the
1st of January 2012. Figure 3.2 displays the number of riots that took place each month.
There is a high frequency of rioting in late 2009, and this continues into the following
year. On average, four riots take place per month, but some months go by (particularly
in 2008) where no riots take place. This clustering is likely to coincide with local religious
3A Bandh refers to a type of general strike commonly used for protest purposes in India. A Bandh can
bring the economy to a standstill, and is a much feared protest tool.
4Usually coinciding with a Bandh, a Raasta roko is a commonly used tactic of blocking main roads
through large crowds, sit-ins or tire burning.
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events and festivities, making some times more sensitive than others.
Table 3.1 provides some summary statistics of the variables describing these riots. On
average, riots tend to last a little over a day, but there is one case of a riot lasting for
twelve days. In 42% of cases, a civilian has been injured during the riots, and 17.3% of
the time a policeman was injured. In 7.6% of cases at least one civilian has been killed,
but a policeman has never been killed in any of the riots in Maharashtra between 2008
and 2011. In a quarter of cases an arrest has been made or someone has been charged,
and the number of these arrests and charges varies wildly depending on the riot. In one
particularly large riot, a thousand civilians were arrested. This event was initiated from
a protest called by the Shiv Sena,5 which turned violent once protesters started to throw
stones. Policemen were attacked and they were forced to disperse the crowd and make
arrests.
In fact, in almost a quarter of riot cases the police have been forced to engage in
violence in order to control crowds and violent rioting. This behaviour includes the use of
tear gas, firing guns into the air and beating with sticks or lathis. In many of these cases
the police behaviour has further enraged the crowds, and has often initiated a fresh riot in
a neighbouring town or in the aftermath when civilians realised that the policemen would
not be reprimanded. In extreme cases, the police also enforce a curfew, not allowing any
civilians outside their homes until tensions calm. This has happened during 9% of riots
reported in the dataset.
For more than half of the riots there was a clear communal element to the event, as
a result of a struggle or conflict between religions, identities or communities. In some
cases the cause is quite clear, but in others there are more subtle communal undertones
to the riot. For example, in February 2009, a riot took place outside of a movie theatre in
Mumbai that was screening Bollywood film star Shah Rukh Khan’s latest release, Billu.
The film included a song that contained lyrics deemed to be offensive to Muslims.6 Shah
Rukh Khan’s house was also attacked by a mob who pelted it with bottles of lit kerosene.
Both the house and theatre were damaged non–negligibly. In Miraj, September 2009, a
welcome sign to the city was put up that showed the defeat of Afzal Khan at the hands
of Shivaji Maharaj. Afzal Khan was a medieval Indian commander who served the Adil
Shahi dynasty of Bijapur, and Shivaji Maharaj a Hindu King warrior who carved out
the Maratha empire. While it is true that Shivaji Maharaj killed Afzal Khan, this is a
contentious event for Hindus and Muslims in Maharashtra. Members of the Shiv Sena
clashed with Muslim groups in the city’s market place, and the police arrived to the scene
to administer tear gas and attempt to control the mob. The clashes further escalated
when a Hindu religious idol was defaced. The police arrested several of the instigators and
declared a city wide curfew that lasted for 13 days. Tensions remained high even after the
curfew was lifted.
5The Shiv Sena is a powerful far-right Maharashtrian political party, with a pro-Marathi and Hindu
nationalist ideology.
6This turned out to be a mistake, and the phrase in question was actually misheard.
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In table 3.1 we see that 20% of riots were initiated from a personal dispute, which
can also in some cases transform into a communal riot. 16.4% of riots followed on from
a non-violent protest that took a nasty turn. In 5.8% of cases this protest took the
form of a Raasta roko where major roads are blocked in order to bring the economy to a
standstill. In a few cases (2.7%) a riot was sparked based on a false rumour. For example,
a riot started in Varangav in February 2009 because a rumour spread that the police had
damaged a religious statue while transporting it to a different location. In 3.1% of cases a
riot took place in slum areas because of a government attempted demolition. 8.9% of riots
were related to a local election. In a quarter of riot events, there was either intentional or
unintentional damage to public or private property. Often rioters would throw stones at
public buses, as this is seen to be a symbol of the state. Othertimes rioters will vandalise
or set fire to private property, as was the case of Shah Rukh Khan’s house.
As mentioned a few times before, stone throwing is the most common modality of
violence during a riot and has been a main feature of the riot in more than 50% of cases.
Stones are either thrown at physical buildings or vehicles, or at other groups, in the case
of the latter causing severe injuries. Closely following stone throwing is a physical fight,
which can include stone throwing between two groups or even the use of swords, sticks
and/or guns. Physical attacks, beatings and scuﬄes have been singled out separately
and occur in less than 10% of cases. While attacks and beatings are mainly one sided
(compared to a fight), a scuﬄe usually occurs unintentionally when large groups gather
and tensions are high. Arson, vandalism and looting occur during some riots, but this is
only in 8% of cases for arson and vandalism and only 1% of cases for looting. Tire burning
has been used to block roads in a very small number of cases.
It is worth noting that the details presented here have been teased out of the newspaper
reporting, and if certain aspects of the riot were left out of the report then they will not be
classified into any of these variables. Perhaps more worryingly is if smaller riots, or riots
in isolated areas, are not reported in newspapers. This could mean that the newspaper
dataset provides a somewhat biased representation of riots in the Maharashtra. For this
reason, and because we will not be able to match the existence of a riot in a large city to
the household’s exposure to a riot, we have not relied on this data for the main household
level analysis. However, this data has been useful to paint a rough idea of what riots
look like in urban Maharashtra, and have also played an important role in the sampling
strategy for the household survey.
3.4 Data
We argue that exposure to violence can have ambiguous effects on social capital depending
on the type and extent of social diversity within neighbourhoods and the costs of out–
migration. In order to study these complex relationships, we make use of a unique panel
dataset collected by the authors of 1,089 households interviewed twice in 20107 and 2012
7See (Gupte et al., 2014) for an analysis of victims of violence using the 2010 data of this panel.
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in 45 urban sites of Maharashtra.
3.4.1 Data collection
Empirically analysing the consequences of civil violence (including on social capital) is
challenging and depends on a robust sampling framework that can simultaneously be lo-
cally representative as well as allow for enough variation in the sample to draw comparative
inferences. Pure random sampling in violence–prone contexts is difficult because violent
events tend to be highly clustered geographically and amongst certain types of individuals.
Some of the most relevant insights into why individuals and groups engage in violence and
on the processes that lead to the onset of violence have been gained from localised quali-
tative research undertaken by sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists (e.g. Moser
and McIlwaine (2000)). In order to capture both localised experience and representative-
ness, we developed a five–stage sampling framework, which employs clustering (at the
district level) at stages one and two, pre–selection (at the site level) at stage three, and
randomisation (at the neighbourhood and household level) at stages four and five.
At stage one, district–level data from the Maharashtra Police on jatiya dangali (com-
munal riots) from 2003 to 2008 captured ‘significant’ riots reported at the police station
level for which a First Information Report (FIR) was filed with a magistrate. This data
was discounted progressively by an order of 1/6th, so that 6 riots in 2003 equated to 1
riot in 2008. The average of the discounted data was then ordered and divided into three
categories:8 high (5 or more riots per district per year), medium (more than 1.5 and less
than 5 riots per district per year) and low (less than 1.5 riots per district per year). While
this ordering does not capture the intensity of each riot episode (the extent of fatalities,
injuries, damages or arrests), it was nevertheless understood as a good indicator of the
endemic nature of civil violence, which not only picked up districts with routinely high
levels of rioting (like Buldhana), but also districts which had a few particularly violent
years (like Dhule).
At stage two, the geographic spread is accounted for by representing all administrative
regions and socio–cultural divisions in the sample, as well as giving each riot category an
equal weight. This resulted in 10 districts, three in each of the high and low riot categories,
and four in the medium category. Gadchiroli (in Nagpur Division in the Vidarbha Region)
was removed from the sampling for logistical and security reasons.
At the third stage of sampling, specific information was collected on instances of civil
violence in the 24 months prior to fieldwork (2008–2010), in each of the nine selected
districts. This was done through a scan of print and online media, as well as key informant
interviews, which included sites where particular bouts of civil violence (rioting, stone
throwing, police firing/violence, large scale arson, among other modalities) had taken
place. The particular search strings, including ‘riots’, ‘public fight’, ‘violence’, ‘police
8These categories are based on the 70th and 90th percentile cut–offs of the distribution of average
number of riots discounted over the last 6 years.
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action’, ‘stone–pelting’, ‘clash’ in printed newspapers, was carried out at the Centre for
Documentation, Mumbai. Based on the riot event data between 2008 and 2012, 22 sites
of interest were selected, where rioting seemed to be re-occurring
Until this point, the sampling had been purposive — it included (1) selected categorised
districts according to the level of civil violence, (2) selected districts which gave us a full
sociocultural and geographic coverage of Maharashtra, and (3) within sampled districts,
purposively selected twenty–two sites of interest.
As a fourth stage of sampling, the sites of interest were matched to maps of assembly
constituencies, acquired from the Election Commission of India, to pick out the corre-
sponding voting–booth zones covering our sites of interest. Prior to fieldwork the last
electoral lists were updated for the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections in 2008–
2009. The electorate in each district is divided into several Assembly Constituencies,
which in turn are split into voting booth zones. Each voting booth zone covers roughly
200 households, although can be much higher in dense conurbations, like Mumbai, where
the number of households is closer to 500+ per voting booth. On average a voting booth
equates to approximately 1,000 individuals of voting age, and in spatial terms equated
to an area in which the research team could walk the perimeter in approximately twenty
minutes. A voting booth zone contains two or three main streets, a handful of secondary
streets or galis and might contain one or two public institutions such as mosques, temples,
or gymnasiums. The number of voting booth zones in our sites of interest varied between
50+ (for large sites) and one or two (for very specific sites). As a rule of thumb, where
more than 10 voting booths corresponded to one site, two voting booths were randomly se-
lected, in all other cases, one was randomly selected. This resulted in five neighbourhoods
per district and forty–five neighbourhoods in our total sample.
The fifth stage of sampling consisted of pre–visits to each of the forty–five selected
neighbourhoods by the supervisors of our research teams. In these pre–visits the supervi-
sors mapped all major and minor streets, including any major landmarks, buildings, insti-
tutions, as well as geographic features like water bodies. These maps were then digitised
and their information merged to the household dataset, allowing us to use neighbourhood
level variables in the analysis. Depending on the size of the neighbourhood, between
5 and 12 ‘starting points’ were set along the extreme periphery of the neighbourhood.
The field team then began household interviews simultaneously from all starting points,
working their way inwards. Households were selected through a skip pattern, which for
larger neighbourhoods was 7 or 8 households, while for smaller neighbourhoods was 4 or
5 households in order to ensure a sample of 24 or 25 households per neighbourhood. This
roughly equated to sampling 10 per cent of all households in each neighbourhood. The skip
pattern followed strict guidelines: (1) actual households, as opposed to built–structures,
were counted in the skipping patterns. This involved finding out whether some households
were co–habiting, renting, living above or below another household, in which case the two
households were counted separately. (2) Take every right turn, no matter how small. The
teams used the right–hand–thumb rule for this, and were instructed to specifically take
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the smallest of turns, even if this involved going into seemingly inaccessible spaces, like
across gutters and into tight corners, to ensure that the skip pattern did not miss out any
households. (3) The skip pattern was followed in such a way that each surveyor would not
cross any major streets but go along them; and (4) If a dead–end was encountered, work
back along the opposite side of the completed road.
Through this multi–staged sampling framework, we achieved a final sample of 1,089
households, spread across forty–five neighbourhoods, in nine districts. The second round
of data consisted of follow up interviews with the same households two years after the
initial round of data collection (in 2012). The detailed maps that were gathered in 2010
were a useful tool to track households, but as is the case in urban areas, attrition does
take place. In fact, in one slum area in Mumbai, most of the sample households had
moved because of a fire that had destroyed the neighbourhood a few months prior to data
collection. In total, 874 out of the 1,089 households were traced, 80.4% of the original
sample.
This high attrition rate might be worrying in terms of selection bias, if those who
dropped out of the sample are significantly different to those who have remained. To
test this bias, table 3.3 compares the 2010 socio–economic indicators of those who were
located in 2012 and those who were not re–surveyed. In addition, we also compare the main
variables that are used in the analysis: measures of social capital, social diversity, riots and
out–migration. The measurement of these variables, and the socio–economic indicators,
are explained in the next section. Table 3.3 shows that households who dropped out of the
sample are less likely to have reported a riot and lived in neighbourhoods that were less
likely to have one–third of households reporting a riot. We also observe that households
from less fractionalised and polarised neighbourhoods are more likely to drop out of the
panel.
In the subsequent analysis we control for all of these variables that are significantly
different for households who are tracked and non–tracked. In addition, we have corrected
for potential selection bias using a Heckman two stage regression, and found no difference
in our results. The added Heckman selection term was also insignificant.
3.4.2 Variables
We test the effect of exposure to violence on the likelihood to display social capital. This
section describes how we measure social capital, riots and other control variables.
Social Capital
The definition of social capital has slowly mutated from its original meaning and “heuristic
value” to become a vague term that often encompasses so many concepts that its distinct
nature is no longer distinct (Portes, 1998). Despite this ambiguity, “the consensus is
growing in the literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits
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by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures (Portes, 1998).” As
different scientists have explored social capital they have added different concepts and
forms to the mix, from collective action to norms of trust and reciprocity. Dasgupta
and Serageldin (2002) and Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) have advocated the multi-
faceted nature of social capital, as the different dimensions of social capital can have
different effects on outcome variables, and it is important each of these dimensions are
explored independently. In this chapter we have chosen four variables from the dataset that
represent three different dimensions of social capital: civic association — (i) membership
in a group or organisation; trust — (ii) trust towards neighbours; collective action — (iii)
participating in community discussion and (iv) participating in joint festival preparations.
Participation in community discussions and festival preparation allow three options, but
we have transformed these variables into a binary variables. This is because most responses
were either “sometimes” or “all the time”, and few respondents wanted to limit themselves
to the “No” response.
Tables 3.5 provides summary statistics of the four social capital variables. 15.9% of
respondents reported that they or a member of their household belong to a group or
organisation. 17.1% of respondents reported that they would be willing to trust their
money or assets for safekeeping with their neighbours. 42% of households participate in
community discussions, and 69% participate in community festival preparations.
Table 3.5 separates these social capital variables between respondents who live in a
neighbourhood where a riot has occurred in the last two years, and those who do not (the
determination of the riot variable is explained in the next section). Respondents who have
at least one household member belonging to an organisation are more likely to be living in
riot prone neighbourhoods, and this difference is also statistically significant. This could be
because individuals feel that they need to become more involved in their community once
faced with a significant threat or problem like a riot. However, the remaining social capital
variables show an entirely different picture: trust towards neighbours, participating in
community discussions and participating in festival preparations are all significantly lower
in riot affected neighbourhoods. This indicates a break down of social capital, rather than
the increase in group membership that we saw earlier. It is not difficult to imagine that
trust is low in neighbourhoods hit by a riot, and one could speculate that this stems from
a decrease in trust in those from other groups. It is interesting to see that participating
in community discussions is lower in riot affected neighbourhoods, compared to belonging
in an organisation, and the next sections aim to understand this complex relationship.
Riots
In India, a riot is officially defined as an assembly of more than 5 people who use violent
means to achieve a common goal (Wilkinson, 2009). While this definition of a riot is quite
broad, there is severe under reporting of riots in India because policemen and politicians
prefer to convey a peaceful and well functioning society in which they are performing their
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best to maintain peace and order (Wilkinson, 2009). For this reason we have decided
against the use of police or official data to represent riots in our analysis.
Newspaper reported data has been used in the past as a more reliable source (compared
to government and official data) to measure the incidence of riots (see for example Bohstedt
(1988) who compiled riot data for the UK, and Varshney (2001) and Wilkinson (2004) for
a dataset on ethnic riots in India), but this data has its own shortcomings. Newspapers
usually cover riots in areas where they have reporter presence, missing out on more isolated
areas. Newspapers are also likely to have a political bias that leads them to report only
particular events, or report them in an instrumental manner. In addition, labelling a
certain event as a riot leaves much discretion to reporters and politicians, whereas those
involved might interpret the event quite differently (Brass, 1997). Riots are small-scale
violent events that occur in localised areas and are often not picked up by the media,
which is why we have not relied on this data for our analysis.
Instead, we make use of self–reported data, which captures riot data that is not picked
up by newspapers or police stations. The survey asks the respondent if “In the last 12
months, have any of the following events occurred in your neighbourhood?”, the events
include riots amongst other violent events such as stone pelting, public fights, bottle
throwing, and tire burning. In 2010, 23% of respondents reported a riot taking place in
their neighbourhood.
If the respondent has reported a riot taking place in their neighbourhood, the question-
naire then went on to ask what action the respondent took. The options to this question
were unprompted, but were then classified into the following categories: “I was involved”,
“I watched from far”, “Harboured others in my house”, “Called the police”, “Joined neigh-
bourhood efforts to stop the riot”, “Contributed money to relief efforts”, “Went home and
shut the door”, “Did nothing”, and “Did not actually see it”. In addition to asking about
the occurrence and action taken during a riot, we also asked respondents about other
events: stone pelting, public fights, tire burning, damaging of bus and/or public property,
police harassment, agitation related to a bandh, violence during curfew, and bottle throw-
ing. As explained earlier, these events are likely to occur at the same time as a riot, and
in fact most respondents who report these events occurring have also reported a riot in
their neighbourhood.
Table 3.7 tabulates the number and percentage of respondents reporting each of these
events, as well as the number of respondents who reported taking a specific action. We
also provide the percentage of respondents reporting a particular subsequent action, given
that they have reported an event in their neighbourhood. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most
common form of action reported is to stay at home and do nothing. This could be because
these violent events are perpetrated by the minority, while the majority keep themselves
safe at home. It could also be that those involved in these violent events are from different
neighbourhoods, which means that if an event occurs in one’s own neighbourhood then
respondents are not likely to be involved and will instead try to keep safe. Finally, it
is possible that respondents did not want to reveal their involvement in a riot, fearing
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repercussions.
A large percentage of respondents reporting an event taking place also say that they
did not actually see the event, a possible occurrence given that we asked if the respondents
know if a riot or other event took place in their neighbourhood, and not if they witnessed
one. In fact, in a separate section of the questionnaire we ask whether the household has
experienced a riot in the last two years, and 12.4% of household report this to be the
case. Of those who report experiencing a riot, a large majority (74%) suggest that the
household was in need of money due to damages or disruptions faced during the riot.
Self-reported data also entails specific challenges as such data can be under or over
reported by households and could be correlated with the household’s vulnerability and
wealth.
We address potential self–reporting biases in three ways. Firstly, we control for house-
hold income in case poorer households are those who are most likely to be affected by riots
or report them. Secondly, households were asked about a riot taking place in the neigh-
bourhood rather than the household’s experience of a riot. This alleviates under–reporting
if households are scared to admit their involvements in riots and alleviates over–reporting
if households are expecting compensation in return for their exposure to riots. The third
way that we correct for potential self–reporting bias addresses the fact that households
sometimes have conflicting views about this variable, because of varying definitions of a
riot or a neighbourhood amongst respondents. Alternatively, some riots might only affect
parts of the neighbourhood. So for each neighbourhood, we computed the proportion of
households who have reported a riot in their neighbourhood. By aggregating this variable
we are able to address some of these discrepancies and get a fuller picture that accounts
for all responses. It is also reassuring that the data on self-reported riots is correlated with
other events in the neighbourhood which may be considered to be modalities of violence
in the context of riots, including stone–pelting, public fights, damages of buses or public
property, burning of tires, throwing of bottles, police harassment, agitation related to a
strike (bandh) and violence during curfew (Gupte et al., 2014).
We then partitioned the sample into riot–affected and less affected sites based on
whether at least 30% of respondents in a given site report a riot in their neighbourhood.
This way, neighbourhoods where very few households have reported a riot are considered
an outlier. While this might miss out on important information, it means we are providing
a conservative measure of riot exposure, rather than an over–estimate. As a robustness
check we repeated the analysis using different cut–offs for the proportion of households
reporting a riot.
Nine neighbourhoods out of 45, or 20% of neighbourhoods, are considered riot–affected
by this measure. Table 3.9 summarises both households and neighbourhood level riot
data. 30% was chosen as a cut-off point because this was the average number of house-
holds reporting a riot in neighbourhoods where at least one hhd reported a riot. When
including neighbourhoods where no households reported a riot, the average is 23% of
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households reporting a riot in a given neighbourhood. Figure 3.3 plots the proportion for
each neighbourhood and includes the cut off line of 30%.
Other variables
We employ a range of respondent, household and neighbourhood level control variables
summarised in table 3.9. These variables have been found to be important predictors in
the social capital literature (Glaeser et al., 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).
In particular, social capital is found to rise then fall with age (Glaeser et al., 2002).
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that women are less likely to trust others because they
feel discriminated against. Age and sex of the respondent are accounted for in 2010 and
2012. Home owners are found to have higher levels of social capital because of their long–
term commitment to their community (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2002).
We include a binary variable equal to one if the household rents their house, a separate
variable equal to one if the dwelling is made of permanent materials (for example cement
rather than tarpaulin), and a variable measuring the number of months the household
has lived in their current house. These variables allow us to control for mobility in our
analysis.
Income has proved to be an important predictor of social capital (DiPasquale and
Glaeser, 1999). However, some studies have also shown how high social capital leads to
higher levels of income (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1997), proving
there to be a potentially endogenous relationship between these two variables. By using
lagged income levels and random effects to control for any omitted variable bias, we are
able to estimate a precise and unbiased effect of income on different forms of social capital.
We control for various identity indicators which could indicate a sense of belonging in
the neighbourhood, specifically whether the household is Muslim, whether the household
mother tongue is Marathi, and whether the household belongs to the largest caste or
religious group in the neighbourhood. In this context we would also expect household size
to play a significant role, because larger households have more opportunity to engage in
social capital. Respondents were also asked if there was an unsafe location within their
neighbourhood, and this was considered in our analysis to represent feelings of safety.
Finally, we also collected certain neighbourhood level indicators which could be indica-
tive of formal and informal institutions. These variables were collected from the field site
maps, in particular they are: presence of a police station, chowk,9, Hindu temple, Mosque,
and a market.
9A chowk is the area at an intersection of two roads, this area usually serves as a small open market.
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3.5 Identification strategy
This chapter analyses the effect of riots on social capital among households living in
urban slums in Maharashtra. There is potential endogeneity bias when considering this
relationship.
First, neighbourhood–level unobservables are likely to be important determinants of
violence, as well as key determinants of social capital. Certain institutions and cultural
characteristics of the neighbourhood could play a significant role in predicting both social
capital and exposure to riots, and unless accounted for, these factors could drive the ef-
fect of violence. In order to alleviate this problem we estimate a random effects model,
which controls for neighbourhood level unobserved heterogeneity. In addition to varying
neighbourhood level intercepts, we control for a range of neighbourhood level variables
as described earlier. The main variable of interest, whether at least 30% of neighbour-
hood report a riot, is also measured at the neighbourhood level. Another potentially
incriminating factor could be household–level unobservables, but we cannot conceive of
any household–level variables that determine neighbourhood level riots as well as social
capital.
Using random effects at the neighbourhood level will control for any unobserved neigh-
bourhood level homogeneity. Considering that the main variables of interest are at the
neighbourhood level, this will eliminate the interdependence of residuals between house-
holds caused by omitted variable bias.
However, random effect models rely on a very strong assumption: the random inter-
cepts must be independent of the covariates. If this assumption is wrong, the estimation
will yield biased results, so this has prompted most researchers to steer away from random
effects, relying on fixed effects instead (fixed effects would not be applicable in this context
because we are interested in estimating certain neighbourhood level effects, rather than
wiping them out). For example, we might suspect an interdependence between neighbour-
hood institutions (the random intercept) and household income (one of the covariates).
Fortunately, although not widely used, Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) have de-
veloped an invaluable tool in solving for the problem of unobservables by controlling for
within-neighbourhood means of the covariates. Consider the following equation:
P [Si,n = 1] = Φ[β1Xi + β2Rn + β3Mn + β4Dn + β5Zn + δn + i] (3.1)
where P [Si,n = 1] if household i in neighbourhood n displays a given social capital, and
P [Si,n = 0] otherwise. Φ is the probit function, or an inverse standard normal transfor-
mation of covariates. Xi denotes household level variables, Rn refers to neighbourhood
rioting, and Zn includes a set of neighbourhood characteristics. δn are the neighbour-
hood level random effects. The Mundlak-Chamberlain approach proposes decomposing
δn into a function of the within–neighbourhood means of the covariates Xi and random
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neighbourhood level intercepts, as shown in equation 3.2.
δn = µn + θX¯n (3.2)
Any dependence between the covariates and the neighbourhood intercepts is captured by
the set of within–neighbourhood means of the covariates Xi. For example, institutions
could be correlated with household income, but this is captured by the aggregate levels
of household income in the neighbourhood. By controlling for the neighbourhood level
means of Xi, the intercept µn is considered to be independent of Xi. This ensures that
the assumption required for a random effects estimation is satisfied.
The second potential source of endogeneity bias results from the fact that social capital
may be both a determinant and a consequence of violence. Neighbourhoods with dense
ties and high social capital could be targeted by rioters for political reasons. As discussed
in Varshney (2001), neighbourhoods with high levels of civic association are less likely to
be affected by riots. This potential reverse causality can yield a biased estimate of the
effect of violence on social capital. In order to deal with this potential bias, we include in
the regression the lag of all covariates by one time period. This ensures that the riots in
2010 (t− 1) occur before the social capital observed in 2012 (t).
The combination of lagged covariates, random effects, and neighbourhood level effects
provides us with reasonable confidence that our estimates are the result of an exogenous
relationship between violence and social capital. By applying these two strategies, we
estimate the following equation:
P [Si,n,t = 1] = Φ[β1Xi,(t−1) + β2Rn,(t−1) + β5Zn,(t−1) + θX¯n,(t−1) + µn + i] (3.3)
where P [Si,n,t = 1] if household i in neighbourhood n at time t displays a given social
capital, and P [Si,n,t = 0] otherwise. The vector of regressors Xi(t−1) includes the lags of
various household characteristics that are likely to be correlated with violence and social
capital, such as household size or income. As per the Mundlak–Chamberlain approach,
X¯n,(t−1) is a set of neighbourhood averages of the household and respondent covariates.
The variable Rn,(t−1) takes the value 1 if the neighbourhood was affected by a severe riot
(if at least 30% of respondents in the area report a riot) and 0 otherwise. The vector
of regressors Zn,(t−1) includes a set of lagged neighbourhood characteristics, such as the
presence of police station, temples, and a mosque in 2010. δn is a vector of neighbourhood–
specific random effects which absorbs the neighbourhood time–invariant heterogeneity.
All independent variables are summarised in table 3.9 in appendix A. Standard errors
are clustered at the neighbourhood level, which allows us to relax the assumption that the
standard errors are independent of each other within a given neighbourhood.
When estimating a probit model, the coefficient is interpreted as the effect of a small
change in the independent variable on the standardised probit index associated with the
event (in this case the event is social capital). In order to provide a more meaningful
inference, we can transform these coefficients into marginal (for continuous variables) and
Page 60 of 223
impact (for binary variables) effects.
Consider a simplified version of equation 3.3, illustrated as equation 3.4 below. Suppose
we are interested in calculating the marginal effect of age and impact effect of riots on social
capital. The marginal effect involves multiplying the estimated coefficient by the standard
normal probability density function calculated at the sample averages of the covariates,
as in equation 3.5. The impact effect is calculated as the difference in the cumulative
distribution function when the binary variable equals one and zero, both calculated at
sample averages. This is shown in equation 3.6.
P [Si,n,t = 1] = Φ[β2Rn,(t−1) + β3Agen,(t−1) + i] (3.4)
δP
δAge
= Φ[β∗2Ravg + β
∗
3Ageavg]× β∗3 (3.5)
∆ = Φ[β∗2Ravg + β
∗
3Ageavg]− Φ[β∗3Ageavg] (3.6)
The computation of equation 3.5 is interpreted as the effect (in probability points, or
1
100
percentage points) of an infinitesimally small change in age on the probability of having
a given social capital at the sample averages of specified covariates. On the other hand,
computing equation 3.6 tells us that at the average, the probability point increase (or
1
100
percentage point increase) in the probability of a given social capital occurring when the
neighbourhood has experienced a riot.
When reporting the results in the next section we aim to provide marginal and impact
effects for easy interpretation. However, when looking at mechanisms in section 3.7, the
interaction of two variables makes calculating the marginal/impact effects difficult, as this
relies on specific values for the interacted variable. Interpreting interaction terms in a
non–linear framework such as a probit estimator is not straightforward from a table of
results, especially for continuous conditional variables. This is explained further in the
subsequent sections and in some cases marginal/impact effects are illustrated graphically.
3.6 Results
Table 3.11 produces the impact and marginal effects of the estimates of equation 3.3. The
equation is estimated for four dependent variables: i. Membership in an organisation
(column (1)), ii. Trust towards neighbours (column (2)), iii. Participation in community
discussions (column (3)) and iv. Participation in joint festival preparation (column (4)).
Membership in organisations
Column (1) shows that if at least 30% of the respondent’s neighbourhood reported a
riot, the respondent and his/her household members are 33 percentage points more likely to
be part of a group or organisation. As the proportion of households in the neighbourhood
that report an unsafe location nearby increases infinitesimally, individuals and/or their
household members are more likely to join a group or organisation. In this column we
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also see that none of the other respondent, household or neighbourhood–level covariates
produce a significant effect on membership in organisations.
Trust in neighbours
Riots do not affect trust significantly, but Muslim and Marathi speaking households
are respectively 54 and 53 percentage points more likely to trust their neighbours. In
addition, households who rent (rather than own property) are 25 percentage points more
likely to trust their neighbours.
Neighbourhoods that are older are less trusting. As the proportion of Muslims and/or
Marathi speakers increase in a given neighbourhood, trust towards neighbours decreases.
This is opposite in sign to the individual level effect.
Participation in community discussions
In column (3) we see that riot affected households are 16 percentage points less likely
to participate in community discussions. Young, male respondents are more likely to
report that they, or a member of their household, participate in neighbourhood discus-
sions. Marathi speakers are 25 percentage points more likely to participate in community
discussions. Wealthier households are also more likely to join community discussions.
The proportion of tenants (versus landowners) increases the likelihood of community
discussions. A neighbourhood with a high proportion of Marathi speakers have low par-
ticipation in community discussions (again this is opposite in sign to the individual level
effect).
Participation in community festival preparation
Riots do not have a significant effect on participation in community festival preparation,
as shown in column (4). Households who have more permanent houses (built with brick
and concrete rather than tarpaulin) are more likely to participate in festival preparation by
26 percentage points. Wealthier households are also more likely to participate in festival
preparation. Households from older neighbourhoods are less likely to participate in festival
preparation.
In addition to the main variable of interest and individual and household covariates, we
have also described the effect of neighbourhood level averages (average age, proportion of
Muslim households, proportion of Marathi speakers, proportion of tenants). These effects
represent the so-called “within effects”, which unless accounted for would have biased the
random effect results. In fact, when testing for the joint significance of the neighbourhood
averages in each of these specifications, we find that we cannot reject the null of no joint
effect of the neighbourhood averages, except for when the dependent variable is trust of
neighbours. It is worth noting that this test of joint significance is effectively the Hausman
test that is used to determine which model is better suited to the context and data, the
fixed effects or random effects model. In the analysis that follows, neighbourhood averages
of lagged covariates are controlled for, but to save space we have not listed these results
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in the tables. The coefficients are largely similar to those reported in table 3.11, and can
be made available to the readers.
Forms of social capital react differently to different factors. Exposure to violence makes
belonging to an organisation more attractive, however households are less likely to partic-
ipate in discussions. This could indicate an increase in certain types of social capital that
are valuable as an insurance mechanism for future shocks, for example joining a group
or organisation can build networks, as opposed to participating in community discussions
when the actual “sense of community” has been challenged by the riots.
In the following sections we postulate whether the mechanisms behind these effects
are related to the social make–up of the neighbourhood, how households relate to their
neighbourhood and community, and the different groups within it.
3.7 Mechanisms
Our results have revealed some interesting insights into how riots have affected social
capital in urban Maharashtra. In order to explore these results further we see how the
effects of rioting might be conditional on the levels of social diversity and out–migration.
3.7.1 Social Diversity and Identity
Does violence generate differentiated effects on social capital depending on the pre–existing
degree of social diversity? Diverse neighbourhoods could be less resilient to riots compared
to non–polarised neighbourhoods, where neighbours come together in the face of adver-
sity. For example, a riot could increase trust if households largely belong to the same
religious/caste group, but decrease it if the neighbourhood is fragmented.
We measure social diversity along three identity dimensions: fractionalisation and po-
larisation, belonging to the majority/minority group and through the salience of specific
identity markers.
Fractionalisation and Polarisation
We focus on three social groups relevant in the India context: religion, caste and jati10.
In our sample, 54% of respondents are Hindus, 39% of respondents are Muslim and the
rest are either Christians or Buddhists. The jati correspond to the narrow definition of
caste, for which 98 different jatis are represented in the sample. The Indian government’s
Mandal commission (1978) classified jatis according to certain socio–economic indicators,
and this classification was followed to assign each jati was assigned to its corresponding
caste group. Caste groups correspond to the four broad categories of the Hindu caste
system: i.e. Scheduled Tribes (ST), Scheduled Caste (SC, ie. Untouchables), Other
10Jati refers to a sub caste.
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Backward Castes (OBC) and other (or Forward Castes). 6.51% of the sample is ST,
14.59% SC, 34.96% OBC and 43.94% are other.
Considering social diversity along each of religion, jati and caste group simultaneously
will lead to multicollinearity because they are highly correlated. For this reason we have
combined religion and caste affiliations by considering Muslims (formally outside of the
caste system) as an additional category to the caste system. This approach has been
taken by scholars who have studied social diversity and heterogeneity in India, particu-
larly Banerjee and Somanathan (2007). According to this categorisation, 4.97% of the
sample is ST, 11.19% SC, 16.59% OBC, 26.91% Other caste, and 40.34% Muslim. This
categorisation is a slight simplification because in reality the caste system has adapted to
apply to Indian Muslims, however its social implications are not as prominent as amongst
Hindus.11
Social diversity is measured within each neighbourhood by the polarisation and frac-
tionalisation of caste and religious groups, using the indices developed by Esteban and
Ray (2008), particularly:
F =
∑
i
ni(1− ni) = 1−
∑
i
n2i
P =
∑
i
n2i (1− ni)
F refers to fractionalisation and P is polarisation. ni is the share of the population in
each neighbourhood belonging to each group i, or ST, SC, OBC, other caste and Muslim.
F can be interpreted as the probability that two individuals from a given neighbourhood
belong to different social groups. So the higher that F is, the more fractionalised the neigh-
bourhood is. P measures the domination of a certain social group in the neighbourhood,
with higher values indicating higher polarisation.12 While both indexes range between
zero and one, it is worth noting that high values of F indicate a large number of small
social groups that are evenly represented, and a high value of P indicates a more even
distribution of the population between few groups (in the case of P=1, the population
would be split equally between two groups).
Table 3.9 provides summary statistics of these social diversity measures. In our sample,
fractionalisation ranges between zero (all households in neighbourhood belong to the same
religious/caste group) and 0.78. The average fractionalisation is 0.53. This means that on
average there is a 53% chance that two households picked at random are from different
religion or caste groups. Polarisation ranges from zero (again meaning all households
belong to the same caste/religious group) to 0.93, which is highly polarised. On average
a neighbourhood has a polarisation index of 0.68, which is considerably high.
11Table 3.18 compares the main results of the analysis with different measures of social diversity across
the three identity dimensions: religion, caste and jati.
12The Polarisation index can account for parameters such as intergroup distance and group identity (see
Esteban and Ray (2008)), but this is difficult to measure in India and highly subjective.
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In this section we interact the neighbourhood experience of a riot with two forms of
social diversity: caste/religious group fractionalisation and caste/religious group polarisa-
tion, represented in the following equation:
P [Si,n,t = 1] = Φ[β1Xi,(t−1) + β2Rn,(t−1) + β3Dn,(t−1) + β4Zn,(t−1)
+β5[Rn,(t−1) ×Dn,(t−1)] + θX¯n,(t−1) + µn + i]
(3.7)
The variable Dn,(t−1) indicates the extent of social diversity, measured by either polar-
isation or fractionalisation of the caste/religious group within neighbourhood n. To avoid
the issue of multicollinearity, polarisation and fractionalisation will be investigated in two
separate regressions.
Equation 3.7 is similar to equation 3.3 except that it includes an augmented interaction
term between exposure to violence and pre–existing social diversity and estimates — β5
— which can be interpreted as the effect of riots on social capital conditional on social
diversity. However, keep in mind that this ‘effect’ is not an impact effect. The impact
effects of a riot on social capital are plotted in figures 3.4 to 3.7 for various values of social
diversity.
Table 3.12 produces the results of estimating equation 2 with four dependent variables:
i. Membership in an organisation (columns (1) and (2)), ii. Trust towards neighbours
(columns (3) and (4)), iii. Participation in community discussions (columns (5) and (6))
and iv. Participation in joint festival preparation (columns (7) and (8)). Columns (1),
(3), (5), and (7) interact the riot variable with caste/religious group fractionalisation
and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) interact the riot variable with caste/religious group
polarisation for each of the five dependent variables.
Membership in organisations
In figure 3.4a we see that there is no effect of a riot on the probability of being part
of a group or organisation for all values of caste/religious group fractionalisation. How-
ever, conditional on polarisation, figure 3.4b shows that in non–polarised neighbourhoods
riots reduce the probability of belonging to an organisation by 570 percentage points. As
polarisation increases this effect becomes smaller, and in highly polarised neighbourhoods
there is a positive effect of riots on the probability of membership — this reaches a maxi-
mum of an increase in 222 percentage points. This result should be compared to the main
results in table 3.11, where riots increase membership in groups and organisations by 33
percentage points, independent of any measure of diversity.
Trust in neighbours
Figure 3.5a shows that in non–fragmented neighbourhoods riots have a positive effect on
trust — there is a maximum increase of around 118 percentage points in non–fractionalised
neighbourhoods. When fractionalisation is in the medium range, i.e. the index is between
0.6 and 0.8, the effect of riots on trust is negative but insignificant. In highly fractionalised
neighbourhoods, i.e. when the index is greater than 0.8, the effect of a riot does become
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significant, and reduces trust by 50 to 131 percentage points. The impact effect of a riot
on the probability of trusting neighbours conditional on polarisation is never significantly
different than zero, as shown in figure 3.5b.
Participation in community discussions
Figure 3.6a shows that in neighbourhoods where fractionalisation is 0.4 and lower, the
effect of a riot is to increase participation in community discussions — but this effect is not
significant. When fractionalisation is above 0.4, there is a negative effect of a riot on the
probability of participating in a community discussion, reaching around −76 percentage
points in completely fractionalised neighbourhoods. Figure 3.6b shows that there is a
trend of the effect of riots on the probability of participating in community discussions
that ranges from a negative effect in polarised neighbourhoods, to a positive effect in non–
polarised neighbourhoods. However, this effect is only significantly different from zero
when polarisation ranges from 0.5 to 0.7 and the impact effect ranges from a 67 to 29
percentage point decrease.
Participation in joint community festival preparations
The effect of riots on the probability of participating in festival preparation is negative
for all levels of fractionalisation, but these effects are not significantly different from zero,
as shown in figure 3.7a. Figure 3.7b shows how the effect of a riot on participating in
festival preparation is mostly significantly negative (ranging from a 280 to 34 percentage
point decrease), and the effect becomes smaller in more polarised neighbourhoods. At
polarisation levels higher than 0.8, riots have a positive effect on festival preparations, but
this is not significantly different from zero.
This means that social heterogeneity has the potential to improve certain social capital
in riot affected neighbourhoods. Households are more likely to belong to an organisation,
and the negative effect of a riot on joining festival preparation is lessened. While this
is a somewhat counter–intuitive result, this can be interpreted as a household insurance
mechanism towards future riots. Worried that they will be attacked the next riot, a
household might invest in “bridging social capital”, building networks with individuals
and households from other social groups.
However, heterogeneous riot–affected neighbourhoods are most affected in terms of a
reduction in trust towards neighbours and contributing to community discussions. This
could indicate that beneath the increased participation and investments in bridging social
capital at the surface level, riots still cause lower levels of trust and less active community
discussions in fractionalised societies.
Majority versus Minority
Riots are likely to affect households differently if they belong to the majority or minority
of their community, independently of their social group. Those in the majority might see
a riot as an attack on their neighbourhood, and will engage in bonding social capital that
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can defend against future aggressions. Those from the minority group could potentially
withdraw from their community, becoming less trusting and less social to the point that
they migrate to a neighbourhood of more similar households. Jaffrelot (2006) shows that
in Gujarat, after riots, people who are local minorities tend to migrate to neighbourhoods
where their groups are dominant, thereby increasing the degree of urban clustering of
neighbourhoods by identities. In this section we repeat the analysis from equation 3.3
above, but separate the sample into those who belong to the majority religious/caste
group, and those who do not. This variable has been used as an independent variable
previously, and while we did not see an effect on social capital alone, we test to see if it
changes the way riots affect social capital in table 3.13.
For those who belong to the minority, a riot reduces trust of neighbours by 58 percentage
points. For those who belong to the majority, there is no effect of riots on trust.
When separating the sample in this way, riots do not have an effect on the other social
capital variables, namely participation in organisations, community discussions and com-
munity preparation. This is despite the fact that when looking at the sample as a whole,
riots increase participation in organisations and decrease participation in discussions.
These results indicate different behaviours depending on the households’ standing in
the community. A riot will make those belonging to the minority group less trusting
of their neighbours, and we can imagine this is because their neighbours are likely to
belong to a different religious/caste group when the respondent belongs to the minority
religious/caste group. This result further substantiates the difference in bridging and
bonding social capital and the need to differentiate between the two.
However, this mechanism cannot be driving the results seen in section 3.6, as partici-
pation in organisations and discussions is not affected by riots for either the minority or
majority group.
Identities
As shown by Wilkinson (2004, 2005), riots are sometimes used by elites to “encourage
members of their wider ethnic category to identify with their party and the ‘majority’
identity rather than a party that is identified with economic redistribution or some ideo-
logical agenda”. An important question then follows, do riots also exert an impact on the
salience of shared identities?
To investigate the effect of violence on the salience of shared identities, we exploit “vi-
gnettes”, which were presented to respondents in the second wave of MHLS. Vignettes
are “short stories about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to whose situ-
ation the interviewee is invited to respond” (Finch, 1987). The use of vignettes in surveys
provides a useful research method to investigate respondents’ beliefs, attitudes and judge-
ments (Atzmu¨ller and Steiner, 2010; Finch, 1987; Nock and Rossi, 1982; Seekings, 2008),
by providing a rich contextual background and randomising certain aspects of the context
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that are significant variables in explaining beliefs. While we could have directly asked the
respondents for their opinions and attitudes towards people of the same religious/caste
group, we are unlikely to have elicited honest responses. This could be because respondents
want to impress the interviewers and respond in a way that they think will be socially
approved of, or because these biases and factors that influence judgement are actually
subconscious so that the respondent is not actually aware of them (Alexander and Becker,
1978).
As an example, Thaler (2014) studies attitudes towards intimate partner violence in
South Africa by providing a scenario to respondents in which a husband hits his wife.
There are four reasons for why the husband hits his wife: suspicion of adultery, com-
mitting adultery, preparing food he does not like and disobeying him. These reasons are
randomly assigned to each respondent and they are subsequently asked whether they think
the act is acceptable. Perhaps unsurprisingly, acceptance is highest when adultery is com-
mitted or suspected compared to the other two situations. However, this attitude towards
intimate partner violence would not have been uncovered through a direct question, as
respondents might have been inclined to report that they were not accepting of intimate
partner violence under any conditions. In this way, the researcher can see how average
acceptance changes when key factors in the vignette change, and then test to see which
covariates, such as gender, race, education, and employment, play a role in this acceptance
(or lack of).
In our study, respondents were asked if they would be willing to give some money (3,000
Rupees, the equivalent of around £35 in 2012) to a person living in their neighbourhood,
for a given reason. The name of the person living in the neighbourhood and the reason
that they needed the money were randomised for each interview. The persons asking for
the money could be named Yadav, Hanif or Deshpande, and the reason for the request of
money could be to repay a loan, bribe a local goon or buy a festive saree. In the current
analysis, we pool these three reasons for request of money together, as this dimension is not
central to the research question. Rather, we focus on the randomised name of character.
Yadav is a name typical to Hindus from OBC caste category, Hanif is a Muslim name
and Deshpande is typical Hindu upper caste name. For each respondent, we created a
variable taking the value 1 if the identity of the respondent matches the identity of the
person in the vignette and 0 otherwise. Dalits, or untouchables, are excluded from this
analysis as they cannot identify with any possible identity to the same extent as the other
groups.
Before proceeding with the analysis we first tested whether random assignment of the
vignette characters has actually created three groups from the sample that are roughly
the same. Often studies have relied on a simple balance test of treatment and control
groups to ensure random assignment, but in the case of three groups this is slightly more
cumbersome and makes inference difficult. We tested first for differences in any of the
covariates used in the analysis between Deshpande and Hanif, Deshpande and Yadav, and
Hanif and Yadav. This resulted in 66 tests (22 covariates for each of these 3 combinations).
Page 68 of 223
Of these 66 tests, 9 showed a statistically significant difference in covariates. This is
a reasonable result given the large number of tests. In addition, we regressed each of
these covariates13 on the character assignment, and then tested the joint significance of
character assignment.14 The results of these orthogonality tests are shown in table 3.10,
and character assignment is only a significant predictor of belonging to the majority caste
or religious group, again a reasonable result. Finally, we regress each character assignment
on all the covariates and test for joint significance of the covariates15 — they do not prove
to be significant predictors. Based on these tests we can be certain that the character
assignment is random, providing exogeneity in the subsequent analysis.
The dependent variable of interest is willingness to give money, which is equal to one if
the respondent has said that they would be happy to offer money to the character in the
vignette. We regress the willingness to give money on whether there is a shared identity
between the vignette character and the respondent. We include the same household and
neighbourhood level covariates (including neighbourhood means of household covariates)
as the analysis above. In addition we include a variable indicating the character randomly
assigned to the respondent.
P [Gi,n,t = 1] = Φ[α1SIi,(t−1) + α2Ci,(t−1) + β1Xi,(t−1)
+β2Zn,(t−1) + θX¯n,(t−1) + µn + i]
(3.8)
This model also uses the probit function, Φ, the inverse standard normal transformation of
covariates. P [Gi,n,t = 1] is the probability of giving money to the character in the vignette,
and SIi,(t−1) is a binary indicator taking the value 1 if there is a shared identity between
the respondent and the character in the vignette, and 0 otherwise. Ci,(t−1) is a set of
two binary variables representing the character assignment (the variable indicating Yadav
was omitted and acts as the base for comparison). Xi,(t−1) are household characteristics,
Zn,(t−1) neighbourhood level characteristics, and X¯n,(t−1) are the neighbourhood level
means of respondent and household characteristics.
Column (1) in table 3.14 shows that a shared identity with the character in the vignette
makes the respondent 24 percentage points more likely to give money to this character.
We then explore whether the salience of shared identities increases with riots. We estimate
the following equation:
P [Gi,n,t = 1] = Φ[α1SIi,(t−1) + α2Ci,(t−1) + β1Xi,(t−1) + β2Rn,(t−1)
+β5Zn,(t−1) + β6[Rn,(t−1) × SIi,(t−1)] + θX¯n,(t−1) + µn + i]
(3.9)
In equation 3.9 there is an additional term of Rn,(t−1) × SIi,(t−1) which captures the
interaction between riots and shared identity. Rn,(t−1) is a binary variable equal to one if
13For continuous variables we use a neighbourhood fixed effects OLS estimation, and for binary variables
a neighbourhood fixed effect logit estimation.
14The p–value of the F–statistic is recorded for continuous variables, whereas the p–value of the Chi–
squared is recorded for binary variables.
15This is using a neighbourhood fixed effect logit estimation, and joint significance is tested using a
Chi–squared distribution.
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at least 30% of households in a neighbourhood reported a riot.
Column (2) of table 3.14 show these results, and figure 3.8 compares the impact effect
of a riot in riot affected and less affected neighbourhoods. A comparison of these results
shows that the impact of shared identity on the willingness to give is driven by those who
have not been affected by riots. These households are 28 percentage point more likely to
give if they match the identity with the character in the vignette. On the other hand,
those who experience riots are not more likely to give money if their identity is shared
with that in the vignette. This comparison shows that experiencing a riot reduces the
salience of identity. This result might seem counter–intuitive, but it can be explained by
a need to ‘curry favour’ with individuals from different social groups, hoping to build new
bridging social capital that will be useful in the face of future riots or communal violence.
3.7.2 Out-migration
In this section we explore whether out–migration mediates the effect of riots on social
capital. It could be that when households learn of others who have left their community,
they feel a lesser extent of “belonging”, and thus no incentive to invest in social capital
when faced with a riot. On the other hand, if out–migration is high, this could indicate that
there has been a shift to a more homogeneous neighbourhood (this is what Jaffrelot (2006)
found after the Gujarat riots), and riots will increase bonding social capital between new
members. In addition, those who migrated could have been those whose social capital
was most affected by riots, and saw migration as the ultimate disinvestment from the
neighbourhood and community. These households will be replaced by new households
who never experienced the riot, and have no reason to change their social capital. This
can lead to an over–all ‘dulling’ of the impact of riots on social capital.
The migration variable is measured in 2012, and depends on whether the household
was located during the second wave of data collection. If the data collectors found a new
household residing in the dwelling from the first wave, or a dwelling that was completely
empty (with no signs of habitation), we deduced that the household had since migrated.
In both cases this was confirmed by talking to the current residents or neighbours. If the
household was not available or refused to be interviewed, then they are not considered to
have migrated. For each neighbourhood, the proportion of households who had migrated
was constructed. Summary statistics for these variables can be found in table 3.9. The
out–migration proportion ranges from 0% to 26% of households across all neighbourhoods,
and the average level of out–migration is 7.4%.
To answer the question of whether the effect of riots are conditional on out–migration,
we estimate the following equation:
P [Si,n,t = 1] = Φ[β1Xi,(t−1) + β2Rn,(t−1) + β3Mn,(t−1)
+β4Zn,(t−1) + β5[Rn,(t−1) ×Mn,(t−1)] + θX¯n,(t−1) + µn + i]
(3.10)
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Mn,(t−1) is the neighbourhood average migration. Equation 3.10 is similar to equation
3.3 except that it includes an augmented interaction term between exposure to violence
and out–migration, allowing us to estimate the coefficient of interest, β5. Again, since
average migration is a continuous variable, figures 3.9a to 3.9d illustrate the conditional
impact effects of riots on social capital.
Membership in organisations
In section 3.6 we saw that riots increase participation in organisations, but as shown in
figure 3.9a, this is largely driven by neighbourhoods that have low levels of out–migration.
In these neighbourhoods of low migration, riots can increase participation in organisations
between 86 and 31 percentage points when migration ranges between 0 and 7% of the
neighbourhood. Above these levels riots do not have a significant effect of belonging to an
organisation.
Trust in neighbours
The effect of riots on trust is negative when out–migration is low and positive when
out–migration is high (figure 3.9b). There is a clear change in impact of riots, so that
conditional on low migration, riots can decrease trust by 77 to 35 percentage points. When
out–migration reaches levels of 10% and higher, riots have the potential to increase trust
in neighbours, from a 30 to 136 percentage point increase.
Participation in community discussions
The main results showed that riots would decrease participation in community discus-
sions by 16 percentage points, and we see that this is largely driven by neighbourhoods
with low out–migration (figure 3.9c). When out–migration ranges from zero to 7% of the
neighbourhood, the effect of rioting ranges between a 37 and 16 percentage point decrease
in the probability of participating in community discussions. Beyond 7% migration, the
effect of riots are no longer significant.
Participation in joint community festival preparation
In figure 3.9d we observe that riots will slightly significantly reduce the probability of
participating in festival preparation when out–migration is lower than 2% of households,
but the effect is not significant otherwise.
Out–migration proves to be a significant mechanism in explaining the effect of riots. If
joining a group or organisation is an investment in bridging social capital to protect against
future shocks, we can imagine that this will be most effective in stable communities where
out–migration does not occur frequently. However, if migration is high, social networks
will shift as individuals and households migrate and drop out, and thus the benefits of
investing in social capital will decrease.
The other interesting result we find is that riots reduce trust, the likelihood of partic-
ipating in a group/organisation and community discussions when out–migration is low.
This confirms the hypothesis mentioned in section 3.2. The effect of a riot is diluted in
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neighbourhoods with high out–migration because households who were most likely to have
lower social capital because of riots have since migrated. On the other hand, new house-
holds, most likely more similar in characteristics to others in the neighbourhood, have not
been affected by riots and do not change their investments in social capital.
3.8 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform a range of checks to ensure that our results are robust to
different estimation specifications and variable measurements.
3.8.1 Correcting for attrition
As mentioned earlier, a significant portion of the sample were not available or willing to
be interviewed for the 2012 wave of the survey. As table 3.3 showed, there are a few
differences between households who were tracked and those who were not tracked when
comparing certain socio-economic conditions. While we have controlled for all of these
variables, we also perform a Heckman two–stage regression to correct for selection bias.
The first stage is a probit model which predicts selection into the second wave of the
survey, the regressors are the same as for the main analysis, but we also include a set
of variables which are likely to affect attrition. These are: reporting fear of travelling to
the nearest town alone, fear of walking alone in the neighbourhood, poor amenities in the
neighbourhood, feelings of safety of female household members in neighbourhood during
the day and night, and finally reporting that household would like to move if possible. It
is this latter variable that is the most significant predictor of selection, as shown in table
3.16. The pseudo–residuals from this equation are then stored (called the inverse–Mills
ratio), representing unexplained selection into the second wave. We then run the same
regression as equation 3.3, but include the inverse–Mills ratio as one of the covariates. As
shown in table 3.17, the results do not change, and the coefficient for the inverse–Mills
ratio is not significant in all specifications, indicating that attrition has not biased our
results.
3.8.2 Looking at different types of social diversity
In these specifications we get a better picture of which types of social diversity matter:
diversity of caste groups, castes or religions. Table 3.18 summarises these results, compar-
ing the conditional effects of riots and social diversity, as well as their interaction, on the
different forms of social capital. The main results, when looking at religious/caste group
diversity, are also included in table 3.18 for comparison. Some of the effects of riots on
social capital differ depending on the type of social diversity used, and this is to be ex-
pected. For example, it makes sense that religious diversity is more relevant in explaining
Page 72 of 223
commitment to festival preparation, because festivals are usually religious in nature. The
main results still fall within the range of these coefficients (if not more conservative).
3.8.3 Different measures of neighbourhood–level rioting
Neighbourhood level experience of rioting was chosen to be equal to one if 30% of house-
holds in the neighbourhood had reported a riot, because this was the average level of rioting
across neighbourhoods in our sample if at least one household had reported a riot. In order
to see whether our results are sensitive to different measures of rioting, we repeated the
analysis at different cut-off levels, ranging from 5% to 95% of households reporting a riot
in the neighbourhood. The impact effect of riots across these specifications are plotted
in figure 3.10 for each of membership in organisations, trust, participation in community
discussions and festival preparations. It is interesting to note that the impact effect of
riots behaves quite differently at the extremities, i.e. when the cut–off for reporting riots
is 20% and below, or 80% and above. This could be because of the severity of the riots in
the high extremity, but also because of certain self–reporting or respondent induced biases
in the lower extremity. But within the range of 20% to 80% of households reporting a
riot, the impact effect of rioting on social capital is largely similar.
3.9 Conclusion
This study has explored the relationship between exposure to riots and social capital
in urban Maharashtra. We have made use of a panel dataset collected by the authors
and applied a random effects model with lagged covariates to estimate an exogenous
relationship between neighbourhood exposure to riots and four forms of social capital:
membership in a group or organisation, trust in neighbours, participation in community
discussions and participation in community festival preparations.
Consistent with Bellows and Miguel’s study of conflict and social capital (2009), we
find that households living in neighbourhoods that experienced a riot are more likely to be
members of groups and organisations. On the other hand, we find that these households are
less likely to join community discussions, which lends more to the hypothesis of fragmented
post–conflict societies with a damaged social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000).
This chapter goes a step further than previous studies and aims to understand how
neighbourhood composition and stability affects the relationship between violence and
social capital. We find the increased membership in organisations is greatest in diverse
neighbourhoods that are stable in terms of out–migration. This indicates that joining
groups and organisations serves as a precaution to protect households against future riots.
Armed with new relationships and networks that include individuals and households from
other social groups, participating in groups and organisations can spare households in case
of another episode of communal violence. In homogeneous neighbourhoods the positive
impact of riots is reversed, possibly because there is no pay–off to trying to build ‘bridging
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networks’ in neighbourhoods of households that are mostly similar. In addition, migration
can be seen as the ultimate dis–investment in social capital, leaving behind households
who are more sociable and less affected by riots.
This result is further substantiated by the vignette analysis which finds that respon-
dents in riot affected neighbourhoods are no more and no less willing to give money in an
emergency to someone with whom they share a social identity. By refusing to differentiate,
these households could be trying to build networks and establish a system of reciprocity.
By giving money to someone the respondent can claim a favour in the future, and if
this person belongs to a different social group, this favour could be protection during a
communal riot.
Unfortunately this positive relationship does not hold for other forms of social capi-
tal. Riots cause a reduction in participation in community discussions, trust is reduced
in fragmented and polarised riot–affected neighbourhoods, and participation in festival
preparation decreases in riot exposed neighbourhoods with low out–migration.
When looking at membership in organisations, our analysis provided insight into how
individuals and households instrumentally use social capital to their advantage. However,
if we look under this surface level networking, and focus rather on trust and sense of
community, there is quite a different picture. Riots can have adverse effects on social
capital, but as this chapter has shown, the relationship is far from simple.
This chapter contributes to an emerging body of literature on the effect of armed
conflict on social capital (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Michal et al., 2011;
Gilligan et al., 2014; Voors et al., 2012). The current literature has missed out on how low–
intensity violence, such as riots, can affect forms of social capital, the gap that this chapter
will fill. In addition, this chapter has addressed the mechanisms behind this relationship,
demonstrating its complexity and dependence on the composition of the neighbourhood,
in terms of social diversity and stability.
Riots are an endemic feature of life in urban Maharashtra. Beyond the physical and
economic losses suffered by those affected, we have also shown how social capital can be
destroyed in polarised and fragmented neighbourhoods. However, civic association shows
signs of improving upon exposure to riots, a fundamental building block for lasting peace
in fragmented societies, according to Varshney (2001). This analysis has shown that there
is agency and thoughtful consideration in building some types of social capital, but that
this is a fragile outcome.
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3.10 Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Hindu–Muslim riots in Maharashtra — Killed, Injured, Arrested 1950–1995.
(Number of riots in each year shown in parentheses). Graph was compiled by the authors
and is based on a dataset collected by Varshney and Wilkinson who screened the Mumbai
edition of the Times of India for communal violence events (Wilkinson, 2004; Varshney,
2002).
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Figure 3.2: Number of riots in Maharashtra per month, from January 2008 to January 2012
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of newspaper reported riot data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Duration of riot in days 1.111 0.802 1 12 225
At least one civilian was injured 0.427 0.496 0 1 225
At least one civilian was killed 0.076 0.265 0 1 225
At least one policeman was injured 0.173 0.379 0 1 225
At least one policeman was killed 0 0 0 0 225
An arrest or charge was made 0.258 0.438 0 1 225
Number of charges 1.298 6.817 0 61 225
Number of arrests 11.924 71.503 0 1000 225
Police engaged in violence against civilians 0.249 0.433 0 1 225
A curfew was enforced due to the riot 0.089 0.285 0 1 225
The riot spread to neighbouring
towns/communities
0.044 0.207 0 1 225
There was a communal element to the riot 0.569 0.496 0 1 225
The riot initiated from a personal dispute 0.209 0.407 0 1 225
The riot was initiated by a rumour 0.027 0.161 0 1 225
The riot initiated from a protest 0.164 0.372 0 1 225
The riot initiated from a Raasta roko 0.058 0.234 0 1 225
The riot was initiated by a slum demoli-
tion (attempted or completed)
0.031 0.174 0 1 225
The riot was related to an election 0.089 0.285 0 1 225
The riot involved a Bandh 0.071 0.258 0 1 225
The riot caused physical damage to public
or private property
0.262 0.441 0 1 225
Modality of Violence
Stone throwing 0.511 0.501 0 1 225
Bottle throwing 0.027 0.161 0 1 225
Physical fight 0.271 0.446 0 1 225
Physical attack 0.067 0.25 0 1 225
Physical beating 0.062 0.242 0 1 225
Physical scuﬄe 0.04 0.196 0 1 225
Arson 0.084 0.279 0 1 225
Vandalism 0.08 0.272 0 1 225
Looting 0.013 0.115 0 1 225
Tire burning 0.004 0.067 0 1 225
3.10.1 Attrition
Table 3.3: Differences in socio–economic characteristics (2010) between tracked and not
tracked households
Mean
Variable Tracked Not tracked Diff.
Household member belongs to an organisation 0.14 0.10 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Trust towards neighbours 0.4 0.29 0.11
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Report a riot taking place in neighbourhood 0.24 0.16 0.07∗∗
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(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
At least 30% report a riot in neighbourhood ]0.21 0.15 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Caste group/Religious fractionalisation 0.54 0.49 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Caste group/Religious polarisation 0.69 0.64 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age of respondent 34.05 32.7 7 1.27
(0.35) (0.69) (0.79)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) 0.34 0.32 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Permanent house materials 0.53 0.66 −0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Household is Muslim 0.39 0.41 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Household size 6.55 4.82 1.74∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.24)
Household rents house (0=Owns) 0.14 0.41 −0.27∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Log of monthly income per capita 6.84 7.19 −0.34∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Mother tongue is Marathi 0.51 0.44 0.07∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
There is an unsafe location nearby 0.1 0.07 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Hhd belongs to predominant religion/caste group 0.62 0.65 −0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
3.10.2 Summary statistics
Table 3.4: Description of social capital variables
Variable Description from questionnaire
Household member be-
longs to an organisation
Are you or any other household member a member of the following
groups or organisations? (Political party; Trade union; Student
organization; Farmer’s organization; Cooperative; Sports/cultural
organization; Gym; Women’s group; Local Mohallas commit-
tee; Caste Panchayat/Sabha/association; Religious organizations;
Youth Organisation; Village redressial committee; Other group or
organisation)
Household participates in
community discussions
How common is it that you or a family member participates in a
community discussion? (All the time; Sometimes; Never)
Household participates in
festival preparation
How common is it that you or a family member will take part in
the preparation? (All the time; Sometimes; Never)
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Trust towards neighbours Would you trust your money or assets for safekeeping with your
neighbours (Yes; No)
Table 3.5: Summary statistics of social capital variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Household member belongs to an organisation 0.159 0.366 0 1 1088
Trust towards neighbours 0.171 0.377 0 1 1087
Household participates in community discussions 0.421 0.494 0 1 1088
Household participates in festival preparation 0.692 0.462 0 1 1088
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Table 3.2: Reason household was not re–interviewed
Reason Frequency Percentage
Household had since migrated 81 37.85%
Could not find original dwelling 68 31.05%
No respondent was available 65 29.68%
Household refused 5 2.28%
Total 219 100%
Figure 3.3: Proportion of self-reported riots in each neighbourhood
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Table 3.6: Differences in social capital variables separated by whether at least 30% of
neighbourhood reports a riot
Mean
Variable Riot No riot Diff.
Household member belongs to an organisation 0.27 0.14 0.12***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Trust towards neighbours 0.11 0.19 −0.07 ∗ ∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Household participates in community discussions 0.34 0.45 −0.1 ∗ ∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Household participates in festival preparation 0.63 0.72 −0.08 ∗ ∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
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Table 3.7: Occurrence of riot related events in neighbourhood and subsequent actions by respondents in 2010
Action taken by respondents who reported event occurring in neighbourhood
Events
Number of respondents
reporting at least one
event occurring in
neighbourhood
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Rioting 237 0 10 1 4 4 1 96 73 49
21.76% 0% 4.22% 0.42% 1.69% 1.69% 0.42% 40.51% 30.8% 20.68%
Stone pelting 221 1 7 0 5 2 0 82 60 43
20.29% 0.45% 3.17% 0% 2.26% 0.9% 0% 37.1% 27.15% 19.46%
Public fights 217 1 19 1 2 4 0 75 74 56
19.93% 0.46% 8.76% 0.46% 0.92% 1.84% 0% 34.56% 34.1% 25.81%
Tire burning 87 0 4 0 0 0 0 36 35 15
7.99% 0% 4.6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 40.23% 17.24%
Damaging of bus 66 0 2 0 0 0 0 27 27 11
or public property 6.06% 0% 3.03% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40.91% 40.91% 16.67%
Police harassment 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 14 9
2.75% 0 3.33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16.67% 46.67% 30%
Agitation related 86 0 3 0 0 0 0 39 28 16
to a bandh 7.9% 0% 3.49% 0% 0% 0% 0% 45.35% 32.56% 18.6%
Violence during curfew 150 0 4 0 0 0 0 59 56 31
13.77% 0% 2.67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 39.33% 37.33% 20.67%
Bottle throwing 72 0 2 0 1 0 0 32 25 11
6.61% 0% 2.78% 0% 1.39% 0% 0% 44.44% 34.72% 15.28%
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Table 3.8: Summary statistics of respondent experience of a riot
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Are riots affecting your neighbourhood a
concern for you?
0.096 0.294 0 1 1089
Household has experienced a riot in the
last two years
0.124 0.33 0 1 1089
Because of experience of a riot the house-
hold was in need of money
0.743 0.443 0 1 35
Amount of money needed (in Rupees) 10,150 13,569.179 600 50,000 24
Table 3.9: Summary statistics of independent variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Household/Respondent level variables
Report riot taking place in neighbourhood 0.235 0.424 0 1 867
Age of respondent 39.13 13.34 15 90 874
Sex of respondent (1=Male) 0.375 0.484 0 1 874
Permanent house materials 0.527 0.5 0 1 867
Household is Muslim 0.386 0.487 0 1 867
Household size 6.562 3.369 1 26 867
Household rents house (0=Owns) 0.133 0.339 0 1 867
Log of monthly income per capita 6.841 0.75 4.711 11.027 854
Mother tongue is Marathi 0.509 0.5 0 1 867
Months lived in current house 18.984 14.282 0 65 859
There is an unsafe location nearby 0.099 0.299 0 1 867
Hhd belongs to predominant religion/caste group 0.621 0.486 0 1 867
Neighbourhood level variables
At least 30% of neighbourhood report a riot 0.2 0.405 0 1 45
Proportion of households migrated by 2012 0.074 0.065 0 0.261 45
Police station in neighbourhood 0.111 0.318 0 1 45
Chowk in neighbourhood 0.4 0.495 0 1 45
Hindu temple in neighbourhood 0.489 0.506 0 1 45
Mosque in neighbourhood 0.378 0.49 0 1 45
Market in neighbourhood 0.2 0.405 0 1 45
Caste group/Religious fractionalisation 0.526 0.217 0 0.778 45
Caste group/Religious polarisation 0.678 0.217 0 0.932 45
Religious polarisation 0.613 0.282 0 1 45
Religious fractionalisation 0.342 0.174 0 0.635 45
Caste group polarisation 0.834 0.09 0.445 0.992 45
Caste group fractionalisation 0.584 0.104 0.244 0.727 45
Caste polarisation 0.496 0.118 0.281 0.806 45
Caste fractionalisation 0.827 0.069 0.583 0.922 45
3.10.3 Test of orthogonality of vignette character assignment
Table 3.10: Test of orthogonality
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Joint significance of
Mean Deshpande and Hanif
Characteristic Deshpande Hanif Yadev Orthogonality test
Main variables in analysis
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot 0.17 0.24 0.23 –
Caste group/religious fractionalisation 0.54 0.52 0.54 –
Caste group/religious polarisation 0.69 0.68 0.69 –
Average household migrated in neighbourhood 0.07 0.07 0.08 –
Respondent level variables 2012
Age (2012) 39.05 39.33 38.27 0.525
Sex (2012) 0.38 0.31 0.35 0.277
Lagged respondent and household variables
Age (2010) 33.68 34.89 33.75 0.277
Sex (2010) 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.384
Dwelling made of permanent material 0.51 0.55 0.51 0.502
Household is Muslim 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.851
Household size 6.5 6.9 6.3 0.14
Household rents (0=own) 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.547
Log per capita monthly income 6.82 6.82 6.88 0.804
Marathi mother tongue 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.909
Length of time in neighbourhood 18.5 19.65 18.78 0.426
Unsafe location nearby 0.11 0.08 0.1 0.322
Household belongs to major caste/religious group 0.59 0.68 0.6 0.093*
Neighbourhood variables
Police station in neighbourhood 0.1 0.14 0.12 –
Chowk in neighbourhood 0.43 0.48 0.42 –
Hindu temple in neighbourhood 0.51 0.56 0.51 –
Mosque in neighbourhood 0.39 0.48 0.38 –
Market in neighbourhood 0.21 0.21 0.23 –
Orthogonality test: Joint significance of
covariates on each character assignment 0.516 0.855 0.119
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3.11 Appendix B: Main Results
Table 3.11: Effect of riot on social capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Organisation Trust Discussions Festival
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot (d) 0.33∗ -0.19 -0.16∗ -0.093
(0.18) (0.22) (0.098) (0.12)
Respondent age and sex in 2012
Age of respondent -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0080∗∗ -0.0018
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0038)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) (d) 0.14 0.035 0.18∗ 0.10
(0.13) (0.10) (0.096) (0.097)
Lagged respondent and household variables (2010)
Age of respondent -0.0042 -0.00092 0.0015 -0.0019
(0.0069) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0049)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) (d) -0.045 0.14 -0.12 0.036
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.090)
Permanent house materials (d) -0.065 -0.17 0.028 0.26∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.12) (0.098) (0.091)
Household is Muslim (d) -0.24 0.54∗∗ 0.27 0.069
(0.19) (0.24) (0.17) (0.21)
Household size 0.013 0.012 -0.00078 -0.0051
(0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015)
Household rents house (0=Owns) (d) 0.11 0.25∗ -0.080 -0.13
(0.18) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10)
Log of monthly income per capita -0.061 0.012 0.17∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.083) (0.082) (0.069) (0.073)
Mother tongue is Marathi (d) 0.029 0.52∗∗∗ 0.25∗ -0.047
(0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16)
Months lived in current house 0.0052 0.0012 0.0027 -0.0020
(0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0038) (0.0037)
There is an unsafe location nearby (d) 0.063 -0.16 0.091 -0.066
(0.19) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15)
Hhd belongs to predominant religion/caste group (d) -0.13 -0.086 0.14 0.13
(0.12) (0.12) (0.094) (0.12)
Lagged neighbourhood level variables (2010)
Police station in neighbourhood (d) 0.061 0.0019 0.078 0.041
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(0.16) (0.13) (0.096) (0.14)
Chowk in neighbourhood (d) 0.31 -0.28 0.13 0.086
(0.22) (0.17) (0.10) (0.14)
Hindu temple in neighbourhood (d) -0.36 -0.038 0.057 0.098
(0.27) (0.22) (0.13) (0.22)
Mosque in neighbourhood (d) 0.041 -0.15 -0.21∗∗ 0.0060
(0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.19)
Market in neighbourhood (d) -0.094 0.056 -0.024 0.0068
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
Lagged neighbourhood level averages
Average respondent age -0.011 -0.054∗∗ 0.0082 -0.041∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Percentage of male respondents -0.13 -1.02 0.024 -0.46
(0.97) (0.76) (0.57) (0.74)
% of houses with permanent material 0.13 0.55 -0.39 -0.48
(0.50) (0.43) (0.40) (0.33)
% of Muslim households -0.054 -0.77∗ -0.39 0.11
(0.60) (0.42) (0.38) (0.50)
Average household size -0.0059 0.026 0.017 -0.011
(0.075) (0.088) (0.050) (0.069)
% of hhds who are tenants -0.76 -0.55 1.35∗ -0.67
(1.07) (0.73) (0.79) (0.58)
Average monthly income per capita -0.042 0.12 0.032 0.11
(0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17)
% of Marathi speakers 0.17 -0.87∗ -0.83∗∗ -0.33
(0.64) (0.46) (0.37) (0.54)
Average length of stay -0.013 0.020 -0.017 -0.0092
(0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015)
% of hhds reporting an unsafe location 1.95∗∗∗ 1.13 -0.074 0.73
(0.73) (0.76) (0.52) (0.50)
Observations 845 845 845 845
Degrees of freedom 29.000 29.000 29.000 29.000
Chi-squared 559.545 95.008 114.856 249.479
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of clusters 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.12: Effect of riot interacted with social diversity on social capital
Organisation Trust Discussions Festival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Frac Pol Frac Pol Frac Pol Frac Pol
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed 0.23 -5.70∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 1.96 0.59 -1.64 -0.33 -2.83∗∗
a riot (0.95) (1.74) (0.70) (1.85) (0.43) (1.21) (0.49) (1.39)
Caste group/Religious diversity -0.70 -0.35 -0.044 -0.51 -0.28 -0.34 -0.71 -0.78
(0.50) (0.44) (0.50) (0.38) (0.37) (0.29) (0.47) (0.48)
More than %30 witnessed riot × 0.028 -2.70∗∗ -1.36∗ 0.25
Caste group/Religious fractionalisation (1.46) (1.13) (0.74) (0.79)
More than %30 witnessed riot × 7.92∗∗∗ -2.89 1.92 3.56∗
Caste group/Religious polarisation (2.31) (2.50) (1.63) (1.83)
Respondent age and sex in 2012
Age of respondent -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0028 -0.0082∗∗ -0.0080∗∗ -0.0017 -0.0017
(0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) 0.14 0.16 0.030 0.033 0.19∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098)
Lagged respondent and household variables (2010)
Age of respondent -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.00100 -0.0013 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0022
(0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) -0.053 -0.069 0.14 0.13 -0.13 -0.13 0.027 0.020
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.091) (0.089)
Permanent house materials -0.065 -0.065 -0.18 -0.17 0.029 0.028 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.098) (0.098) (0.092) (0.092)
Household is Muslim -0.23 -0.23 0.56∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.28 0.28 0.087 0.081
(0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21)
Household size 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 -0.00093 -0.00098 -0.0055 -0.0056
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Household rents house (0=Owns) 0.11 0.11 0.25∗ 0.26∗ -0.081 -0.078 -0.12 -0.12
(0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
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Log of monthly income per capita -0.062 -0.064 0.015 0.011 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.12∗
(0.084) (0.085) (0.083) (0.082) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.073)
Mother tongue is Marathi 0.037 0.041 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.25∗ -0.042 -0.045
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16)
Months lived in current house 0.0052 0.0055 0.0015 0.0014 0.0028 0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0017
(0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0037)
There is an unsafe location nearby 0.063 0.066 -0.17 -0.16 0.089 0.089 -0.068 -0.069
(0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Hhd belongs to predominant -0.16 -0.13 -0.098 -0.11 0.12 0.13 0.097 0.11
religion/caste group (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.096) (0.12) (0.12)
Lagged neighbourhood level variables (2010)
Police station in neighbourhood 0.074 0.0015 0.14 -0.031 0.16 0.041 0.039 -0.038
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.093) (0.15) (0.14)
Chowk in neighbourhood 0.29 0.45∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.28∗ 0.036 0.19 0.070 0.20
(0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14)
Hindu temple in neighbourhood -0.35 -0.33 0.060 -0.059 0.14 0.047 0.11 0.081
(0.28) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.14) (0.12) (0.23) (0.20)
Mosque in neighbourhood 0.073 -0.0057 -0.18 -0.11 -0.24∗∗ -0.20∗∗ 0.043 0.023
(0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.093) (0.18) (0.18)
Market in neighbourhood -0.072 -0.24 0.19 0.11 0.041 -0.050 0.015 -0.052
(0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Lagged neighbourhood means of covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 845 845 845 845 845 845 845 845
Degrees of freedom 31.000 31.000 31.000 31.000 31.000 31.000 31.000 31.000
Chi-squared 580.988 663.213 172.863 99.758 314.911 170.976 180.607 352.886
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of clusters 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Impact effects of riots on social capital conditional caste/religious group
fractionalisation and polarisation (with 95% CI)
Figure 3.4: Belonging to an organisation
(a) Fractionalisation (b) Polarisation
Figure 3.5: Trust in neighbours
(a) Fractionalisation (b) Polarisation
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Figure 3.6: Participates in community discussions
(a) Fractionalisation (b) Polarisation
Figure 3.7: Participates in festival preparation
(a) Fractionalisation (b) Polarisation
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Table 3.13: Effect of riot on social capital separating by those who belong to majority and minority
Organisation Trust Discussions Festival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot 0.34 0.20 -0.12 -0.58∗ -0.099 -0.30 -0.27 0.092
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.33) (0.17) (0.33) (0.17) (0.23)
Respondent age and sex in 2012
Age of respondent -0.0014 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0018 -0.0095∗∗ -0.0069 -0.0021 0.00030
(0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0051) (0.0077) (0.0037) (0.0065) (0.0049) (0.0059)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) 0.33∗∗ 0.020 0.19 -0.31 0.20∗∗ 0.094 0.31∗∗ -0.22
(0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.21) (0.10) (0.23) (0.13) (0.16)
Lagged respondent and household variables (2010)
Age of respondent -0.016∗ 0.0080 -0.00043 -0.0028 0.0016 0.0011 -0.0080 0.0026
(0.0084) (0.012) (0.0069) (0.011) (0.0060) (0.0095) (0.0073) (0.0090)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) -0.29∗ 0.100 0.23 -0.16 -0.027 -0.48∗∗ -0.0017 0.11
(0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.25) (0.15) (0.20) (0.13) (0.15)
Permanent house materials -0.11 -0.14 -0.19 -0.23 -0.15 0.48∗∗ 0.21 0.46∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.19) (0.15) (0.21) (0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16)
Household is Muslim -1.13∗∗∗ 0.060 0.62 0.89∗∗ 0.13 0.55∗ -0.43 0.27
(0.40) (0.31) (0.41) (0.44) (0.29) (0.29) (0.42) (0.28)
Household size 0.016 -0.00093 0.033 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.027∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.0094 -0.0060
(0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.034) (0.016) (0.041) (0.018) (0.030)
Household rents house (0=Owns) 0.39 -0.16 0.35∗ 0.19 -0.017 -0.32 0.043 -0.50∗∗
(0.24) (0.30) (0.21) (0.33) (0.16) (0.35) (0.15) (0.22)
Log of monthly income per capita -0.31∗ 0.16 -0.15 0.17 0.15∗ 0.18 0.087 0.097
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(0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.092) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Mother tongue is Marathi -0.14 0.017 0.49∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.18 0.26 -0.20 0.10
(0.22) (0.19) (0.26) (0.30) (0.22) (0.32) (0.29) (0.24)
Months lived in current house 0.011 -0.0031 0.0039 0.0056 0.0032 0.0021 0.0042 -0.015∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0086) (0.0063) (0.010) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0048) (0.0077)
There is an unsafe location nearby -0.012 0.29 0.0075 -0.24 -0.013 0.46 -0.25 0.15
(0.30) (0.32) (0.27) (0.40) (0.19) (0.30) (0.23) (0.23)
Lagged neighbourhood level variables (2010)
Police station in neighbourhood -0.14 0.067 -0.35 0.75∗∗∗ 0.072 -0.065 0.045 -0.076
(0.19) (0.29) (0.24) (0.28) (0.11) (0.29) (0.22) (0.28)
Chowk in neighbourhood 0.29 0.49∗ -0.19 -0.36∗ -0.059 0.66∗∗∗ -0.21 0.52∗
(0.33) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.22) (0.18) (0.27)
Hindu temple in neighbourhood -0.56 -0.077 -0.29 0.18 0.40∗∗ -0.51∗∗ 0.70∗∗ -0.84∗∗
(0.41) (0.30) (0.36) (0.27) (0.17) (0.25) (0.35) (0.35)
Mosque in neighbourhood 0.42∗ -0.53∗ 0.33 -0.72∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ 0.042 -0.20 0.33
(0.22) (0.27) (0.30) (0.24) (0.11) (0.38) (0.28) (0.30)
Market in neighbourhood -0.24 -0.16 -0.081 -0.16 -0.040 0.056 -0.068 0.19
(0.15) (0.35) (0.22) (0.27) (0.11) (0.35) (0.17) (0.27)
Lagged neighbourhood means of covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 526 319 526 319 526 319 526 319
Degrees of freedom 28.000 28.000 28.000 28.000 28.000 28.000 28.000 28.000
Chi-squared 812.247 101.886 86.951 978.245 218.956 224.885 200.920 120.254
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of clusters 44.000 42.000 44.000 42.000 44.000 42.000 44.000 42.000
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.14: Dependent Variable: Willingness to give
(1) (2)
Riot Riot × Match
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot -0.00057
(0.15)
More than %30 witnessed riot × No shared identity -0.25
(0.24)
Shared identity with vignette character 0.24∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.12) (0.14)
Assigned Hanif as character -0.18 -0.19
(0.12) (0.12)
Assigned Deshpande as character -0.083 -0.095
(0.10) (0.100)
Respondent age and sex in 2012
Age of respondent 0.0050 0.0050
(0.0038) (0.0039)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) 0.14 0.14
(0.11) (0.11)
Lagged respondent and household variables (2010)
Age of respondent -0.0058 -0.0058
(0.0055) (0.0055)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) -0.15∗ -0.15∗
(0.091) (0.090)
Permanent house materials 0.0095 0.0091
(0.081) (0.081)
Household is Muslim 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.16) (0.16)
Household size 0.0079 0.0084
(0.016) (0.016)
Household rents house (0=Owns) -0.070 -0.076
(0.15) (0.15)
Log of monthly income per capita 0.13∗ 0.13∗
(0.075) (0.075)
Mother tongue is Marathi 0.26 0.26
(0.17) (0.17)
Months lived in current house -0.0015 -0.0016
(0.0041) (0.0041)
There is an unsafe location nearby 0.15 0.15
(0.17) (0.17)
Hhd belongs to predominant religion/caste group 0.071 0.073
(0.11) (0.11)
Lagged neighbourhood level variables (2010)
Page 92 of 223
Police station in neighbourhood 0.18 0.19∗
(0.11) (0.12)
Chowk in neighbourhood -0.052 -0.080
(0.12) (0.13)
Hindu temple in neighbourhood 0.25 0.28∗
(0.16) (0.17)
Mosque in neighbourhood -0.36∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13)
Market in neighbourhood 0.16 0.15
(0.14) (0.14)
Lagged neighbourhood means of covariates Yes Yes
Observations 844 844
Degrees of freedom 31.000 33.000
Chi-squared 166.910 301.859
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000
Number of clusters 45.000 45.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.8: Conditional impact effect of match on willingness to give
Table 3.15: Effect of riot interacted with out–migration on social capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Organisation Trust Discussions Festival
More than %30 witnessed riot 0.86∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.33∗
(0.21) (0.23) (0.15) (0.18)
Proportion of households migrated by 1.24 2.44∗∗∗ -0.50 0.28
2012 (0.99) (0.89) (0.77) (0.70)
More than %30 witnessed riot × -7.91∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 3.02 4.00
Proportion of households migrated by 2012 (2.96) (2.42) (1.91) (2.55)
Respondent age and sex in 2012
Age of respondent -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0080∗∗ -0.0018
(0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0038)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) 0.16 0.0036 0.18∗ 0.095
(0.13) (0.10) (0.096) (0.097)
Lagged respondent and household variables (2010)
Age of respondent -0.0048 -0.0021 0.0016 -0.0018
(0.0070) (0.0059) (0.0054) (0.0049)
Sex of respondent (1=Male) -0.051 0.15 -0.12 0.040
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.091)
Permanent house materials -0.066 -0.18 0.030 0.26∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.12) (0.098) (0.092)
Household is Muslim -0.24 0.55∗∗ 0.27 0.067
(0.20) (0.24) (0.18) (0.21)
Household size 0.012 0.010 -0.00084 -0.0052
(0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015)
Household rents house (0=Owns) 0.12 0.27∗ -0.080 -0.12
(0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10)
Log of monthly income per capita -0.057 0.013 0.17∗∗ 0.12∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.069) (0.073)
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Mother tongue is Marathi 0.030 0.54∗∗∗ 0.25∗ -0.050
(0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.16)
Months lived in current house 0.0055 0.0015 0.0027 -0.0021
(0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0038) (0.0037)
There is an unsafe location nearby 0.059 -0.18 0.094 -0.070
(0.19) (0.23) (0.15) (0.15)
Hhd belongs to predominant -0.12 -0.091 0.14 0.13
religion/caste group (0.13) (0.12) (0.095) (0.12)
Lagged neighbourhood level variables (2010)
Police station in neighbourhood 0.066 -0.059 0.075 0.018
(0.15) (0.098) (0.091) (0.13)
Chowk in neighbourhood 0.37∗ -0.31∗∗ 0.10 0.061
(0.20) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15)
Hindu temple in neighbourhood -0.45∗ 0.0051 0.10 0.14
(0.25) (0.16) (0.13) (0.22)
Mosque in neighbourhood 0.16 -0.35∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.086
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.21)
Market in neighbourhood -0.091 -0.055 -0.022 -0.017
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Lagged neighbourhood means of covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 845 845 845 845
Degrees of freedom 31.000 31.000 31.000 31.000
Chi-squared 277.710 299.227 170.745 166.509
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of clusters 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.9: Impact effects of riots on social capital conditional on out–migration (with
95% CI)
(a) Belonging to an organisation (b) Trust in neighbours
(c) Participates in community discussions (d) Participates in festival preparation
3.12 Appendix C: Robustness Checks
Table 3.16: Heckman first stage: Probit model
(1)
Selection into second wave
Afraid of going to nearest town out of fear of 0.092
being mugged, attacked or abducted (0.10)
Afraid of going within current area out of fear of -0.046
being mugged, attacked or abducted (0.12)
Poor/unreliable amenities provision in -0.12
neighbourhood (0.19)
No police station in area 0.038
(0.28)
Respondent would like to move out of area -0.35∗∗∗
(0.13)
Feel female members are safe at day 0.14
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(0.20)
Feel female members are safe at day 0.045
(0.11)
Constant 4.37∗∗
(1.80)
Respondent and Household controls Yes
Neighbourhood controls Yes
Lagged neighbourhood means of covariates Yes
Observations 1063
Degrees of freedom 34.000
Chi-squared 228.331
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000
Number of clusters
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.17: Heckman second stage: Effect of riot on social capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Organisation Trust Discussions Festival
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot (d) 0.33∗ -0.20 -0.16∗ -0.093
(0.18) (0.22) (0.099) (0.12)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.20 0.83 -0.32 0.16
(0.60) (0.53) (0.41) (0.57)
Respondent and Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbourhood controls and means Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 845 845 845 845
Degrees of freedom 30.000 30.000 30.000 30.000
Chi-squared 628.119 94.428 123.365 258.139
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of clusters 45.000 45.000 45.000 45.000
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.18: Robustness checks: Different measures of social diversity
Organisation Trust Discussions Festival
Frac Pol Frac Pol Frac Pol Frac Pol
Main results (Caste group/Religious diversity)
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot 0.23 −5.7∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 1.96 0.59 −1.64 −0.33 −2.83∗∗
(0.95) (1.74) (0.70) (1.85) (0.43) (1.21) (0.49) (1.39)
Caste group/Religious diversity −0.70 −0.35 −0.044 −0.51 −0.28 −0.34 −0.71 −0.78
(0.50) (0.44) (0.50) (0.38) (0.37) (0.29) (0.47) (0.48)
At least 30% witnessed riot × Caste group/Religious diversity 0.03 7.92∗∗∗ −2.70∗∗ −2.89 −1.36∗ 1.92 0.25 3.46∗
(1.46) (2.31) (1.13) (2.50) (0.74) (1.63) (0.79) (1.83)
Religious diversity
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot −0.99∗ −1.25∗∗∗ 0.5 0.56 −0.22 −0.29 −0.68∗ −0.64∗
(0.52) (0.42) (0.4) (0.39) (0.28) (0.27) (0.39) (0.37)
Religious diversity −1.44∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ 0.24 0.09 −0.2 −0.14 −1.14 −0.65∗∗
(0.46) (0.23) 0.37 (0.21) (0.31) (0.16) (0.49) (0.18)
At least 30% witnessed riot × Religious diversity 3.55∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ −2.27∗∗ −1.3∗∗ 0.04 0.16 1.19 0.67
(1.34) (0.59) (1.06) (0.52) (0.81) (0.42) (0.95) (0.51)
Caste group diversity
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot 2.36∗∗ −1.09 3.01∗∗ −4.8∗ 1.99∗∗∗ −3.1∗∗∗ 0.54 −2.72∗∗
(1.06) (2.41) (1.53) (2.56) (0.55) (0.93) (0.96) (1.27)
Caste group diversity −0.11 0.68 0.61 0.34 −0.11 0.09 −0.14 0.89∗
(0.59) (0.86) (0.52) (0.71) (0.37) (0.43) (0.42) (0.47)
At least 30% witnessed riot × Caste group diversity −3.32∗ 1.69 −5.21∗∗ 5.57∗ −3.48∗∗∗ 3.55∗∗∗ −1.03 3.17∗∗
(1.72) (2.94) (2.55) (3.01) (0.89) (1.17) (1.49) (1.58)
Jati diversity
At least 30% of neighbourhood witnessed a riot 3.32 −0.27 3.29 −1.43∗∗ 2.47∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ 1.39 −0.36
(2.09) (0.56) (2.03) (0.66) (1.21) (0.35) (1.11) (0.35)
Jati diversity 0.21 0.03 −0.39 −0.18 0.07 −0.09 −0.27 0.24
(1.04) (0.64) (0.96) (0.59) (0.82) (0.49) (0.81) (0.55)
At least 30% witnessed riot × Jati diversity −3.5 1.36 −4.05∗ 2.81∗∗ 1.72 1.77∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗ 0.64
(2.4) (1.27) (2.39) (1.37) (1.45) (0.68) (1.33) (0.67)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
P
age
9
8
of
223
Figure 3.10: Using different cut–offs for neighbourhood level riots
Chapter 4
Making and breaking social capital
The effect of displacement and return
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Abstract
This chapter studies the effect of returning home after conflict induced displace-
ment on social capital, compared to remaining displaced. I have collected a household
survey of displaced Palestinians from a refugee camp in Lebanon, and this chapter
assesses the impact of return on the different dimensions of social capital based on a
diverse and rich set of questions. An instrumental variable is used to model the return
decision in one part of the camp, and the exogenous nature of return is exploited in
another section of the camp. Results show that return can improve social capital if
households return within one year of the war ending and with their friends and family.
If households have been displaced for too long, then social capital is decreased upon
returning home. This indicates that social capital is not simply carried over from
displacement to return, but is rebuilt in a process that takes time and effort.
We were leading a happy life, despite the difficulties of being refugees, because we were living amidst
our relatives, friends and neighbours and they helped us to face any problems. But now we miss
our life among our friends. We miss the good old days and we miss the large family circle.
Samira Loubani, displaced Palestinian from Nahr el–Bared refugee camp1
1Taken from an UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East) emergency appeal progress report on the reconstruction of Nahr el–Bared camp (UNRWA, 2008b).
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4.1 Introduction
Wars, conflicts and natural disasters have produced an estimated 50 million refugees,
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and stateless persons around the world (UNHCR,
2014). More often than not, this has resulted in a ‘refugee crisis’, since host countries and
communities struggle to find the resources to care for refugees or the political motivation to
allow them to settle. While the UNHCR seeks a ‘lasting and durable solution’, the return
of refugees and IDPs is promoted by the hosts without fully considering the consequences.
Some evidence has shown that returnees have difficulty readjusting to the life that they
have left, finding that economic, social, cultural and political conditions have changed
(Kibreab, 2002). In many cases refugees and IDPs do not want to return home (Deininger
et al., 2004), because they fear for their safety, and also find that ‘home’ has become a
foreign place after years of displacement. Before promoting return, many questions on the
consequences of returning should be answered in a rigorous and empirical fashion. This
chapter aims to address this issue by exploring the effect of returning home after conflict
induced displacement on social capital.
Social capital — the networks of relatives, friends and neighbours and the trust, co–
dependency and cooperation that results from these relationships (Portes, 1998) — is a
necessary factor for economic development, especially when formal institutions are weak
(Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002). Conflict can alter the social fabric of the communities
involved (Colletta and Cullen, 2000), and understanding how social capital changes with
the return of displaced populations is crucial. So far the creation of social capital is
not well understood, mostly because it is correlated with a large range of environmental,
political, economic and demographic factors. What happens to social capital after return
from conflict induced displacement is even less clear, despite the fact that a peaceful and
cooperative society is a primary concern in post–conflict settings (Varshney, 2001). This
chapter addresses a major gap in the literature by identifying an exogenous return effect
on different dimensions of social capital drawn from a large number of indicators, namely
trust, bonding social capital, non–institutional social capital and ‘weak’ social capital.
Theoretically, social capital can be destroyed during the displacement phase because of
large geographical distances, but restored upon return. It could be maintained throughout
the displacement and return process because IDPs rely on their networks for support. New
social capital could be formed during displacement, and returnees might have to start this
process all over again upon return. These are all plausible hypotheses that empirical
research should address, but the current state of the art has no answers.
This research presents a major contribution to the literature in that it utilises the first
dataset that contains a representative sample of both the displaced and those that have
returned home. In order to estimate a causal return effect, I exploit the nature of the return
process of Palestinian households from Nahr el–Bared camp (NBC) in North Lebanon. In
2007, a war broke out in NBC which lasted for 3 months. All residents of the camp
were evacuated to nearby areas in the first few days of the war while the Lebanese army
conducted an aerial bombardment operation to wipe out Fatah al–Islam militia fighters
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who were hiding in the camp. The aerial bombardment completely destroyed all buildings
and homes in one of two sections of the camp (section A), but the damage in the second
section B was sporadic and superficial. Households from section B were able to return
home soon after the war ended, if their houses were rebuilt or undamaged. However,
section A was completely destroyed during the war, so in the aftermath this section was
cordoned off from the public and divided into eight geographical plots so that it could be
rebuilt. Once funding from international donors was received for each plot, reconstruction
took place and households were allowed to return home.
Because the decision of returning could be correlated with household characteristics, the
damage levels are used as an instrumental variable to model the return decision in section
B. The aerial bombardment occurred after households were evacuated, and it is difficult
to conceive that dwellings were targeted based on any of the households’ characteristics.
Rather, I argue that the bombing in section B was a random spill–over from the main
operation. In section A we have a cleaner natural experiment, and I use the fact that the
return decision was out of the hands of the household to provide a plausibly exogenous
return effect.
The current gap in the literature is due to a lack of available data — displaced house-
holds are by nature difficult to locate and there is a potential selection bias involved when
dealing with displacement and subsequent return (Deininger et al., 2004). Some studies
have tried to find a way around this challenge, by comparing returnees with ‘stayers’, or
those who were never displaced to begin with. Fiala (2015) and Verwimp and Mun˜oz Mora
(2013) have found that returnees lag behind stayers in terms of calorie intake, poverty and
household welfare. In contrast, Kondylis (2008) finds that returnees actually outperform
stayers in agricultural productivity, but this could be a short term impact of returnees try-
ing to catch up. By comparing households who have been displaced to stayers, the impact
of return is not isolated, but confounded with the displacement effect. In order to better
evaluate the return policy, returnees should be compared to those who are still displaced,
rather than those who were never displaced in the first place. Bozzoli et al. (2011) are able
to avoid this confounding effect, and find that returnees, compared to IDPs, are less likely
to work in trading and more likely to make handicrafts and participate in a wider range
of activities. However, their empirical strategy relies on the household head’s experience
of conflict, another factor which has been confounded with the return effect.
This chapter vastly improves on current datasets and identification strategies, which
have until now confounded the return effect with displacement or experience of conflict.
Because the residents of NBC were originally registered with a UN agency, it was relatively
easy to track down households who were displaced around the country (the details of the
data collection are explained in section 4.4). In addition, as the movement of Palestinians
in Lebanon is restricted to within the country (as was their displacement), I am certain of
capturing a representative sample of households living in NBC prior to the war, a major
achievement and unique contribution to the conflict and displacement literature, which has
thus far been unable to collect data on difficult to reach populations such as the displaced.
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Because of this, the literature has so far confounded the displacement and return effect.
However, this chapter provides an isolated and causal estimate of the effect of return,
a critical piece of information for both the displaced and relevant policy makers when
considering the option of returning home. I am also able to causally identify the impact
of return, by exploiting the exogenous return process in section A and an instrumental
variable (the damage level of the original dwelling) in section B of NBC.
The main results show that there are two effects on social capital. Section A re-
turnees have lower average social capital compared to the displaced (particularly lower
bonding, non–institutional and weak social capital), but section B returnees have higher
non–institutional social capital compared to the displaced. These results are robust to
various specifications. Further analysis indicates that the positive effect of return is felt
most for those who return home early with friends and family, but as time passes return
will decrease social capital compared to the displaced. Logistical concerns and challenges
that arise upon immediate return do not make social capital a priority, and building or
restoring social capital takes time. Returnees in section A have only returned within the
last year, however section B returnees had returned, on average, 5 years earlier. This
implies that the creation of social capital is a slow process, and is not simply ‘carried over’
during displacement and return. But despite starting from scratch, IDPs show resilience
in the face of losing their social capital, rebuilding it during displacement and once again
upon return.
This chapter contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, I study a consequence
of returning home that has not been previously evaluated in a rigorous and scientific man-
ner: the effect of return on social capital. Secondly, this chapter improves on previous
strategies used to identify the consequences of returning home after conflict induced dis-
placement by a) utilising a unique dataset that is representative of all households prior to
the displacement and b) causally estimating the impact of return through the exogenous
nature of the return process. Thirdly, I contribute to the literature on the formation of
social capital, which has thus far been unable to explain how social capital is formed over
time (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Gambetta, 1988; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002).
Lastly I contribute to the emerging literature that explores the relationship between
social capital and conflict. On the one hand this literature has found that conflict can
destroy the social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000), decrease civic association (De Luca
and Verpoorten, 2011) and create mistrust (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2011; Rohner et al.,
2013; Cassar et al., 2013). On the other hand, older children exposed to conflict behave in
more egalitarian ways (Michal et al., 2011), individuals exposed to civil conflict have higher
civic association (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009), are more altruistic (Voors
et al., 2012) and display more pro–social behaviour (Gilligan et al., 2014). A distinguishing
feature of this chapter is that it unpacks social capital into different dimensions based on a
diverse and rich range of social capital indicators. In addition, I explore various potential
mechanisms that could explain how social capital changes, particularly how it is built up
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over time and depends on others in the social environment. In these two ways this chapter
provides much needed insight into the complexity of the relationship between social capital
and conflict, lending evidence to an exciting debate.
The next section explains the conceptual framework behind social capital. Section
4.3 describes the context, then section 4.4 explains how the data was collected, and in
particular how social capital is measured. Section 4.5 outlines the identification strategy
and 4.6 the subsequent results. In section 4.7, I show how timing of return drives the two
opposite effects of return. Section 4.8 provides robustness checks for the main results, and
section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
There is a current consensus that social capital refers to social networks and relationships,
and the social outcomes that result from these resources, such as trust, cooperation, and
dependency (Portes, 1998). A body of empirical literature suggests several advantages to a
more cooperative society and better socialised individuals: public goods, institutions and
community–level investments are more effective (Habyarimana, 2009), the tragedy of the
commons is avoided (Ostrom et al., 1999), public institutions and public policies are more
productive (Putnam et al., 1994a), growth rates increase (Fukuyama, 1996; Knack and
Keefer, 1997), human productivity is higher (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2002), household
welfare improves (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Maluccio et al., 2000), high school drop
outs decrease (Coleman, 1988), and financial investments and networks increase (Harker
et al., 1990). Related to the subject of this chapter, properly developed social capital that
brings together different communities is essential for lasting peace in post–conflict settings
(Varshney, 2001) and a reduction in violent crime (Lederman et al., 2002).
Although the importance of social capital is not in dispute, its definition has been
contested. This is mainly due to vagueness over whether social capital refers to the actual
resources, i.e. the social networks and relationships, or the results of these relationships
(which can serve as resources in themselves), i.e. trust, cooperation and dependence
(Portes, 1998). For this reason, and following from recent work on social capital, this
chapter adopts a multi–faceted approach (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2002; Grootaert and
van Bastelaer, 2002), which can identify extensive social networks that are helpful in
finding a job in a city (Granovetter, 1974), and strong social connections that are necessary
for community collective action in a small village (Marwell et al., 1988). In addition, I
differentiate between bridging social capital, which refers to social capital between two
members of two different groups, and bonding social capital, which refers to capital within
the same group (Putnam, 2000). These categories have been guided by Grootaert and van
Bastelaer (2002) as well as an extensive review of the empirical social capital literature.
Section 4.4 provides further description of the questionnaire and variables used for the
analysis and how they are combined using factor analysis to form four dimensions of
social capital: trust, bonding social capital, non–institutional social capital and weak
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social capital.
The current understanding of how conflict induced displacement and return affects
social capital is weak, and the results are theoretically ambiguous. We might expect
forced displacement to destroy and disrupt social capital, as large geographical distances
are created between previous neighbours, and meeting friends and family becomes difficult
and dangerous. Because old neighbours live far apart, they might not be able to rely and
depend on each other as much as before. Trust could deteriorate as friends see each other
less, and are forced to compete for limited resources. Upon returning home social capital
could be restored.
On the other hand, social capital can be used throughout the displacement process as
an essential resource when governments and institutions are weak or even untrustworthy.
In addition, entire social networks can be displaced collectively (Harpviken, 2009). Sayigh
(1978) finds that when Palestinians were displaced from Palestine to Lebanon in 1948,
there was a reliance on social and kinship networks which were used as a survival tool
in the absence of a formal government. This was reinforced by the collective trauma and
nakba2. Also, in this age of easy mobility and communication, geographical distance need
not imply a disruption to social capital, this is especially true of internal displacement and
migration within the same country. It is even likely that those displaced for a long period
of time will be able to build new networks that can be maintained once returned home.
These hypotheses imply three possible effects of return on social capital:
• If displacement destroys social capital, then returning home might restore it, and
higher social capital amongst returnees compared to the displaced will be observed.
This is especially true for returnees who have been displaced for long periods of time,
as they have formed new networks and relationships.
• On the other hand, social capital might not be the priority upon returning home,
because for example, households do not have a completed and furnished house ready
for entertaining.
• If social capital is maintained throughout the displacement, there will be no impact
of return.
Theoretically, the impact of return on social capital is not immediately clear and thus an
empirical analysis is needed.
4.3 Context
4.3.1 Nahr el–Bared camp
Palestinian refugees represent a specific refugee situation, in that it is one of the longest
cases of protracted displacement in the world (Dumper, 2006). It has been 67 years
2Nakba is the Arabic word for disaster, which is used to refer to the exodus of 1948.
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since they fled from Palestine, and up to three generations have been born in Lebanon.
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon were established to host Palestinians who escaped
the violence during 1948 Palestinian nakba. Today, there are 12 official camps, managed
by UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East), which host around 280,000 registered refugees. Marginalised and denied many of
their rights by the Lebanese government, social and family ties have become an important
part of life for Palestinians in Lebanon, a coping strategy to deal with the current situation
(Sayigh, 1978).
The Nahr el–Bared refugee camp (NBC) was established by the League of Red Cross
societies in 1949. NBC, a small enclosure of around 2 km2, is located in the north of
Lebanon, around 20 km from Tripoli (the capital of the North Lebanon district). Prior
to 2007 the camp was host to around 27,000 individuals (4,600 households) (UNRWA,
2008a).
Nahr el–Bared camp is administratively divided into two parts, section A and section B.
While section A was the land assigned to Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese government
in 1949, due to population growth the boundaries of the camp have expanded to include
section B. Figure 4.1 shows section A in pink and the shaded area around it is section B.
The distribution of residents (as they were living in Nahr el–Bared prior to the 2007 war)
between the sections is shown in table 4.1 — section A is the more densely populated part
of the camp. As explained in the following sections, my analysis is conducted separately
in each of sections A and B, and section 4.5 of this chapter discusses possible differences
between these two sections that could yield different results, including population densities.
4.3.2 War in 2007 and displacement
In May of 2007, fighting broke out in the camp when members of Fatah al–Islam stole
money from a bank near Tripoli, and hid in apartments in the area. Fatah al–Islam is an
Islamist militia that was able to reside in NBC due to the absence of Lebanese security
and intelligence within the camp.
The Lebanese armed forces raided these apartments killing several militants (Ramadan,
2009). In retaliation, members of Fatah al–Islam attacked an army base outside the camp,
brutally killing ten Lebanese soldiers. The Lebanese army then began shelling the camp,
and the three month long war ensued. 47 civilians were killed, 95% of buildings in section
A of the camp were completely destroyed or damaged beyond repair, and the majority of
households were forced to flee from their homes. The neighbouring Beddawi refugee camp
hosted a large number of the ‘internally displaced refugees’, and the remaining families
were displaced to various parts of the country, the majority remaining in North Lebanon.
Figure 4.3 shows where households stayed during the displacement, with the majority
staying with family who were living in other parts of the country.
The neighbouring Beddawi refugee camp hosted a large number of the ‘internally dis-
placed refugees’, and the remaining families were displaced to various parts of the country,
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the majority remaining in North Lebanon, as shown in figure 4.2. Figure 4.3 shows where
households stayed during the displacement, with the majority staying with family who
were living in other parts of the country. There is a clear majority of households staying
with either friends or family, but other collective centres such as schools, garages and
mosques were also used as temporary shelter during the initial phase of displacement. On
average households have moved 2.7 times (including the initial displacement) since 2007.
88.64% of households in the sample were displaced all together, and of the households
who were not displaced all together, only two households had members who did not join
them later on.
After the war, section A was almost completely destroyed by aerial bombardment from
the Lebanese military, as this was where Fatah al–Islam militants were residing. Section
B, on the other hand, was not subjected to as much destruction. Figure 4.4a shows the
geographical distribution of the destroyed buildings, with completely destroyed buildings
mapped in red. We notice a concentration of destruction within the confines of section A,
but a more sporadic distribution of damaged buildings in section B. It should be noted
that Palestinians from NBC were not in support of Fatah al–Islam, but had to put up with
them because of fear of retaliation (Ramadan, 2009). In fact, as a part of the robustness
checks in section 4.8 I have controlled for trust in ‘local forces’, a proxy for Fatah al–Islam,
in case households from section A were more trusting of these fighters to begin with.
4.3.3 Return process
During the war, all residents of Nahr el–Bared camp were evacuated and displaced to
nearby camps. The majority of residents were displaced from Nahr el–Bared camp during
the first few days of the war. Since the initial displacement, 22.54% of the sample had
returned home. As explained below and in figure 4.5, the return process was different in
sections A and B.
Firstly, residents of section A were unable to return home immediately after the war.
Rather, the decision of returning home was left to UNRWA, an external agency. As section
A was almost completely destroyed from aerial bombardments during the war, the area
needed to be cordoned off to ensure the safety of the residents. UNRWA divided section
A into eight unique geographical packages. The partition of the camp was not random,
instead the camp was partitioned into four quadrants and the far right quadrant was
rebuilt first alongside neighbourhoods closest to the sea. UNRWA did not disclose any
reasoning behind this choice, and it is thought that they expected to receive funding for
all the reconstruction at once. While they started work in one corner of the camp it was
not envisioned that packages of the camp would be finished before others. As it happened,
there were delays to construction because of a lack of funding and due to the discovery
of an ancient archaeological site, so UNRWA allowed those whose dwellings were rebuilt
to return home. At the time of my fieldwork, only 3 packages have been rebuilt, and 332
households (or 33 households from the sample and 7.35% of residents of section A) had
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returned home. Figure 4.4b gives us an idea of the reconstruction process within section
A. Buildings in blue have been reconstructed, whereas buildings in grey belong to packages
which have not yet been financed.
This return process in section A made the decision to return outside the hands of the
household and therefore uncorrelated to any socio–economic characteristics and indepen-
dent of labour market outcomes. In order to provide evidence of this exogeneity, I have
constructed pre–war characteristics based on the dataset and compared households and
individuals who had returned and found little difference. I also rule out the possibility
that households with connections to UNRWA are able to have their dwelling rebuilt by
controlling for a contact with UNRWA as part of the robustness checks. This identification
strategy is explained further in section 4.5.
As for the households originally from section B, if their dwellings were exposed to
superficial or no damage, households were able to return home soon after the war ended.
Remaining households have struggled to put together the funds to rebuild their houses,
with little support from the Norwegian Refugee Council and other NGOs. As the decision
of return is highly dependent on whether the household’s original dwelling was destroyed
during the war, this is used as an instrumental variable to predict the return status of the
household. In this way, I can purge the return decision from any factors that are correlated
with household characteristics, such as job opportunities and social networks, which can
independently affect social capital. I also control for current household wealth measured
by consumption and assets, in case poorer households with poorly built houses were those
that were destroyed. This is explained further in section 4.5. Figure 4.5 summarises the
return process in both sections of the camp.
Palestinians do represent a specific community within Lebanon and we might be con-
cerned that lessons learnt from this case study are exclusive to a population that have been
displaced twice. But in reality only 4.6% of the sample were alive at the time of the ini-
tial displacement. Although living standards and social isolation are unfavourable, many
Palestinians have set up home within the camp — their situation of displacement becoming
a permanent status, especially since the Oslo Accords of 1993 which have severely dimin-
ished the chances of return to Palestine. This does not mean that Palestinian refugees have
given up on their right of return, but for the definition of returning used in my analysis
it is safe to say that Palestinian refugees from Nahr el–Bared still regard the camp as a
home —be it a home away from home (Ramadan, 2010). The displacement of households
from Nahr el–Bared camp can be comparable to many cases of forced displacement and
returning around the world, from Sri Lankan asylum seekers in the UK who have been
forced to return, to the large scale return of refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The analysis of this chapter relies on households who are displaced and those have
returned to be similar in every way if the war had never happened. Unfortunately, I do
not have a pre–war dataset that I could match to the current dataset in order to compare
characteristics of the displaced and returnees. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 compare constructed
pre–war characteristics between the returnees and the displaced in each of sections A and
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B.
The pre-war characteristics were created by excluding individuals from the sample
below the age of five. Five years have been subtracted from the ages, I also constructed
certain education variables by excluding those who were younger than 27 in the current
dataset, or 21 at the time of the war in 2007. These constructed variables can be considered
as proxies for pre–war characteristics, and the differences in averages across these variables
between the displaced and returnees are not significant. The one exception to this is the
literacy rate in section A, returnees have higher literacy than the displaced. There is
no reason to believe that educated households were systematically targeted and asked to
return, so I have considered this to be an anomaly in the data and controlled for literacy
in the subsequent analysis. When conducting multiple hypothesis testing, 5% of tests will
provide a significant result due to the nature of the test (Shaffer, 1995). In this case, we
are testing for differences amongst 30 variables, so it is expected that in 1.5 cases we will
find a significant result.
4.4 Data collection and data
In order to obtain the information needed for this research question, I conducted a house-
hold survey with the help of a local NGO, Lebanon Support,3 in February of 2012.
I collected a 590 household dataset, stratified so that a representative sample of house-
holds residing in each of the different residential areas was obtained. The sample was
drawn from a database provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Collected soon after the 2007 war and
over the following year, the aim of this database was to register and trace all households
displaced from Nahr el–Bared camp. As displaced families approached centres throughout
the country to receive aid and rent subsidies, UNRWA social workers gathered concise de-
mographic information on the members of the households, the addresses of the household,
and if possible a contact number. This information is updated each time rent subsidies
are disbursed to displaced households, which at the time of the survey was three times per
year. The version of the database which was used to create the sample for this household
survey was last updated in December of 2012, i.e. one month prior to fieldwork.
Because the reality of the return process was only made clear to me after the data
collection process, the sample was not equally split between section A and section B. Of
the 590 households, 449 originally resided in section A and 141 in section B. With a modest
impact size of around 0.1 standard deviations, this yields a power of 28% in section A and
14% in section B. This means that there is relatively high chance that true effects are
shown to be insignificant. This should be kept in mind for the analysis.
Within each geographical strata households were selected randomly, either geograph-
3http://daleel-madani.org/about-lebanon-support
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ically using the right–hand rule4 or households were randomly selected from a list and
traced. The choice of selection depended on how clustered households were in a given
geographical strata—if households were dispersed then they were traced, but if they were
clustered together then geographical selection on site was more appropriate. Because I
used a stratified sampling methodology, different sampling strategies can be used for each
stratum (Cochran, 1977).
The dataset was collected through face–to–face interviews with one member from each
household using a pre–determined questionnaire programmed into tablet PCs. The data
collectors interviewed an available household member if he/she was above 15. The re-
spondent answered questions about all household members (e.g. the levels of health and
education), questions at the level of the household (e.g. household expenditure on food),
and questions related to the respondent him/herself (e.g. How many times have you visited
a friend over the last week to socialize?).
4.4.1 Social Capital
The dataset includes more than twenty–five variables capturing the different dimensions
of social capital. These variables and related questions from the questionnaire are listed
in table 4.30 in the appendix, and include: the level of trust in neighbours; the number
of times an individual socialised over the last week; and reactions to certain hypothetical
situations, such as “Would you expect your purse or wallet to be returned to you if it was
dropped in the street in your neighbourhood?”. I also included some questions particular
to the Palestinian culture, such as “How many times have you paid condolences to someone
over the last year?”. I also ask if households have a contact within UNRWA or the camp’s
popular committee in order to capture a prevalent form of social capital in the Arab
world, social connections, or wasta. To the best of my knowledge this is the first paper
that quantifies it.
First, I took a simple average of these variables to compute average social capital.
Second, I used factor analysis to accommodate for any subtlety that might be cancelled out
if the variables are averaged out (Narayan and Cassidy, 2001). To illustrate this, consider
the variables that measure trust. Respondents are asked whether they trust certain groups
of individuals (such as other Palestinians) and institutions (such as the Lebanese army)
from a scale of one to four, ranging from completely distrust to completely trust. If I
were to take an average of these trust scores, a potentially negative response to trust of
the Lebanese army will be cancelled out by the likely positive response to trust of other
Palestinians.
4If the total population size of a strata is 100, and the sample size required in this strata is 25, then
100/25 = 4 is used as a counting rule. Enumerators would count three dwellings (verifying with locals
that the dwellings were inhabited by one household) and interview the fourth household. If enumerators
were faced with an intersection, they would always choose the right side. This ensures that all parts of the
enumeration area are covered, and if enumerators choose different starting points, they will not cover the
same ground.
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In addition, factor analysis will divide social capital into independent dimensions, and
attach weights to each of the social capital variables related to how much they explain
the variance of a given component, whereas a simple average will assign an equal weight
to two variables that are essentially measuring the same thing. For example, trust in
neighbours is likely to be closely correlated with trust in Palestinians. Factor analysis
will assign a weight to each variable that corresponds to how much extra variation the
variables add to the social capital index. If trust in Palestinians does not add anything
substantial to the measurement of social capital, then it will be assigned a low weight.
Theoretically, factor analysis can identify two components of social capital — bridging
and bonding social capital, if they are in fact independent of each other.
For these reasons, factor analysis allows the data to speak to the researcher, rather
than forcing the data into pre–conceptualised dimensions of social capital. After I applied
factor analysis to the data, four different and independent dimensions of social capital
were identified.5 After interpreting the size and sign of the weights given to each variable
in the four dimensions, I attached four labels to these dimensions, as explained below:
Trust:
This dimension of social capital gives the highest weight to all the trust variables. These
variables are based on a series of questions of the form “On a scale of 1–4, how much do
you trust community leaders, committee leaders, local forces...”.
Bonding social capital:
Referring to social capital within one community, this dimension gives a higher weight to
social capital variables related to Palestinians, and sometimes negative weight to those
related to the Lebanese. These variables include having a contact with the UN, having
a contact with the camp’s popular committee, belonging to a civic association or group,
and trust in neighbours and Palestinians.
Non–institutional social capital:
This dimension gave larger and positive weights to social capital variables related to indi-
viduals, specifically the number of relatives and friends, the number of wedding invitations
and times condolences were paid over the last year, the number of potential wedding guests
if a family member got married today and the trust variables relating to individuals rather
than institutions. In fact, trust in institutions such as the popular committee, community
leaders and local forces have a negative weight.
Weak social capital:
The variables with a positive weight in this dimension are variables related to having
extensive social capital: having a contact, being invited to weddings, paying condolences
and belonging to a group. However, social interaction variables do not have much weight
and trust variables have negative weight, and so we can interpret this as extensive social
capital but of a weak quality, in reference to Granovetter’s distinction between weak,
extensive social ties and strong, dense ties (Granovetter, 1974).
5The Keiser–Olsen–Meyer statistic is 0.75, which is reasonably high, indicating that there is enough
common variance amongst the variables and making it suitable for factor analysis.
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Table 4.2 provides the weights of each of these variables for the four dimensions. The
dimensions are standardised with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Table 4.3
shows us how the averages of these dimensions of social capital differ between the displaced
and returnees in section A and section B. We see that social capital is lower across all
dimensions for returnees in section A, but higher amongst returnees in section B (except
for bonding and non–institutional capital where there is no significant difference). While
we do not control for any other variables or address the possible endogeneity of return in
section B, these descriptive statistics largely corroborate the regression results reported in
section 4.6. Section 4.7 tries to understand why we see these two opposite effects of return
on social capital.
4.5 Identification Strategy
I aim to estimate a causal effect of return on 5 different indexes or dimensions of social
capital: average social capital, trust, bonding social capital, non–institutional social capital
and weak social capital. Specifically, I am interested in estimating the following equation:
Social capitali,j = α+ β1Returnk + β2Respondenti
+β3Householdk + β4Populationl + 
(4.1)
Where Social capitali,j is the j
th dimension of social capital (average social capital and
the four dimensions specified in section 4.4) for respondent i and Returnk is a dummy
variable specifying whether the respondent’s household k has returned or not. Populationl
is the number of Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared living in the area l of the household,
a variable that will conceivably affect social capital. Respondenti and Householdk are
respondent and household covariates that are summarised in table 4.4. These variables are
those commonly used in the literature when explaining the determinants of social capital
(Glaeser et al., 2002), and proved to be significant in at least one of the specifications
tested. In particular, the control variables are: the sex, age, and literacy of the respondent,
whether the household is nuclear, the age of the oldest household member, the household
sex ratio, an index of household assets, household monthly consumption, and whether the
household stayed with friends or family during the entire displacement period (compared
to renting a house or staying at a school or other institution).
In this case it is impossible to include fixed effects, because they would be collinear with
the main variable of interest, return. Those who have returned all live within the same
area, so there would be no variation below the ‘treatment’ variable. Robust standard errors
are estimated to correct for any potential interdependence among the standard errors.
Deininger et al. (2004) propose that households are willing to return if the expected
utility of returning is greater than the expected utility of remaining displaced or resettling.
This utility depends on associated risks due to violent conflict in the area of displacement
or potential return, the economic opportunities available for household members in both
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areas, migration costs, and certain socio–demographic characteristics that might shape
the preferences of the household. In particular, after forced displacement from the long–
standing conflict in Colombia, Deininger et al. (2004) find that landowners, agricultural
labourers and those with dense social networks are more willing to return home. On the
other hand, more vulnerable groups and those who have experienced trauma before and
throughout the displacement are less likely to return home.
Equation 4.1 will be biased if any of the socio–demographic characteristics not ac-
counted for in the control variables that affect the return decision also affect social capital,
or if they include social capital itself. If returnees inherently have higher social capital,
then we will overestimate β1, the effect of return.
As mentioned previously, the dynamics of the return process were different for house-
holds originally from section A and section B of the camp, and imply two different iden-
tification strategies. Due to this difference, I have divided my sample in two: households
who originate from section A and households who originate from section B. In each section
I address the potential endogeneity of social capital and return.
Before proceeding with the separate identification strategies it is worth mentioning
that there are some concerns to splitting the sample in two, especially if the households
from the two different sections are systematically different. However, this will not affect
the return coefficient unless the systematic difference is correlated with the return effect.
This is similar to using a fixed effect control at the section level, which would control for
the effect of the section on the outcome variable. In section 4.8.4, as a robustness check
I combined both sections to create one sample and then conducted the same analysis
including section fixed effects. This yielded similar results to the ones reported in section
4.6. In other words, there might be characteristics of the camps that affect social capital
in different ways, but this cannot not be driving the difference in results alone.
Based on anecdotal evidence and observations from the field, I list below three potential
differences between these two camps and how I aim to control for this in the analysis and
robustness checks:
1. Relationship with Fatah al–Islam
For some Palestinian residents, the fact that Fatah al–Islam was residing in Nahr el–Bared
camp was heard on the eve of the war, as Lebanese news channels brought breaking news
to the rest of the country. There is now a consensus that Fatah al–Islam is a non–local and
external entity composed of Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians and other nationals, aiming to
establish an Islamic emirate (Hassan and Hanafi, 2010). Due to lax security of Palestinian
camps, ambiguous land laws in NBC, and a lack of agreement among Palestinians on
how best to deal with the infiltration, Fatah al–Islam managed to secure Nahr el–Bared
camp as a jihadi base. Local support for the group was not a considerable factor in the
establishment of their base.
However, if there is variation amongst Palestinians in terms of support for Fatah al–
Islam, this might have effects on the social fabric of society upon return. For example,
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supporters of Fatah al–Islam might be blamed for the war and displacement. Supporters
could be ostracised by the rest of society, thus having lower social capital upon return. If
it is the case that support was systematically different in section A and B of the camp, it
could yield different effects of return.
While it was too sensitive to ask about support of Fatah al–Islam directly, I included
a question asking how much the respondent trusts local forces. This does not spell out
Fatah al–Islam in case the questionnaire ended up in the wrong hands, but there is an
understanding that this refers to the Islamist militia. Table 4.5 shows no statistical dif-
ference between trust of local forces in section A and section B. If we also compare trust
of the Lebanese army, which would be low if the respondent supported Fatah al–Islam,
we also see no significant results. As a further test, trust of local forces and the Lebanese
army are excluded from the social capital index and used as a separate regressor in table
4.23. These results are the same as the main results.
2. Age of camp
Section A of the Nahr el–Bared camp is often referred to as ‘The Old Camp’. It was the
land originally given to Palestinians once they were exiled from Palestine, and section B
was a natural continuation of the small original allocation. While the age of the camp is a
difference between the two sections, theoretically it is implausible to believe that this could
change the way that return affects social capital. The age of the respondent is controlled
for in the regressions, and this can act as a proxy for the age of social relationships.
3. Population density
Prior to the war, section A and section B had different population densities. The majority
of Palestinians live in section A, an area which is around one tenth the size of section B.
The density of the population could be related to social capital and how return affects
social capital. For example, a household living in a densely populated neighbourhood
during displacement could find that their social capital is reduced upon return to sparsely
populated neighbourhoods. In order to test this empirically, I have included as a re-
gressor the number of Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared living in the household’s current
neighbourhood in the main analysis.
As further evidence to show that any systematic difference between the two camps is
not causing the effect of return on social capital to be different in section A and section
B, I have compared the social capital of the displaced who are originally from section A
to those displaced but originally from section B. Ideally, we would compare the pre–war
social capital of section A and B, but this data does not exist. Table 4.6 shows that there
is no statistical difference amongst the social capital of the displaced from section A and
section B.
In addition to comparing social capital, table 4.7, compares pre–war individual and
household characteristics of households originally from section A and those from section
B. We see that there is a significant difference in education, section A residents are more
educated. I have checked for impact heterogeneity of return across education backgrounds
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(amongst other variables). The analysis does not find any heterogeneity along these lines,
and while the results are not reported here, they are available at the request of the author.
4.5.1 Section A
As previously explained, in section A the camp was geographically partitioned into pack-
ages by UNRWA, making the decision to return outside the hands of the household and
therefore uncorrelated to any socio–economic characteristics and independent of the social
capital of the households. In section A I simply estimate equation 4.1 using ordinary least
squares.
Table 4.8 provides justification for the exogeneity of return in section A, showing that
there is little significant difference between returnees and displaced persons in terms of
pre–war household and individual characteristics. The pre–war characteristics were con-
structed using certain variables that are unlikely to have changed because of the war,
displacement or return. This includes individual level sex, age, and literacy as well as
household level sex ratio, average age, household size, dependency ratio, number of chil-
dren in the household and number of working members. When constructing these variables
I excluded all of those born after the war in 2007. I also constructed certain education
variables by excluding those who were younger than 27 in the current dataset, or 21 at
the time of the war in 2007. There seems to be a slight difference in literacy between re-
turnees and displaced persons, but there is no reason to believe that educated households
were systematically targeted and asked to return, since the camp was clearly divided into
packages in a transparent manner. Nevertheless, education of the respondent is controlled
for in the main analysis.
It can be argued that households with close connections to officials rebuilding the camp
have influenced the reconstruction process. As part of the robustness checks in section 4.8,
I control for connections to UNRWA and find no difference in results. A second potential
challenge to the exogeneity of return could result from some households whose dwellings
were reconstructed but might not want to return home, because they have built new social
capital and networks during displacement. In this case we would be estimating a biased
effect of return by comparing returnees to a contaminated sample. As a robustness check
in section 4.8, I exclude households who do not want to return, a total of 14 households
in section A, and the results are similar to those reported in the main results.
4.5.2 Section B
In section B of the camp, households make a decision, but this largely depended on whether
their house was destroyed or not. If a household’s dwelling was not completely destroyed
after the war, they were able to return home. If not, households struggled to find the funds
to rebuild their houses and have remained displaced. As I worry that the social capital
of households, or characteristics of households related to social capital, might predict the
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decision of returning home, I use the destruction of the household’s original dwelling as an
instrumental variable to predict return. To be a valid identification strategy, destruction
needs to be exclusive (i.e. independent of social capital except through returning home)
and relevant (i.e. a strong predictor of return).
Exclusivity:
The destruction of the dwellings in section B of the camp is a sporadic spill–over from the
aerial bombardment that completely destroyed section A. Households were evacuated from
NBC before the Lebanese army began the aerial bombardment operation, so it is unlikely
that the destruction of dwellings was a targeted attack based on the social capital (and
correlates of social capital) of the residents of the dwellings. This makes the destruction
of dwellings an exclusive instrumental variable. As further justification, table 4.9 provides
a balance table of pre–war characteristics (similar to those constructed for section B)
between households whose dwellings were destroyed and households whose dwellings are
not destroyed. We find no significant differences in these characteristics.
Despite this, it can be argued that there are potential challenges to this exclusivity.
Firstly, dwellings that were of poorer quality could be those that did not withstand the
bombardment and were razed to the ground. These dwellings are likely to belong to
poorer and more vulnerable households. This confoundment is not likely because the
power of rockets used by the Lebanese army would have destroyed any building no matter
its foundations, but nevertheless I control for household wealth by including an index of
household assets and consumption in the main analysis. Secondly, it could be argued that
households who supported Fatah al–Islam were targeted by the Lebanese military, which
would play a role in determining social capital. While this is unlikely because Palestinians
had since evacuated the camp, as a robustness check I also control for trust in ‘local forces’,
a proxy for Fatah al–Islam.
It is worth noting that the over–identification test, or Sargan–Hansen test, can statis-
tically test for exclusivity of an instrumental variable if at least two instruments are used.
Unfortunately I only find one relevant instrument, otherwise this test would have been
conducted.
Relevance:
The second criteria for a valid instrumental variable is its relevance, i.e. whether destruc-
tion is a good predictor of return. After the war ended, some Palestinians from section
B found themselves in a difficult situation. These households arrived at the camp to find
their houses razed to the ground. With insufficient funds to rebuild their dwellings, and
no help from the Lebanese government, UNRWA or other NGOs, most households waited
it out. They either tried to save enough money for construction costs, or thought that
UNRWA would pick up the pieces (ultimately they did not, and at the time of writing
many of these households remain displaced). But households who were lucky enough to
not have their dwellings destroyed returned as soon as the war ended. As further evidence
of the relevance of this instrument, consider the first stage of the instrumental variable
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regression, which estimates the following equation:
Returnk = α+ β1Destructionk + β2Respondenti
+β2Householdk + β4Populationl + j
(4.2)
Where the Returnk, Respondenti, and Householdk are the same as those described previ-
ously. Destruction is a binary variable equal to one if the household reported their dwelling
as being completely destroyed during the war, and zero if their houses were not destroyed
or only superficially damaged. The results of this regression are reported in table 4.10.
When using a binary dependent variable in the first stage of an IV estimation, an OLS
regression should be applied (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This is because the results of
this estimation will be used for the second stage regression, which requires residuals of the
first stage to be uncorrelated with the predicted values. Using a non–linear estimation
such as a probit or a logit can produce residuals that are correlated with predicted results.
In this case, a linear probability model provides an approximation for the non–linear
relationship, and the coefficients should be interpreted with caution. So, we can say that
having a dwelling that is completely damaged by the war reduces the chances of returning
home by approximately 47 percentage points, all other variables held constant. This is
also a highly significant result.
Table 4.11 provides further statistics that show the relevance of destruction as an
instrument, and with a F–statistic of 16.97, higher than the rule of thumb of 10 (Stock
et al., 2002), we can be confident in the strength of the IV.
The second stage of the two–stage least squares then estimates the following equation:
Social capitali,j = α+ β1Return
∗
k + β2Respondenti
+β3Householdk + β4Populationl + 
(4.3)
Where Return∗ is a variable consisting of the predicted values based on the first stage
regression using destruction as an instrumental variable. The remaining independent
variables are the same as before.
In both equations 4.1 and 4.3 the dependent variables are standardised with a mean
of zero and standard deviation of one. In this case, coefficients β are interpreted as: a
one unit increase in the covariate leads to a β standard deviation change in the dependent
variable. If the covariate is a binary variable, as is the case of return, then the coefficient
β1 represents the impact effect of return on social capital in standard deviations. However,
in the case of the second stage of an IV estimation, return is no longer binary, but rather
a predicted probability. In this case if the likelihood of return increases by one probability
point, we will see a change in social capital of β1 standard deviations.
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4.6 Results
Table 4.16 produces the regression results for the impact of return on average social capital
(columns 1–3), trust (columns 4–6), and bonding social capital (columns 7–9). The results
are continued in table 4.17, with the impact of return on non–institutional social capital
(columns 1–3) and weak social capital (columns (4–6)). For each of these dependent
variables the first columns (columns 1, 4, 7 in table 4.16 and 1 , 4 in table 4.17) are the
results in section A, and the second two columns for each dependent variables (columns
2,3,5,6,8,9 in table 4.16 and 2,3,5,6 in table 4.17) are the results for section B, estimated
first using ordinary least squares and then two stage least squares.
When considering the results of section B, it is worth comparing the OLS results to
the IV results. The magnitude of the return coefficients in each of the five regressions
has changed slightly with the introduction of an IV. In table 4.16, for average social
capital (columns 2,3), trust (columns 5,6) and bonding social capital (columns 8,9) the
effect of return is smaller when using an IV, indicating that the OLS results provided
an overestimate and that the households who returned home were likely to have more
average social capital, trust and bonding social capital to begin with. On the other hand
in table 4.17, the OLS results produce an underestimate of the effect of return on non–
institutional social capital (columns 2,3) and weak social capital (columns 5,6). This
means that households who returned had less non–institutional social capital and weak
social capital to begin with. These changes in effect size show us that it was correct
to worry about the endogeneity of return in camp B. The standard errors for the effect
of return are greatly increased, as is normal when introducing an instrumental variable.
Combined with a lower coefficient, this makes the effect return on average social capital
no longer significant.
In the following I discuss the effects of return for each of the dimensions of social
capital in each of sections A and B. I have also included a description of the significant
determinants of these dimensions of social capital.
Average social capital
In section A we see that return decreases average social capital (column 1) by 0.322
standard deviations. In addition, households with greater assets and a male to female sex
ratio have higher average social capital. The number of Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared
living in the household’s community slightly increases average social capital.
In section B, return does not affect average social capital (column 3). Older respondents,
and those who stayed with friends and family during the displacement period, have higher
average social capital today.
Trust
In section A there is no effect of return on trust (column 4). If the ratio of males to females
in the household increases, so do levels of trust. Households who stayed with friends and
family during the displacement phase see an increase in trust of 0.479 standard deviations.
In section B there is also no significant effect of return on trust (column 6). Older respon-
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dents are more trusting, as are households who stayed with family and friends during the
displacement.
Bonding social capital
In section A return decreases bonding social capital by 0.32 standard deviations (column
7). As the number of males to females in the household increases, so does bonding social
capital. Interestingly, when the number of Palestinians in the neighbourhood increases,
bonding social capital decreases.
In section B there is no significant effect of return on bonding social capital (column 9).
We see lower bonding social capital for those who stayed with family and friends during
the displacement.
Non–institutional social capital
In section A we see that return decreases non–institutional social capital (column 1 of
table 4.17) by 0.343 standard deviations. Household consumption slightly increases non–
institutional social capital.
In section B, non–institutional social capital is increased by 0.751 standard deviations if
the probability of return is increased by one probability point (column 3 of table 4.17).
Households with more household assets also have more non–institutional social capital.
Staying with friends and family during the displacement means the respondent has higher
non–institutional social capital.
Weak social capital
In section A we see that return decreases weak social capital (column 4) by 0.609 standard
deviations. Male and older respondents have higher weak social capital. If the respondent
is male, weak social capital increases by 0.414 standard deviations. Households with more
household assets also have more weak social capital.
In section B there is also no significant effect of return on weak social capital. The
only significant covariate is whether the household stayed with family and friends during
displacement, which increases weak social capital by 0.333 standard deviations.
In sum, while average social capital, and in particular bonding, non–institutional and
weak social capital, are reduced upon return in section A, non–institutional social capital
has increased upon return in section B. As a reminder, non–institutional social capi-
tal refers to the trust and social relations in individuals such as neighbours and family,
compared to institutions such as the camp’s popular committee or the Lebanese army.
Bonding social capital refers to the social capital amongst Palestinians, particularly those
from Nahr el–Bared camp, rather than social capital with the Lebanese. Weak social
capital refers to the extent of social capital, large networks, contacts in high places, but
these relationships are also characterised by mistrust.
The next section tries to understand why we might be observing these contradictory
results.
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4.7 Mechanisms
This section looks at the possible mechanisms which might explain why social capital (in
particular non–institutional, bonding and weak social capital) decreases upon return in
section A, and non–institutional social capital increases upon return in section B. These
two results can either be explained by a systematic difference between the two sections,
or the different return processes in sections A and B.
As explained in section 4.5, we rule out any systematic difference in sections A and B by
controlling for the age of respondent and population density. In addition, as a robustness
check in section 4.8, we have excluded trust in local forces and the Lebanese army from
the social capital indexes to include them as controls in the regressions. There are no
differences in results.
This means that the difference in results between sections A and B are more likely to
be due to the different return processes. Firstly, households from section A returned in
groups, which could influence social capital. Secondly, households from section B returned
home soon after the war ended, as opposed to households from section A, who returned
home on average 5 years later.
Return in section A is done by package
These two differing results could be explained by the fact that households in section A
returned with their neighbours in packages, as opposed to the less systematic return of
households in section B. However, we would expect this to have a more positive effect on
social capital (as opposed to a negative one) in section A, which is not what we observe.
In fact, in table 4.12 below we see that 33% of returnees from camp A report their friends
and families have returned, significantly lower than 52% of returnees from camp B.
Table 4.18 shows the results when including a variable for whether friends and family
have returned. The decrease in social capital is still observed in section A, which means
that independent of whether friends and family have returned, there is still a decrease in
social capital for those from section A.
In section B, the positive effect of return on non–institutional social capital is no longer
significant (column 8), indicating that rather than return playing a role, it was the fact
that households had returned to a camp with their friends and family. On the other
hand, the coefficient of return on weak social capital has increased, becoming significant
(column 10). Controlling for whether friends and family have returned, an increase in
the likelihood of return by one percentage point will increase weak social capital by 1.12
standard deviations.
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Time since return and length of displacement
The concentration of the aerial bombardment in section A has led to a divergence in the
timing of return between original residents of section B, who are able to return home soon
after the war (in 2007), and residents of section A, who are only able to return home later
(since the first package was completed in 2010). On average, those originally from section
A were displaced for five years before returning, and those from section B for one year.
Figure 4.6, and tables 4.13 and 4.14 show the difference in the years of return between
these two groups.
To test whether the timing of return has caused these contrary results, I look into the
number of years of displacement. Unfortunately, as shown in table 4.13, only returnees
in section B provide us with enough variation in the length of displacement to analyse
statistically. Table 4.19 reports the results of the regression when I replace the return
variable three different variables indicating the timing of return. It is important to note
that the destruction of the dwellings is not a relevant instrument for the timing of return
in section B, so we need to interpret these results with caution.
When return is split up into those who have returned within one, two and three years,
we have quite different results. The effect of return on average social capital and trust
for those who return within one year is significant and positive. While this effect is no
longer significant for those who return within two or three years, the coefficients are much
smaller. The large effect of return on non–institutional social capital seems to be largely
driven by those who have returned within two years, and this effect becomes close to zero
for those who have been displaced for three years. While the effect of return on weak social
capital is never significant for each of the three groups of returnees, the effect is positive
for those who return within a year, and this becomes negative for those who return later.
These results match the trend of a negative effect of return on social capital in section A.
The timing of displacement and return plays a crucial role in determining the effect
of return on the social capital dimensions, however we are faced with a challenge: Is it
the time spent away from home during displacement that reduces the effect of return on
social capital (possibly becoming a negative effect after 2–3 years), or is it the time since
returning home that rebuilds social capital that was destroyed?
It could be that if households have enough time to settle down after returning home,
they can reconnect with old friends and rebuild social capital after being away for a long
time. However, social capital might be destroyed during long periods of displacement, and
those who had been displaced for a long period of time do not manage to rebuild their
social capital, whereas the early returnees do.
In this case study all households were displaced from NBC at the same time, in May of
2007, which means that the time of displacement is a direct function of the time of return:
Length of displacement = Time of return− 2007
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Time since return = 2012− Time of return
Combining these two equations we get:
Time since return = 5− Length of displacement
So for example, if a household returned to the camp in 2010, then length of displacement
is three years, and the time since return is 2 years.
In the next subsection I try to use a proxy for the time since return and see if this is
driving the results.
Proxying time since return
It is likely that households who have only returned recently have not had enough time to
set up and be ready for certain kinds of social capital. A household who has just returned
to a newly constructed house might not have the facilities to entertain and socialise with
friends and family, thus decreasing their levels of social interactions. In addition they
might not have the time or energy to focus on their social life, as there are more pressing
concerns upon return, such as setting up the house and settling down.
Respondents were asked if they have enough furniture in their house for family to sit
and have dinner together. I use furniture as a proxy for how settled down the household
is, and the tables 4.20 reports the results of including this variable.
In section A we see that the negative effect of return on social capital indexes is no longer
significant, except for ‘weak social capital’, mainly due to a decrease in the coefficients
upon the introduction of the furniture variable. This indicates that the differential effect
of return is due to the fact that early returnees have not had enough time to rebuild their
social capital.
4.8 Robustness Checks
I have conducted various robustness checks in this section to make sure that the results
reported above are robust to different specifications.
4.8.1 Controlling for connections and trust in local forces
For this robustness check I exclude connections to UNRWA and the popular committee
from the social capital indexes in case they bias the return of households. This produces
slightly different dimensions of social capital, as shown in table 4.21. The results are
reported in table 4.24, with little difference to the main results.
In addition, in table 4.5 I repeat the analysis excluding trust in local forces and find
little difference. Table 4.22 show how the social capital dimensions have changed.
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4.8.2 Excluding those who do not want to return
It is entirely possible that those who are displaced would rather remain displaced because
they have resettled and formed new and better social capital than is possible upon return.
Anticipating this, I included the following question in the questionnaire, to be asked to
those who are still displaced:
“Would you like to return home to Nahr el–Bared if you had the opportunity?”
16 respondents said ‘No’: 14 from section A and 2 from section B. The responses to
why they would not like to return are summarised in table 4.25. The reasons provided
are not surprising, but might be problematic for the analysis as they can be related to
social capital. Tables 4.26 reproduce the analysis but exclude the 16 households that do
not want to return and we find that the results still hold.
4.8.3 Increasing sample size by excluding trust variables
A limiting factor to this analysis is the small sample size. For this robustness check I try
to increase the sample size by excluding the variables that have fewer observations. Most
of the questions about trust have a lower sample size because some respondents refused to
answer these sensitive questions. Table 4.27 reproduces the factor analysis on the social
capital variables excluding the trust variables, and one factor is created with a high KMO
of 0.648 and eigenvalue of 1.14.
The variables with low weights are those related to instrumental connections, rather
than deeper family and friendship ties which have larger weights. Table 4.28 provides the
regression results for section A in column (1) and section B in column (2).
This specification increases the sample size from 301 to 399 households in section A
and 109 households to 129 households in section B. If the sample size is what is causing
less significant results in section B, we would expect this specification to increase the
significance of the result.
In section A these results are consistent with the primary results, social connections and
interactions decrease upon return in section A. However, in section B, rather than become
more significant, the positive effect of return on social capital is no longer significant. This
indicates that in section B trust has a greater role in the relationship between return and
social capital compared to the other social capital variables.
4.8.4 Combining section A and B into one sample
Here I have combined both sections into one sample and estimated the following equation:
Social capitali,j = α+ β1Early Returni + β2Late Returni + β3Respondenti
+β4Householdk + β5Section Bl + 
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Where Early Returni is a binary variable equal to one if the household has returned
home early (within the first three years of the war ending), and Late Returni is a binary
variable equal to one if the household returned home late (beyond the first three years of
the war ending). For this specification I have also included a binary variable Section Bl
which controls for whether the household is originally from Section A or Section B of
Nahr el–Bared. Table 4.29 reports the regression results which are largely in line with
the primary results and the mechanism that looks at the timing of return. Early return
increases average social capital, trust, and non–institutional social capital but decreases
bonding social capital. Late return decreases average social capital, bonding social capital,
non–institutional social capital and weak social capital.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented an empirical study of the effect of return on social capital
based on a household survey of residents from a Palestinian refugee camp. The residents
were displaced due to a three month long battle between the Lebanese army and an
Islamist militia. I compare the social capital of households who have returned to the
camp and those who have remained displaced, after collecting an extensive household
dataset capturing the different dimensions of social capital. I have used an instrumental
variable and exploit the exogenous nature of the return process in order to estimate a
causal effect of return. The results are two–fold: compared to the displaced, social capital
is lower in section A but higher in section B.
If social capital was a resource that could simply be moved across time and space, then
we would observe no effect of return. But in fact, we see that social capital is broken
down upon return, and is built up again slowly once households have settled down. This
destruction of social capital has taken approximately five years to recover, a long time for
households dependent on social support as a coping strategy during hard times.
While this conclusion is somewhat intuitive, I have illustrated processes and dynamics
in the social capital creation process which have not been understood before. Displacement
is a traumatic and damaging experience, and before imposing solutions, it is important
to understand the coping strategies, informal institutions and social dynamics that are in
place, and the implications for return.
This chapter shows that social capital is fragile, and care needs to be taken when
dealing with return. Social capital suffers upon immediate return, and although it will
naturally revert to previous levels (if not higher), some support can be given to speed up
this process. For example, financial support can be given to local groups and associations
that encourage individuals to meet, socialise and build networks. Social spaces (in the
form of libraries, cafes, and club houses ...) can be created to allow returnee households
to socialise and meet regularly if they do not have the space to do this immediately.
Fun activities and social events can be organised that bring together returnees once they
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arrive home. Furniture can be provided to households to allow them to set up house and
entertain and socialise with friends and family upon return.
The number of refugees and IDPs is reaching levels higher than those seen in World
War II, and governments and agencies are offering varying levels and types of support.
As of writing, the revolutions and conflicts in the Arab world have generated millions of
refugees, and once the conflict ends, a top concern will be the return of these households.
Whether living in camps, with friends or family, or moving to a new city or country,
conflict induced displacement is a protracted, traumatic, uncertain and sometimes isolating
process, with implications to the social capital of refugees, IDPs and returnees that ought
to be considered.
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4.10 Appendix A: Figures
Figure 4.1: Map of NBC. Source: Group (2012)
Figure 4.2: Area of initial displacement (author’s dataset).
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Figure 4.3: Households stay during displacement (author’s dataset).
Figure 4.4: Maps of Nahr el–Bared camp. Both from Nahr el–Bared reconstruction com-
mittee for civil action and studies.
(a) Completely destroyed buildings in red (b) Completed packages in blue
Figure 4.5: Return Process
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Figure 4.6: Year of return (from author’s dataset).
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4.11 Appendix B: Tables - Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1: Original distribution of population amongst section A and B
# of households % of households Estimated # of
in sample in sample Hhds in population
NBC section A 449 76.1 4638
NBC section B 141 23.9 1456
Total 590 100 6094
Table 4.2: Weights of social capital variables from factor analysis
Variable Trust Bonding SC Non–institutional SC Weak SC
# of relatives 0.0655 -0.0505 0.4101 0.0499
Friends in community 0.0676 0.0067 0.3787 0.1372
Friends outside community -0.0056 -0.0384 0.2537 0.1736
Contact with UNRWA 0.1363 0.3809 -0.2144 0.2496
Contact with committee 0.1966 0.421 -0.1688 0.3233
Wedding invitations 0.0606 0.2038 0.3491 0.3191
Wedding invitees 0.0738 0.1727 0.3391 0.2659
Socialising in last week 0.0001 0.1662 0.4265 0.1007
Paying condolences 0.1471 0.163 0.1645 0.2759
Belong to group 0.0124 0.3096 -0.013 0.2218
Community is honest 0.2907 0.0191 0.0345 -0.4346
Community lies -0.1394 0.1046 -0.0459 0.1262
Purse would be returned 0.3745 -0.0005 0.2359 -0.2802
Trust: Community leaders 0.655 0.0726 -0.4078 0.1212
Trust: Popular committee 0.6766 0.0457 -0.3643 0.0634
Trust: Local forces 0.6976 0.1081 -0.3983 0.0827
Trust: Religious leaders 0.4938 0.0358 -0.0927 -0.1475
Trust: Neighbours 0.417 0.3103 0.3371 -0.2464
Trust: Palestinians from NBC 0.396 0.356 0.2333 -0.2651
Trust: Palestinians 0.4303 0.3396 0.2103 -0.2678
Trust: Lebanese civilians 0.5511 -0.135 0.1261 -0.0297
Trust: Lebanese ISF 0.6148 -0.5134 0.1787 0.2092
Trust: Lebanese army 0.5794 -0.486 0.1695 0.2366
Trust: NGO workers 0.5239 -0.0991 0.1242 0.0931
Trust: UNRWA workers 0.4575 -0.0879 0.016 -0.0544
Source: Author’s dataset. Weights that are higher than average are listed in bold font.
Table 4.3: Differences in social capital by return in section A and section B
Section A Section B
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Variable Return Displaced Return Displaced
Avg Social Capital -0.48 -0.03 -0.44** 0.36 -0.13 0.48**
(0.16) (0.06) (0.18) (0.11) (0.35) (0.21)
Trust -0.18 -0.05 -0.13 0.31 -0.17 0.48**
(0.16) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.23)
Bonding Social Capital -0.42 0.08 -0.5*** -0.11 -0.004 -0.11
(0.15) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.22)
Non-institutional Social Capital -0.43 -0.03 -0.4** 0.3 0.007 -0.22
(0.13) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21)
‘Weak’ Social Capital -0.67 0.04 -0.71*** 0.13 -0.06 0.19
(0.14) (0.06) (0.18) (0.1) (0.14) (0.19)
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Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.4: Summary statistics of control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Sex of respondent (=1 if male) 0.253 0.435 0 1 590
Age of respondent 40.741 14.362 15 84 590
Respondent literacy (=1 if literate) 0.888 0.315 0 1 590
Household is a nuclear family (=1 if nuclear) 0.837 0.369 0 1 590
Age of oldest household member 50.047 15.496 19 100 590
Household sex ratio 1.254 1.116 0 9 590
Index of household assets 0 0.923 -1.941 3.635 587
Household total monthly consumption (in US $) 1019.432 743.111 110 5771.667 590
Household stayed with friends or family 0.534 0.499 0 1 590
Source: Author’s dataset
Table 4.5: Differences in trust of local forces and Lebanese army between section A and
section B
Mean Difference
Variable Section A Section B
Trust of local forces -0.017 0.052 -0.069
(0.049) (0.088) (0.1)
Trust of Lebanese army -0.031 0.091 -0.122
(0.051) (0.09) (0.102)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.6: Difference in social capital indexes for displaced from section A and section B
Mean Diff.
Section A Section B
Avg Social Capital -0.028 -0.152 0.123
(0.06) (0.18) (0.18)
Trust -0.051 -0.17 0.12
(0.06) (0.18) (0.19)
Bonding Social Capital 0.09 -0.01 0.09
(0.06) (0.19) (0.19)
Non–institutional Social Capital -0.04 0.01 -0.04
(0.06) (0.13) (0.19)
‘Weak’ Social Capital 0.05 -0.05 0.11
(0.06) (0.14) (0.19)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Pre–war differences between section A and section B.
Mean Difference Mean Difference
Variable Section A Section B Variable Section A Section B
Individual level characteristics Household level characteristics
Sex 0.49 0.51 -0.03 Sex ratio 1.17 1.34 -0.16
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Age 25.06 23.52 1.53* Average age 28.2 24.98 3.21**
(0.41) (0.65) (0.79) (0.65) (0.91) (1.27)
Literacy 0.86 0.93 -0.06*** Household size 4.46 4.93 -0.48
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) (0.18) (0.22)**
Ever attended 0.91 0.97 -0.05*** Dependency 0.26 0.25 0.01
school (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) ratio (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
University 0.09 0.14 -0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Working 0.37 0.37 0.003
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.8: Pre–war differences between displaced and returnees (section A)
Mean Difference Mean Difference
Variable Displaced Return Variable Displaced Return
Individual level characteristics Household level characteristics
Sex 0.49 0.46 0.03 Sex ratio 1.18 1.06 0.12
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.23) (0.22)
Age 25.24 22.69 2.54 Average age 28.15 28.91 -0.76
(0.42) (1.51) (1.57) (0.66) (3.2) (2.51)
Literacy 0.85 0.93 -0.08* Household size 4.47 4.33 0.14
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.42) (0.75)
Ever attended 0.9 0.97 -0.07 Dependency 0.27 0.22 0.04
school (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) ratio (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Prim. school 0.79 0.85 -0.05 # of children 1.87 2.33 -0.45
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) in hhd (0.09) (0.37) (0.36)
Int. school 0.65 0.71 -0.07 # of working 1.02 1 0.02
(0.01) (0.05) (0.06) members in hhd (0.04) (0.12) (0.14)
Sec. school 0.18 0.17 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
University 0.09 0.05 0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Working 0.37 0.42 -0.05
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.9: Pre–war differences between households with destroyed and not destroyed
dwellings (section B)
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Variable Not Destroyed Destroyed Variable Not Destroyed Destroyed
Individual level characteristics Household level characteristics
Sex 0.53 0.45 0.07 Sex ratio 1.38 1.15 0.23
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.1) (0.22) (0.23)
Age 23.57 23.27 0.29 Average age 24.69 26.34 -1.64
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(0.71) (1.67) (1.73) (0.92) (2.87) (2.39)
Literacy 0.92 0.93 -0.01 Household size 4.97 4.76 0.21
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.2) (0.5) (0.48)
Ever attended 0.96 0.98 -0.02 Dependency 0.25 0.28 -0.03
school (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) ratio (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
Prim. school 0.74 0.78 -0.04 # of children 2.11 2.48 -0.37
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) in hhd (0.18) (0.45) (0.43)
Int. school 0.77 0.79 -0.02 # of working 1.07 1.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.05) (0.06) members in hhd (0.06) (0.11) (0.14)
Sec. school 0.26 0.23 0.03
(0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
University 0.14 0.13 0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Working 0.36 0.41 -0.05
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.10: First stage results
Variables Return
Dwelling completely damaged -0.473***
(0.115)
Constant 0.118***
(0.190)
Respondent controls Yes
Household controls Yes
Observations 107
R-squared 0.7612
F (11, 95) 29.67
Prob > F 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.11: First stage regression summary statistics
Variables R–sq. Adjusted R–sq. Partial R–sq. Robust F (1,5) Prob > F
Return 0.7612 0.7335 0.3353 16.9706 0.0001
Table 4.12: Difference in return of friends and family for section A and section B returnees
Mean Diff.
Section A Section B
Have family & friends returned 0.33 0.52 -0.19*
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Page 133 of 223
Table 4.13: Years of displacement for returnees in sections A and B
Number of Returnee households
Displaced for: Section A Section B
Less than 1 year 0 48
Less than 2 years 0 32
Less than 3 years 0 20
Less than 4 years 1 0
Less than 5 years 9 0
More than 5 years 23 0
Table 4.14: Difference in years since return between section A and section B returnees
Mean Diff.
Section A Section B
# of years since return 0.33 4.28 -3.95***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.15)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.12 Appendix C: Tables - Regression Results
Table 4.15: Reduced form: Impact of return on social capital
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC Non-institutional SC Weak SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A B A B A B A B A B
Return -0.460∗∗ 0.507∗∗ -0.125 0.477∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.395∗∗ 0.292 -0.714∗∗∗ 0.189
(0.180) (0.213) (0.178) (0.226) (0.180) (0.223) (0.180) (0.218) (0.187) (0.190)
Constant -0.0284 -0.152 -0.0513 -0.168 0.0867 -0.00418 -0.0366 0.00735 0.0488 -0.0577
(0.0593) (0.181) (0.0588) (0.192) (0.0592) (0.190) (0.0592) (0.186) (0.0616) (0.162)
Observations 304 110 304 110 304 110 304 110 304 110
R2 0.021 0.050 0.002 0.040 0.026 0.002 0.016 0.016 0.046 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.16: Impact of return on social capital — part 1
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A B B:IV A B B:IV A B B:IV
Return -0.322∗ 0.835∗ 0.606 -0.0969 0.737 0.512 -0.320∗ -0.264 -1.001
(0.193) (0.438) (0.612) (0.190) (0.473) (0.674) (0.168) (0.390) (0.663)
Respondent is male 0.185 -0.0294 -0.0237 0.0454 0.0458 0.0514 -0.0254 0.0172 0.0356
(0.135) (0.276) (0.262) (0.137) (0.297) (0.282) (0.136) (0.294) (0.278)
Age of respondent -0.000562 0.0138∗ 0.0136∗ -0.00404 0.0193∗∗ 0.0191∗∗ 0.000660 -0.00671 -0.00714
(0.00564) (0.00817) (0.00772) (0.00640) (0.00876) (0.00825) (0.00583) (0.00960) (0.00912)
P
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Respondent is literate 0.00261 0.138 0.169 0.0393 -0.223 -0.192 -0.150 0.321 0.421
(0.145) (0.702) (0.692) (0.150) (0.835) (0.816) (0.171) (0.404) (0.438)
Household is nuclear -0.254 -0.172 -0.197 -0.250 -0.224 -0.249 0.0345 0.140 0.0592
(0.156) (0.218) (0.214) (0.170) (0.243) (0.241) (0.158) (0.289) (0.279)
Age of oldest household member 0.00491 -0.00383 -0.00343 0.00585 -0.0108 -0.0104 0.00252 0.00904 0.0103
(0.00503) (0.0104) (0.00980) (0.00590) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.00528) (0.0115) (0.0108)
Household sex ratio 0.142∗∗ -0.0900 -0.0873 0.142∗ -0.141 -0.138 0.111∗ 0.0136 0.0222
(0.0686) (0.0759) (0.0728) (0.0781) (0.0892) (0.0855) (0.0612) (0.0585) (0.0574)
Index of household assets 0.226∗∗∗ 0.00152 0.00801 0.0665 -0.0851 -0.0787 0.201∗∗ 0.138 0.159
(0.0740) (0.0915) (0.0838) (0.0781) (0.100) (0.0926) (0.0791) (0.133) (0.129)
Household monthly consumption 0.000102 -0.000165 -0.000180 -0.00000188 -0.000150 -0.000166 0.0000306 -0.000266∗∗ -0.000317∗∗∗
(0.0000862) (0.000127) (0.000113) (0.0000898) (0.000158) (0.000144) (0.000115) (0.000107) (0.000119)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0439 0.500∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.0459 0.508∗∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.0429 -0.617∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.211) (0.203) (0.116) (0.225) (0.215) (0.111) (0.209) (0.209)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000662∗ -0.00132 -0.000729 0.000756∗∗ -0.00103 -0.000456 -0.000938∗∗∗ -0.000479 0.00142
(0.000343) (0.00139) (0.00181) (0.000377) (0.00149) (0.00197) (0.000356) (0.00132) (0.00189)
Constant -0.552 -0.249 -0.281 -0.416 0.287 0.256 0.141 0.199 0.0963
(0.394) (0.746) (0.724) (0.405) (0.827) (0.802) (0.422) (0.782) (0.708)
Observations 298 107 107 298 107 107 298 107 107
R2 0.144 0.163 0.160 0.061 0.181 0.179 0.120 0.150 0.116
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.17: Impact of return on social capital — part 2
Non-institutional SC Weak SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A B B:IV A B B:IV
Return -0.343∗∗ 0.709∗∗ 0.751∗ -0.609∗∗∗ 0.119 0.895
(0.169) (0.344) (0.433) (0.175) (0.265) (0.554)
Respondent is male 0.183 -0.0527 -0.0538 0.414∗∗∗ -0.0193 -0.0387
(0.155) (0.289) (0.273) (0.146) (0.243) (0.234)
Age of respondent 0.00534 0.000112 0.000136 0.00349 -0.00333 -0.00288
(0.00677) (0.00875) (0.00825) (0.00684) (0.0106) (0.0100)
Respondent is literate -0.119 0.463 0.458 0.263 0.0565 -0.0484
(0.181) (0.371) (0.347) (0.191) (0.241) (0.312)
Household is nuclear -0.0276 -0.257 -0.253 -0.0348 0.237 0.322
(0.199) (0.349) (0.329) (0.172) (0.289) (0.278)
Age of oldest household member -0.000662 -0.00221 -0.00229 -0.000725 0.00633 0.00497
(0.00571) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.00630) (0.0121) (0.0115)
Household sex ratio -0.0286 0.0184 0.0179 -0.0512 0.0471 0.0380
(0.0721) (0.0655) (0.0623) (0.0616) (0.0515) (0.0515)
Index of household assets 0.105 0.255∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ -0.102 -0.124
(0.0785) (0.117) (0.112) (0.0767) (0.0983) (0.0986)
Household monthly consumption 0.000256∗∗∗ 0.000125 0.000128 -0.0000489 0.0000933 0.000147
(0.0000822) (0.000144) (0.000138) (0.000126) (0.000128) (0.000146)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.105 0.572∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ -0.108 0.263 0.333∗
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(0.120) (0.216) (0.210) (0.115) (0.198) (0.198)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000472 -0.000707 -0.000814 0.000536 0.000475 -0.00152
(0.000420) (0.00104) (0.00114) (0.000358) (0.000899) (0.00154)
Constant -0.531 -0.783 -0.777 -0.336 -0.854 -0.746
(0.457) (0.736) (0.689) (0.419) (0.645) (0.664)
Observations 298 107 107 298 107 107
R2 0.072 0.189 0.189 0.206 0.058 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.18: Impact of return on social capital including return of family and friends
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC Non–institutional SC Weak SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV
Return -0.325∗ 0.361 -0.0805 0.309 -0.344∗∗ -1.052 -0.359∗∗ 0.560 -0.625∗∗∗ 1.122∗
(0.196) (0.733) (0.192) (0.797) (0.167) (0.736) (0.171) (0.484) (0.174) (0.660)
Friends & fam returned 0.0841 0.403∗∗ 0.0537 0.295 -0.118 0.620∗∗∗ 0.127 0.100 0.119 -0.0440
(0.123) (0.195) (0.124) (0.205) (0.112) (0.218) (0.128) (0.202) (0.119) (0.204)
Respondent is male 0.204 0.0301 0.0733 0.102 -0.0696 0.161 0.187 -0.115 0.414∗∗∗ -0.0140
(0.140) (0.262) (0.140) (0.284) (0.134) (0.275) (0.159) (0.274) (0.147) (0.233)
Age of respondent -0.000380 0.0101 -0.00332 0.0161∗∗ -0.00112 -0.0143 0.00602 0.00216 0.00315 -0.00369
(0.00595) (0.00729) (0.00678) (0.00805) (0.00579) (0.00945) (0.00703) (0.00831) (0.00711) (0.00987)
Respondent is literate 0.0312 -0.0179 0.0529 -0.333 -0.0544 0.0708 -0.0611 0.474 0.197 -0.0692
(0.152) (0.717) (0.157) (0.843) (0.169) (0.433) (0.187) (0.375) (0.190) (0.361)
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Household is nuclear -0.295∗ -0.153 -0.273 -0.219 0.0357 0.0914 -0.0758 -0.203 -0.0801 0.293
(0.165) (0.198) (0.180) (0.226) (0.158) (0.289) (0.210) (0.326) (0.177) (0.272)
Age of oldest household member 0.00484 -0.00246 0.00494 -0.00964 0.00520 0.00796 -0.000263 0.000454 -0.000454 0.00243
(0.00525) (0.0101) (0.00616) (0.0103) (0.00528) (0.0107) (0.00591) (0.0106) (0.00653) (0.0116)
Household sex ratio 0.140∗ -0.0727 0.130 -0.127 0.122∗∗ 0.0485 -0.0182 0.0184 -0.0338 0.0388
(0.0713) (0.0762) (0.0803) (0.0868) (0.0619) (0.0578) (0.0733) (0.0643) (0.0623) (0.0540)
Index of household assets 0.213∗∗∗ 0.0255 0.0646 -0.0634 0.213∗∗∗ 0.164 0.0848 0.264∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ -0.139
(0.0779) (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0935) (0.0794) (0.117) (0.0791) (0.113) (0.0788) (0.103)
Household monthly consumption 0.0000987 -0.000153 0.00000348 -0.000141 0.0000275 -0.000248∗∗ 0.000246∗∗∗ 0.0000970 -0.0000668 0.000162
(0.0000877) (0.000109) (0.0000924) (0.000138) (0.000111) (0.000105) (0.0000836) (0.000131) (0.000123) (0.000153)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0534 0.492∗∗ 0.0483 0.511∗∗ 0.0792 -0.686∗∗∗ 0.110 0.538∗∗ -0.117 0.322
(0.117) (0.198) (0.120) (0.211) (0.111) (0.207) (0.123) (0.209) (0.117) (0.204)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000664∗ 0.0000223 0.000728∗ 0.000174 -0.000886∗∗ 0.00165 0.000494 -0.000308 0.000548 -0.00216
(0.000352) (0.00218) (0.000387) (0.00231) (0.000362) (0.00219) (0.000427) (0.00128) (0.000368) (0.00184)
Constant -0.580 -0.386 -0.414 0.170 0.0180 0.314 -0.639 -1.035 -0.271 -0.496
(0.412) (0.763) (0.416) (0.846) (0.419) (0.722) (0.469) (0.711) (0.423) (0.692)
Observations 290 105 290 105 290 105 290 105 290 105
R2 0.148 0.183 0.058 0.187 0.132 0.175 0.076 0.185 0.204 .
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.19: Effect of timing of return on social capital in section B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC Non–institutional SC Weak SC
Return within 1 year 1.033∗∗ 0.893∗ -0.295 0.811∗∗ 0.433
(0.454) (0.489) (0.422) (0.365) (0.299)
Return within 2 years 0.722 0.560 -0.324 1.011∗∗∗ -0.0107
(0.467) (0.503) (0.426) (0.351) (0.283)
Return within 3 years 0.601 0.696 -0.101 0.00570 -0.331
(0.480) (0.539) (0.424) (0.399) (0.328)
Respondent is male -0.00432 0.0705 0.0176 -0.0597 0.0177
(0.284) (0.309) (0.293) (0.256) (0.242)
Age of respondent 0.0131 0.0197∗∗ -0.00581 -0.00392 -0.00480
(0.00847) (0.00872) (0.00925) (0.00880) (0.00969)
Respondent is literate 0.181 -0.220 0.286 0.615 0.143
(0.734) (0.887) (0.416) (0.402) (0.244)
Household is nuclear -0.145 -0.200 0.138 -0.254 0.278
(0.221) (0.251) (0.294) (0.351) (0.265)
Age of oldest household member -0.00387 -0.0113 0.00863 -0.000325 0.00653
(0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0107)
Household sex ratio -0.101 -0.157∗ 0.00890 0.0423 0.0332
(0.0745) (0.0889) (0.0602) (0.0729) (0.0524)
Index of household assets -0.000890 -0.0738 0.150 0.200∗∗ -0.113
(0.0938) (0.0997) (0.141) (0.0947) (0.0888)
Household monthly consumption -0.000143 -0.000126 -0.000263∗∗ 0.000106 0.000124
(0.000132) (0.000161) (0.000106) (0.000124) (0.000111)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.501∗∗ 0.516∗∗ -0.611∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.261
(0.212) (0.227) (0.211) (0.215) (0.189)
Number of NBCers living in community -0.00129 -0.00100 -0.000469 -0.000755 0.000504
(0.00140) (0.00150) (0.00133) (0.00102) (0.000901)
Constant -0.312 0.237 0.209 -0.816 -0.954
(0.783) (0.879) (0.786) (0.724) (0.589)
Observations 107 107 107 107 107
R2 0.187 0.195 0.155 0.283 0.148
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.20: Impact of return on social capital including furniture as proxy for settling down
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC Non–institutional SC Weak SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV
Return -0.226 0.661 -0.0792 0.577 -0.248 -1.028 -0.161 0.720 -0.575∗∗∗ 0.956∗
(0.210) (0.625) (0.211) (0.693) (0.183) (0.669) (0.193) (0.441) (0.184) (0.545)
Furniture sufficient for hhd 0.176 -0.342 0.0326 -0.403 0.134 0.163 0.334∗∗ 0.196 0.0618 -0.375
(0.156) (0.279) (0.156) (0.284) (0.141) (0.307) (0.156) (0.248) (0.140) (0.247)
Respondent is male 0.190 -0.0186 0.0463 0.0574 -0.0215 0.0332 0.193 -0.0567 0.415∗∗∗ -0.0331
(0.135) (0.260) (0.137) (0.282) (0.136) (0.278) (0.154) (0.276) (0.146) (0.226)
Age of respondent 0.000369 0.0147∗ -0.00387 0.0204∗∗ 0.00137 -0.00766 0.00710 -0.000482 0.00381 -0.00170
(0.00565) (0.00776) (0.00640) (0.00816) (0.00570) (0.00919) (0.00677) (0.00819) (0.00684) (0.00985)
Respondent is literate 0.00985 0.229 0.0407 -0.121 -0.145 0.392 -0.105 0.423 0.265 0.0182
(0.146) (0.647) (0.151) (0.760) (0.173) (0.434) (0.175) (0.342) (0.191) (0.297)
Household is nuclear -0.279∗ -0.238 -0.255 -0.296 0.0154 0.0784 -0.0753 -0.229 -0.0436 0.278
(0.159) (0.201) (0.172) (0.226) (0.162) (0.279) (0.205) (0.329) (0.171) (0.278)
Age of oldest household member 0.00399 -0.00456 0.00568 -0.0117 0.00182 0.0109 -0.00240 -0.00164 -0.00105 0.00373
(0.00507) (0.00965) (0.00595) (0.00985) (0.00519) (0.0110) (0.00576) (0.0104) (0.00631) (0.0114)
Household sex ratio 0.148∗∗ -0.0968 0.143∗ -0.149∗ 0.116∗ 0.0268 -0.0164 0.0234 -0.0489 0.0275
(0.0687) (0.0677) (0.0780) (0.0782) (0.0618) (0.0599) (0.0694) (0.0602) (0.0614) (0.0518)
Index of household assets 0.195∗∗ 0.0329 0.0609 -0.0494 0.178∗∗ 0.147 0.0476 0.239∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ -0.0966
(0.0820) (0.0862) (0.0852) (0.0950) (0.0865) (0.129) (0.0828) (0.112) (0.0810) (0.0973)
Household monthly consumption 0.000101 -0.000190∗ -0.00000199 -0.000177 0.0000302 -0.000313∗∗∗ 0.000255∗∗∗ 0.000133 -0.0000491 0.000137
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(0.0000868) (0.000112) (0.0000901) (0.000148) (0.000115) (0.000117) (0.0000829) (0.000141) (0.000125) (0.000137)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0320 0.481∗∗ 0.0436 0.491∗∗ 0.0338 -0.685∗∗∗ 0.0823 0.575∗∗∗ -0.112 0.336∗
(0.115) (0.200) (0.117) (0.210) (0.112) (0.209) (0.122) (0.208) (0.116) (0.195)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000770∗∗ -0.00101 0.000776∗∗ -0.000789 -0.000856∗∗ 0.00155 0.000676 -0.000652 0.000574 -0.00183
(0.000354) (0.00189) (0.000385) (0.00208) (0.000366) (0.00194) (0.000428) (0.00119) (0.000367) (0.00154)
Constant -0.696∗ 0.0549 -0.443 0.651 0.0321 -0.0640 -0.803∗ -0.970 -0.386 -0.377
(0.418) (0.815) (0.420) (0.911) (0.437) (0.776) (0.455) (0.712) (0.434) (0.721)
Observations 298 107 298 107 298 107 298 107 298 107
R2 0.149 0.176 0.061 0.198 0.123 0.117 0.087 0.194 0.206 0.020
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.13 Appendix D: Tables - Robustness checks
Table 4.21: Weights of social capital variables from factor analysis, excluding connections
with UNRWA and camp popular committee
Variable Trust Non–institutional SC Bonding SC
# of relatives 0.0776 0.3837 -0.1048
Friends in community 0.0779 0.3702 -0.0903
Friends outside community 0.0006 0.2425 -0.1531
Wedding invitations 0.0531 0.4035 -0.0526
Wedding invitees 0.0733 0.3777 -0.0248
Socialising in last week 0.0034 0.4596 0.0368
Paying condolences 0.1324 0.2084 -0.0590
Belong to group -0.0124 0.0754 0.0704
Community is honest 0.2989 0.0096 0.2778
Community lies -0.1466 -0.0202 0.0850
Purse would be returned 0.3834 0.1994 0.1487
Trust: Local forces 0.6815 -0.3709 0.1338
Trust: Lebanese army 0.5936 0.0694 -0.571
Trust: Community leaders 0.6410 -0.3871 0.0850
Trust: Popular committee 0.6588 -0.3560 0.106
Trust: Religious leaders 0.4893 -0.08850 0.1354
Trust: Neighbours 0.4893 0.3757 0.3427
Trust: Palestinians from NBC 0.3867 0.2774 0.3907
Trust: Palestinians 0.4232 0.2618 0.3721
Trust: Lebanese civilians 0.5557 0.0875 -0.1251
Trust: Lebanese ISF 0.6308 0.0697 -0.5735
Trust: NGO workers 0.5266 0.1045 -0.1226
Trust: UNRWA workers 0.4631 -0.0074 -0.0114
Source: Author’s dataset. Weights that are higher than average are listed in bold font.
Table 4.22: Weights of social capital variables from factor analysis, excluding trust of local
forces and the Lebanese army
Variable Trust Non–institutional SC Weak SC
# of relatives 0.1007 0.3926 -0.1511
Friends in community 0.0745 0.4143 -0.0970
Friends outside community -0.0080 0.2909 -0.0465
Contact with UNRWA 0.1464 -0.1237 0.5099
Contact with committee 0.2122 -0.0604 0.5788
Wedding invitations 0.0760 0.4469 0.1983
Wedding invitees 0.0909 0.4263 0.1166
Socialising in last week 0.036 0.4883 0.0202
Paying condolences 0.1252 0.2307 0.2263
Belong to group 0.0292 0.0491 0.4227
Community is honest 0.3224 -0.0543 -0.2687
Community lies -0.1287 0.0042 0.1092
Purse would be returned 0.4092 0.1528 -0.2608
Trust: Community leaders 0.5617 -0.3524 0.1092
Trust: Popular committee 0.6116 -0.3366 0.0714
Trust: Religious leaders 0.5018 -0.1559 -0.0559
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Trust: Neighbours 0.5141 0.2868 0.0544
Trust: Palestinians from NBC 0.4778 0.1932 0.1251
Trust: Palestinians 0.5236 0.1375 0.1294
Trust: Lebanese civilians 0.5508 -0.0162 -0.1209
Trust: Lebanese ISF 0.4850 -0.0152 -0.1850
Trust: NGO workers 0.5300 0.0432 -0.0853
Trust: UNRWA workers 0.4722 -0.0814 -0.1177
Source: Author’s dataset. Weights that are higher than average are listed in bold font.
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Table 4.23: Impact of return on social capital excluding trust in Lebanese army and local forces
Avg SC Trust Non–institutional SC Weak SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV
Return -0.294 0.0835 -0.0815 -0.253 -0.429∗∗∗ 0.641∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.227
(0.188) (0.397) (0.176) (0.418) (0.123) (0.358) (0.122) (0.452)
Trust in local forces 0.391∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.0555) (0.0709) (0.0502) (0.0644) (0.0570) (0.108) (0.0694) (0.0767)
Trust in Lebanese army 0.243∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.00147 0.0383 -0.241∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗
(0.0651) (0.0670) (0.0563) (0.0698) (0.0658) (0.0981) (0.0693) (0.0626)
Respondent is male 0.131 -0.0616 -0.0663 0.0439 0.207 -0.151 0.282∗∗ 0.152
(0.118) (0.209) (0.107) (0.176) (0.136) (0.292) (0.133) (0.248)
Age of respondent 0.00324 0.00166 0.000786 0.00557 0.00184 -0.00295 0.00515 -0.000717
(0.00496) (0.00744) (0.00472) (0.00656) (0.00597) (0.00846) (0.00572) (0.00961)
Respondent is literate -0.101 0.465 -0.122 0.169 -0.0437 0.606∗ 0.0170 -0.0624
(0.135) (0.426) (0.134) (0.389) (0.171) (0.366) (0.202) (0.234)
Household is nuclear -0.191 -0.181 -0.173 -0.316∗∗ 0.0316 0.0316 -0.0750 0.0290
(0.146) (0.188) (0.122) (0.138) (0.172) (0.287) (0.158) (0.202)
Age of oldest household member -0.0000165 0.00747 -0.000502 0.00311 0.00279 -0.00184 0.00173 0.00893
(0.00454) (0.00835) (0.00454) (0.00745) (0.00502) (0.0103) (0.00470) (0.0101)
Household sex ratio 0.0850 -0.0335 0.0890∗∗ -0.0900∗ -0.000665 0.0502 0.0823 -0.00651
(0.0524) (0.0518) (0.0437) (0.0539) (0.0712) (0.0647) (0.0694) (0.0528)
Index of household assets 0.204∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.00735 0.158∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.182 0.389∗∗∗ 0.0394
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(0.0599) (0.0824) (0.0532) (0.0617) (0.0676) (0.118) (0.0763) (0.0692)
Household monthly consumption 0.000142∗ -0.000222∗∗∗ 0.0000482 -0.000253∗∗∗ 0.000278∗∗∗ 0.0000700 -0.000147∗ -0.000152∗∗
(0.0000752) (0.0000748) (0.0000764) (0.0000951) (0.0000734) (0.000125) (0.0000807) (0.0000693)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0366 0.0378 0.0590 -0.0976 0.113 0.476∗∗ -0.0791 -0.310∗
(0.101) (0.165) (0.0933) (0.143) (0.106) (0.217) (0.107) (0.159)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.0000761 -0.000261 -0.000133 0.000404 0.000659∗ -0.000505 -0.000666∗ -0.000204
(0.000281) (0.00115) (0.000258) (0.00121) (0.000367) (0.000891) (0.000394) (0.00130)
Constant -0.181 -0.365 0.117 0.244 -0.789∗ -0.963∗ 0.0719 0.0619
(0.347) (0.511) (0.296) (0.501) (0.424) (0.563) (0.422) (0.622)
Observations 298 107 298 107 298 107 298 107
R2 0.376 0.497 0.475 0.644 0.281 0.265 0.284 0.217
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.24: Impact of return on social capital excluding connections with UNRWA and camp popular committee
Avg SC Trust Non–institutional SC Bonding SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV
Return -0.259 0.720 -0.0357 0.584 -0.477∗∗∗ 0.409 0.176 -1.128∗
(0.198) (0.643) (0.180) (0.661) (0.146) (0.334) (0.173) (0.643)
Contact with UNRWA -0.0520 0.0246 0.0162 0.0933 -0.196∗∗∗ -0.106 0.0985∗ 0.0959
(0.0620) (0.0982) (0.0597) (0.101) (0.0563) (0.0828) (0.0519) (0.0811)
Contact with popular committee 0.175∗∗ 0.0915 0.138∗∗ 0.0996 0.00135 -0.0425 0.0392 0.0965
(0.0682) (0.104) (0.0688) (0.102) (0.0508) (0.0957) (0.0460) (0.0737)
P
age
1
4
6
of
223
Respondent is male 0.125 -0.0496 -0.0000641 0.0344 0.198 -0.0374 -0.284∗∗ 0.00925
(0.135) (0.288) (0.128) (0.274) (0.128) (0.232) (0.118) (0.261)
Age of respondent -0.00150 0.0162∗∗ -0.00436 0.0192∗∗ 0.00537 -0.00186 -0.00341 -0.00217
(0.00573) (0.00812) (0.00597) (0.00788) (0.00551) (0.00723) (0.00571) (0.00906)
Respondent is literate -0.0438 0.159 0.00985 -0.206 -0.0905 0.474 -0.237 0.295
(0.145) (0.611) (0.142) (0.703) (0.155) (0.319) (0.154) (0.347)
Household is nuclear -0.261 -0.293 -0.232 -0.313 -0.0980 -0.107 0.0954 -0.156
(0.165) (0.216) (0.165) (0.218) (0.159) (0.280) (0.146) (0.282)
Age of oldest household member 0.00468 -0.00834 0.00518 -0.0133 -0.000263 0.00263 0.00228 0.000660
(0.00514) (0.0107) (0.00554) (0.00971) (0.00465) (0.00874) (0.00545) (0.0115)
Household sex ratio 0.116∗ -0.0848 0.115∗ -0.129∗ 0.00894 0.0239 0.0883∗ 0.00624
(0.0648) (0.0692) (0.0690) (0.0742) (0.0577) (0.0501) (0.0470) (0.0560)
Index of household assets 0.132∗ 0.0265 -0.00460 -0.0690 0.234∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ -0.141∗∗ 0.133
(0.0732) (0.0879) (0.0751) (0.0909) (0.0659) (0.107) (0.0713) (0.116)
Household monthly consumption 0.000155 -0.0000920 0.0000295 -0.0000840 0.000198∗∗∗ 0.00000842 0.0000554 -0.000228
(0.0000942) (0.000113) (0.0000889) (0.000132) (0.0000694) (0.000111) (0.000109) (0.000144)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0453 0.654∗∗∗ 0.0450 0.586∗∗∗ 0.0882 0.304∗ 0.0712 -0.580∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.186) (0.110) (0.189) (0.0982) (0.177) (0.0989) (0.201)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000752∗∗ -0.000552 0.000771∗∗ -0.000304 0.000122 -0.000688 -0.000781∗∗ 0.00220
(0.000360) (0.00187) (0.000361) (0.00189) (0.000332) (0.000786) (0.000302) (0.00175)
Constant -0.508 -0.383 -0.364 0.187 -0.346 -0.640 0.267 0.351
(0.377) (0.674) (0.370) (0.713) (0.369) (0.543) (0.360) (0.637)
Observations 298 107 298 107 298 107 298 107
R2 0.137 0.200 0.081 0.213 0.160 0.189 0.074 0.092
P
age
1
4
7
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.25: Reasons for not wanting to return home. Source: Author’s dataset.
Frequency Percentage
I am now close to family 2 12.5
The house that was rebuilt for us is too small 2 12.5
Someone from our household married into this community 3 18.75
We are happier here 4 25
We have settled down here 3 18.75
Someone from our household found work here 2 12.5
Total 16 100
Table 4.26: Impact of return on social capital excluding those who do not want to return
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC Non–institutional SC Weak SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV A B:IV
Return -0.322∗ 0.442 -0.0948 0.328 -0.325∗ -0.849 -0.345∗∗ 0.706∗ -0.615∗∗∗ 0.892
(0.194) (0.580) (0.191) (0.634) (0.166) (0.631) (0.171) (0.424) (0.174) (0.549)
Respondent is male 0.186 0.0336 0.0511 0.115 -0.0664 0.00538 0.196 -0.0406 0.411∗∗∗ -0.0418
(0.137) (0.261) (0.138) (0.280) (0.133) (0.281) (0.157) (0.277) (0.148) (0.237)
Age of respondent -0.000833 0.0131∗ -0.00493 0.0186∗∗ 0.00214 -0.00685 0.00647 0.0000227 0.00247 -0.00286
(0.00580) (0.00762) (0.00654) (0.00818) (0.00567) (0.00915) (0.00688) (0.00825) (0.00692) (0.0100)
Respondent is literate -0.00854 0.167 0.0113 -0.193 -0.142 0.406 -0.0839 0.459 0.261 -0.0454
(0.150) (0.700) (0.153) (0.824) (0.176) (0.428) (0.183) (0.351) (0.200) (0.313)
P
age
1
4
8
of
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Household is nuclear -0.241 -0.222 -0.232 -0.276 0.0552 0.0693 -0.0459 -0.258 -0.0400 0.324
(0.157) (0.213) (0.171) (0.238) (0.156) (0.278) (0.200) (0.330) (0.172) (0.278)
Age of oldest household member 0.00512 -0.00275 0.00658 -0.00965 0.00130 0.00979 -0.00137 -0.00211 -0.000454 0.00496
(0.00512) (0.00983) (0.00596) (0.0102) (0.00518) (0.0108) (0.00575) (0.0105) (0.00637) (0.0115)
Household sex ratio 0.148∗∗ -0.112 0.150∗ -0.166∗ 0.115∗ 0.0415 -0.0339 0.0115 -0.0530 0.0382
(0.0691) (0.0765) (0.0787) (0.0908) (0.0615) (0.0581) (0.0726) (0.0643) (0.0627) (0.0536)
Index of household assets 0.226∗∗∗ -0.00707 0.0619 -0.0952 0.216∗∗∗ 0.164 0.116 0.251∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ -0.123
(0.0747) (0.0831) (0.0789) (0.0933) (0.0792) (0.130) (0.0791) (0.112) (0.0779) (0.0997)
Household monthly consumption 0.000116 -0.000172 0.00000182 -0.000157 0.000108 -0.000310∗∗∗ 0.000261∗∗∗ 0.000128 -0.000102 0.000145
(0.0000904) (0.000112) (0.0000948) (0.000143) (0.0000917) (0.000118) (0.0000866) (0.000140) (0.000130) (0.000148)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0746 0.466∗∗ 0.0676 0.474∗∗ 0.0966 -0.679∗∗∗ 0.120 0.573∗∗∗ -0.129 0.334∗
(0.115) (0.203) (0.118) (0.215) (0.109) (0.206) (0.123) (0.209) (0.117) (0.198)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000591∗ 0.0000213 0.000660∗ 0.000373 -0.00102∗∗∗ 0.000953 0.000569 -0.000634 0.000478 -0.00155
(0.000351) (0.00168) (0.000388) (0.00181) (0.000370) (0.00181) (0.000443) (0.00112) (0.000371) (0.00156)
Constant -0.563 -0.395 -0.399 0.131 0.0658 0.129 -0.602 -0.800 -0.221 -0.734
(0.397) (0.728) (0.407) (0.811) (0.417) (0.719) (0.464) (0.694) (0.422) (0.674)
Observations 290 105 290 105 290 105 290 105 290 105
R2 0.149 0.166 0.061 0.189 0.151 0.133 0.074 0.188 0.203 0.004
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.27: Weights of social capital variables (excluding trust) from factor analysis
Variable Social connections
and interactions
# of relatives 0.3294
Friends in community 0.4832
Friends outside community 0.3858
Contact with UNRWA -0.0043
Contact with committee 0.0830
Wedding invitations 0.4732
Wedding invitees 0.4367
Socialising in last week 0.3724
Paying condolences 0.285
Belong to group 0.0703
Source: Author’s dataset. Weights that are
higher than average are listed in bold font.
Table 4.28: Impact of return on connections and interactions in sections A and B
(1) (2)
Section A Section B (using IV)
Return -0.389∗∗∗ 0.401
(0.137) (0.377)
Respondent is male 0.315∗∗∗ -0.00970
(0.118) (0.240)
Age of respondent -0.00244 0.00157
(0.00533) (0.00879)
Respondent is literate 0.00264 0.658∗∗
(0.134) (0.319)
Household is nuclear -0.0576 -0.00422
(0.164) (0.296)
Age of oldest household member 0.00228 -0.00656
(0.00429) (0.00988)
Household sex ratio -0.0531 0.105
(0.0598) (0.0654)
Index of household assets 0.283∗∗∗ 0.0746
(0.0605) (0.1000)
Household monthly consumption 0.000233∗∗∗ 0.0000576
(0.0000797) (0.000115)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.0416 0.377∗∗
(0.0951) (0.191)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000647∗∗ 0.0000560
(0.000320) (0.00108)
Constant -0.432 -0.885
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(0.357) (0.603)
Observations 399 129
R2 0.150 0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.29: Impact of return on social capital on full sample - OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg SC Trust Bonding SC Non-institutional SC Weak SC
Early return 0.430∗ 0.327 0.0659 0.394∗ 0.0128
(0.256) (0.265) (0.241) (0.212) (0.207)
Late return -0.387∗∗ -0.153 -0.310∗ -0.348∗∗ -0.670∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.184) (0.171) (0.169) (0.172)
Respondent is male 0.111 0.0187 0.0211 0.128 0.246∗∗
(0.121) (0.122) (0.118) (0.128) (0.123)
Age of respondent 0.00343 0.00226 -0.00240 0.00401 0.00336
(0.00491) (0.00542) (0.00508) (0.00526) (0.00558)
Respondent is literate 0.0733 0.0692 -0.109 -0.0708 0.281∗
(0.159) (0.178) (0.155) (0.165) (0.169)
Household is nuclear -0.270∗∗ -0.293∗∗ 0.0900 -0.0972 0.0309
(0.134) (0.142) (0.145) (0.176) (0.154)
Age of oldest household member 0.000942 0.000499 0.00357 -0.000792 -0.000936
(0.00469) (0.00524) (0.00490) (0.00499) (0.00550)
Household sex ratio 0.0801 0.0578 0.0558 -0.00501 0.0242
(0.0515) (0.0567) (0.0454) (0.0490) (0.0435)
Index of household assets 0.153∗∗ 0.0228 0.203∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.0616) (0.0623) (0.0687) (0.0618) (0.0640)
Household monthly consumption 0.0000325 -0.0000380 -0.0000574 0.000203∗∗∗ 0.0000160
(0.0000669) (0.0000729) (0.0000816) (0.0000698) (0.0000921)
Household stayed with friends or fam 0.152 0.147 -0.132 0.231∗∗ 0.00143
(0.0994) (0.102) (0.0983) (0.103) (0.0998)
Number of NBCers living in community 0.000407 0.000602∗ -0.000921∗∗∗ 0.000314 0.000317
(0.000333) (0.000359) (0.000348) (0.000381) (0.000342)
Household from section B -0.196 -0.0624 -0.284 -0.163 -0.103
(0.221) (0.228) (0.211) (0.164) (0.168)
Constant -0.396 -0.268 0.350 -0.433 -0.507
(0.325) (0.343) (0.371) (0.386) (0.358)
Observations 405 405 405 405 405
R2 0.103 0.053 0.098 0.095 0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.14 Appendix E: Variables from Questionnaire
Table 4.30: Description of variables used in chapter
Variable Question from questionnaire/Description
Social Capital (In some cases these variables were recoded so that higher values indicated higher
social capital)
Number of relatives Without considering those who are living with you in your house, how
many of your relatives live in this community?
Friends in community How many friends do you have living in this community? (By friends
we mean those that you see at least once a month)
Friends outside commu-
nity
How many friends do you have living outside this community? (By
friends we mean those that you see at least once a month)
Contact with UNRWA Do you or any member of your household have a contact with an UN-
RWA employee who could help you out in the case of an emergency or
if needed?
Contact with committee Do you or any member of your household have a contact with a member
of the popular committee who could help you out in the case of an
emergency or if needed?
Wedding invitations If a member of your family were preparing for a wedding today, how
many persons would be invited to the ceremony?
Wedding invitees Over the last year, how many weddings have you attended?
Socialising in last week Over the last week, how many times have you socialised with others
(to have dinner, drink coffee/tea, play cards or backgammon, or other
social visits)?
Paying condolences Over the last year, how many times have you paid condolences?
Belong to group Do you or any member of your family belong to any of the follow-
ing groups or organisations? Co–op; Work Union; Work syndicate;
Micro–finance group; Waste or water management group; Neighbour-
hood association; Civil society organisation; School committee; Sport’s
group; Youth group; Camp popular committee; NGO; Religious group;
Cultural group (theatre, reading); Political party or group; Women’s
group; Parent’s group; Health group; Camp association; Local forces
On a scale of one to four, one being completely agree and 4 being completely disagree, how much
do you agree with the following sentences?
Community is honest Most people in this community are honest and can be trusted
Community lies Most people in this community lie and try to take advantage of you
Purse would be returned If you dropped your purse or wallet in your neighbourhood, it will be
returned to you
On a scale of one to four, one being completely trust and 4 being completely distrust, how much
do you trust the following?
Trust: Community lead-
ers
Community leaders
Trust: Committee lead-
ers
Committee leaders
Trust: Local forces Local forces
Trust: Religious leaders Religious leaders
Trust: Neighbours Neighbours
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Trust: Palestinians from
NBC
Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared camp
Trust: Palestinians Palestinians from outside of Nahr el–Bared camp
Trust: Lebanese civil-
ians
Lebanese civilians living in surrounding areas
Trust: Lebanese ISF The Lebanese Internal Security Forces
Trust: Lebanese army The Lebanese Army
Trust: NGO workers NGO workers
Trust: UNRWA workers UNRWA workers
Regression controls
Sex of respondent Taken from the household roster: What is the sex of [name]?
Age of respondent Taken from the household roster: What is the age of [name]?
Respondent literacy Taken from the household roster: Can [name] read or write in any
language?
Household is a nuclear
family
Nuclear family is defined as those consisting of the head, his/her spouse
and children — or any combination of these.
Age of oldest household
member
Maximum age of all household members taken from the household ros-
ter: What is [name]’s age?
Household sex ratio Ratio of males to females in household
Index of household as-
sets
Factor analysis is applied to a list of household assets to create an
index.6 Household assets: Car; Motor cycle; van; truck; Cellular phone;
Land line; Bed; Fridge; Freezer; Oven; Microwave; Washing machine;
Computer; Internet; Heater; AC; TV; Satellite; Fan; Bank accounts;
Loans (negative weight); Micro credit loans (negative weight)
Household total monthly
consumption (in US $)
This is the sum of expenses on rent, electricity, water, petrol, food,
clothing, education, health and tobacco
Household stayed with
friends or family
Selected “With friends” or “With extended family” when asked “Where
did you stay during the displacement?”
Pre–war characteristics: These variables were constructed by the author to cover individuals
who were alive before the war (those older than 5 years old)
Sex What is the sex of [name]?
Age What is [name]’s age?
Literacy Can the [name] read or write in any language?
Ever attended school Has [name] ever attended school?
If yes, what is the highest level of schooling that [name] has achieved?
Prim. school Selected “Primary schooling”
Int. school Selected “Intermediate school”
Sec. school Selected “Secondary school”
University Selected “University”
Working Has [name] worked for cash or in kind over the last week even if for
only one hour?
Sex ratio Ratio of males to females in household
Average age Average age of the household
6Weights for factor analysis can be provided
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Household size Number of household members who live and sleep under the same roof
and share meals together
Dependency ratio Ratio of working household members to non working household
members
Number of children in
hhd
Number of individuals below the age of 15
Number of working
members in hhd
Number of working individuals in household
Other variables used in mechanisms or robustness checks
Number of NBCers liv-
ing in community
Extracted from UNRWA database of Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared
and their location
Friends and family re-
turn
Have your friends and family returned to Nahr el–Bared camp? Yes all
of them; Yes some of them; No
Furniture Do you have enough furniture in their house for family to sit and have
dinner together?
Like to return Would you like to return home to Nahr el–Bared if you had the oppor-
tunity?
Chapter 5
The labour market returns to
returning home
154
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Abstract
This chapter studies the effect of returning home on labour market outcomes.
Theoretically the effect of return is ambiguous, depending on changes in both the
demand and supply of labour. I empirically study the effect of return on four labour
market outcomes: participation in the labour force, working, wages and number of
days worked. I analyse a dataset of individuals originally from Nahr el–Bared camp in
North Lebanon, displaced within Lebanon after a war in 2007 between the Lebanese
army and Fatah al–Islam. I use an instrumental variable and exploit the exogenous
nature of the return process in order to estimate a causal effect of return. The results
show that return increases the likelihood of working by 117 percentage points. This
effect is greatest for those who have returned within two years, reaping the benefits of
greater aggregate demand as the market increases. Women returnees are more likely
to be working compared to the displaced, but there is no difference in employment
between men who have been displaced and those who have returned. This could be
because women possess skills that are adaptable in labour markets, working in cottage
type industries from home, as opposed to the more specialised skills that men tend to
possess.
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5.1 Introduction
High employment rates and decent wages are signs of healthy economy. In fact, govern-
ments will often try to improve these indicators by creating new economic opportunities
and jobs. This is a high priority in post–conflict settings and upon returning home after
conflict–induced displacement. Research has shown that the unemployed and poor can be
seduced by conflict and crime in the face of impoverishment and lack of opportunity (Col-
lier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Becker, 1968; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008), an undesirable
outcome when peace-building and economic reconstruction are the main concern. The
economic and social benefits of increased employment and wages are also obvious, and
particularly so for individuals who have experienced the traumas of war and are ready
to restart their lives. We have little understanding of how labour markets can redevelop
in post–conflict settings, in addition to who can benefit from starting over and who will
be side–lined. Returning home after conflict–induced displacement is seen as a necessary
solution to the refugee crisis, but there is insufficient evidence showing how returnees
compare to the displaced in terms of employment and wages.
In this chapter I explore how the demand and supply for labour shifts upon returning
home. During the initial phases of return, the pool of potential workers will be small
because not all former residents have returned, thus labour supply will be lower than
that in displacement markets. However, female labour supply could increase because of
a sustained change in attitude towards the role of women who are more likely to find
work during displacement. Labour demand could reduce because of a smaller market size
and fewer economic opportunities, but demand for construction workers and unskilled
labourers could increase due to a focus of the economy on these sectors. These potential
shifts of labour demand and supply can affect wages and employment, but the result is a
priori ambiguous. This implies the need for an empirical analysis to determine the effect
of return on labour market outcomes.
This chapter supplements the analysis of chapter four of this thesis by utilising a unique
and rich dataset collected by the author. To the best of my knowledge, this dataset is
the first of its kind in the way that it represents both the displaced and returnees, and
allows me to isolate the effect of return, rather than confounding it with the displacement
effect. When considering the decision to return home, this information is critical, as a
displaced household or policy maker will be interested in the added effect of returning
home compared to remaining displaced, rather than the effect of the entire displacement
and return process.
In order to empirically estimate a causal return effect, I use an individual level dataset
that I collected in Nahr el–Bared camp following the 2007 war and subsequent displace-
ment. Labour market outcomes are measured through four dependent variables: partici-
pation in the labour force, working, wages and number of days worked during the week. I
follow an identification strategy similar to that of chapter 4 of my thesis, which exploits the
nature of the return process of Palestinian households from Nahr el–Bared camp (NBC)
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in North Lebanon. In section A of the camp I take advantage of a natural experiment,
as the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was controlled and organised by an
external UN agency. In section B of the camp I use an instrumental variable approach to
model the return decision, in case it is correlated to economic opportunities at the return
or displacement sites.
The results of this chapter show that returning home can increase the likelihood of
working by around 117 percentage points, but does not affect the likelihood of joining
the labour force, wages or number of days worked per week. The increase in employment
prospects is greatest for those who return after two years of displacement, as these individ-
uals can reap the benefits of an economy that has restarted. In addition, the main result of
an increase in the probability of working is found to be even larger and more significant for
women, but there is no effect for men. When comparing the percentage of skilled workers
between the displaced and returnees it becomes clear that there are more opportunities
for unskilled work upon returning home, as the economy is not yet developed and has
not recovered since the war. This result complements that of Caldero´n et al. (2011), who
find increased employment amongst displaced women, but not displaced men, compared
to those who have not been displaced. This chapter has gone one step further, to see how
the displaced fare in the labour market upon returning home.
Despite the fact that returning home after conflict induced displacement is a popular
policy recommendation, there are few articles that empirically determine the effect of re-
turn: Fiala (2015) finds that Ugandan returnees face lower consumption and have fewer
household assets compared to the non–displaced; Verwimp and Mun˜oz Mora (2013) have
found that returnees lag behind stayers in terms of calorie intake, poverty and household
welfare; Kondylis (2008) finds that Ugandan returnees yield higher agricultural productiv-
ity compared to those who were never displaced; Bozzoli et al. (2011) find that returnees
engage in different activity choices compared to the displaced; and finally chapter 4 of this
thesis finds that return, compared to the displaced, decreases social capital in the short
term, but increases it in the long term. This chapter will contribute to this emerging lit-
erature, as well as provide much needed research on return and labour market outcomes,
thus filling the gap in the academic literature.
This chapter is similar to the research of Bozzoli et al. (2011) who compare the economic
activity choices of the displaced and returnees in Northern Uganda. Conceding that the
two groups of returnees and IDPs are likely to be of different socio–economic backgrounds,
the authors use the conflict intensity at the place of birth of the head of the household
as an instrumental variable. Their analysis focuses on participating in three activity
choices: cultivation, handicrafts and trading — the three activities that at least 5% of
the sample reported participating in. Counter–intuitively, IDPs are more likely to engage
in cultivation and trading compared to returnees, but less likely to engage in handicraft
making. In general, IDPs are less likely to participate in any economic activity. The
reasons for this divergence are not tested, but the authors propose several explanations
with contradictory policy recommendations.
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In this chapter, I follow a similar identification strategy, comparing the displaced with
those who have returned, and relying on an instrumental variable of destruction of housing
in addition to the exogeneity of the return process. The instrumental variable used in this
chapter, the destruction of housing during a war when all residents were evacuated, is an
improvement over the one used by Bozzoli et al. (2011), as it is a stronger predictor of
return (more relevant) and independent of labour market outcomes (more exclusive). The
conflict intensity at place of birth, which is used as an IV strategy by Bozzoli et al. (2011),
is likely to be correlated with certain socio–economic characteristics (such as ethnicity, age,
education and family income) that still hold significance in current labour market activity
choices. In fact, the legacy and long term effects of conflict have been widely documented,
for example, Galdo (2013) finds that a one standard deviation increase in early childhood
exposure to violence in Peru leads to a 5% decrease in adult monthly earnings.
Another difference from the work of Bozzoli et al. (2011) is that this chapter is interested
in different labour market outcome variables, namely: participating in the labour force,
working, number of days worked per week, and wages. These variables have been selected
because they are the most indicative of performance in the labour market, most likely to
be affected by return (see section 5.2), are easy to measure through a survey, and will
yield the most useful policy recommendations.
This chapter also ties into the literature on the effect of forced displacement and conflict
on labour market outcomes. Kondylis (2010) studied the labour market effect of household
displacement during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, instrumenting the household’s
displacement status with the level of violence and conflict at the household’s original
locality. She found that displaced Bosnians are less likely to be working than Bosnians who
were not displaced. This translated into more unemployment for men, but dropping out of
the labour force for women. Kondylis hypothesizes that the main reason for this increase
in unemployment amongst the displaced is due to the prevalence of informal markets in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since displaced workers are less likely to have access to existing
social networks and informal markets it is also more difficult for them to find a job. While
Kondylis does not have any social network or social capital data to test this mechanism,
this chapter will test the hypothesis empirically by including social capital data collected
by the author in the analysis. In addition, Kondylis (2010) cannot differentiate between
displaced persons who have returned home and those who are still displaced, ignoring an
extremely important area that this chapter addresses.
Caldero´n et al. (2011) show that forced displacement in Colombia improves women’s
participation in the labour force, as IDPs find themselves in unfamiliar urban settings
where women are more likely (than men) to possess the necessary experience for low–skill
urban work. Caldero´n and Iba´n˜ez (2009) study the effect of forced migration on labour
market outcomes in Colombia and find that immigration flows produce a negative impact
on wages and employment opportunities for all workers (both displaced and “native”
workers), and especially so for low–skilled workers. The informal sector expands as a
result. Ferna´ndez et al. (2014) find that households living through certain shocks of
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violence and conflict increase their labour force supply as a coping strategy. Specifically,
they find that men take most of this responsibility, and while time spent in agricultural
work decreases, time spent in non–agriculture markets increases. Bozzoli et al. (2013) find
that an increase in net displacement leads to an increase in the probability of becoming
self–employed in Colombia. Self–employment is seen by the authors as a last resort, one
that migrants turn to because of their limited social and professional networks.
Using a comparative study of two cities in Sudan, Alix-Garcia and Bartlett (2015)
conclude that long term urban residents in conflict areas have a higher probability of
being employed in skilled sectors. Michaelsen (2012) instruments mental health with
exposure to drug related violence in Mexico, and finds that an increase in exposure to
violence has adverse effects on mental health and thus the individual supply of labour.
While the effect is strong, the assumption that violence affects labour supply only through
the mental health channel is difficult to believe. Violence can affect access to education,
damage infrastructure, and cause physical harm, all of which can directly affect labour
market outcomes. Shemyakina (2011a) finds that women who were of school age and living
in conflict affected areas of Tajikistan had lower school attainment but were more likely
to find a job.
These studies are not able to identify the mechanism that causes a change in labour
force outcomes, nor do they look at what happens to individuals once they return home.
This is a large gap in the literature which has been insufficiently addressed so far. While
testing the impact of returning home after conflict induced displacement, this chapter
draws from the current state of the art by improving the instrumental variable approach
of Bozzoli et al. (2011); empirically testing the mechanisms and hypotheses put forward
by Kondylis (2010) and Bozzoli et al. (2013); observing heterogeneity by gender, as in
Caldero´n et al. (2011) and Caldero´n and Iba´n˜ez (2009); focusing on skilled labour like
Caldero´n and Iba´n˜ez (2009); and looking at the supply of labour as a coping strategy, as
described by Ferna´ndez et al. (2014).
When returning home to an economy that has been destroyed by bombing and fighting
(see Justino (2012) for a review) and a dramatically altered social fabric (see chapter
1 for a review of this literature), the rebuilding of the economic market and returnees’
participation in it warrants further research. By addressing this gap, this chapter speaks to
the literature on post–conflict reconstruction and peace–building (del Castillo and Myers,
2010; Addison and Bru¨ck, 2008), which has documented that the slow recovery to peace
depends on the creation of inclusive economic opportunities and productive reintegration.
The resilience of labour markets to shocks such as war, conflict and natural disasters is a
little understood topic, yet crucial for peace–building efforts.
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5.2 Conceptual Discussion
According to neo–classical economic theory, at a macro–level the supply and demand for
labour determine wages and the number of persons employed in a given economy or market.
Any changes to these indicators of labour markets, i.e. wages and employment, stem from
the supply and demand for labour. Figure 5.1 displays the demand for labour (LD) —
as wages are higher, firms demand less labour given the same marginal productivity of
labour. The supply of labour (LS ) increases as wages increase, but this is only found
to be true up to a certain point. Once workers earn higher salaries, it is theorised that
the substitution effect of leisure time over work becomes smaller than the income effect,
since leisure is considered to be a normal good. Graphically this is represented in the
backward–bending labour supply curve.
The labour demand curve could shift for two main reasons. Firstly, due to a change in
preferences within a certain sector. For example, with the rise in information technology,
the demand for IT specialists has also increased. Secondly, the demand curve will shift
because of a general increase or decrease in wealth — demand for labour declines during
a recession as businesses start to shut down. Indirectly the interest rates have been used
as a tool to increase labour demand, by stimulating the growth of the economy. On the
other hand, the labour demand curve can become steeper or shallower if there is a change
in the marginal productivity of labour for a given wage rate.
The labour supply curve could shift because of population growth. Theoretically it
was thought that migration caused an increase in labour supply and thus a decrease in
wages, but this has not shown to be the case empirically, and led economists to believe
that migrant workers compete for jobs in a different but complementary labour market
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). The slope of the labour supply curve could change if there
is a change in the marginal returns to leisure. For example, one could think that during
the summer months the supply of labour will be lower for a given wage rate as some of us
would prefer to be at the beach.
In what follows I aim to theoretically examine how the labour market could be affected
by returning home, compared to remaining displaced. There are several effects occurring
simultaneously, each resulting in different changes to the wage rate and employment. In
addition, some effects will hold in the short run, but could possibly be reversed in the long
run. For this reason it is important to test the impact of return empirically, but before
this I present the potential effects that return can have on labour market outcomes. If
we assume that figure 5.1 represents the demand and supply for labour in displacement
markets, figures 5.2 to 5.8 have been adapted to reflect changes upon return. The latter
figures include dotted lines to indicate the original labour demand (LD) and labour supply
(LS ).
Intuitively we would expect changes to the labour market to stem from the following
factors.
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1. Population changes:
During wartime there is a dramatic decrease in labour supply, as other concerns
such as fighting and security become a priority (Matowu and Stewart, 2001) and
sources of livelihoods are destroyed (Iba´n˜ez and Moya, 2010; Bru¨ck, 2001). In the
case of the war in Nahr el–Bared, the evacuation of Palestinians on the third day
of fighting drove the labour supply to zero. Compared to the displacement market
this is represented by a left shift in the labour supply curve as shown in figure 5.2.
This means that wages are initially higher than the displaced, but the employment
rate is lower. For illustration purposes, assume that there are three waves of return:
1st, 2nd and 3rd waves of returnees. With each wave we see an increase in labour
supply, or a shift in the labour supply curve, resulting in a decrease in wages, from
W1 to W2 to W3, and an increase in employment, from E1 to E2 to E3. When
comparing these wages to the displaced, the picture is less clear. If all potential
workers have returned home, it is possible that the labour supply will be equal to
that in displacement markets. However, if not all households and potential workers
have returned, then labour supply will always be lower than in displacement markets.
This means that returnees will have higher wages and lower employment than the
displaced. There is a dynamic effect of return on the labour market, since wages
and employment will be determined by the wave of return. This chapter tries to
account for this by analysing the effect of the timing of return, as well as controlling
for population size.
H1.1: Returnees have higher wages but lower employment compared to the displaced.
H1.2: Early returnees have higher wages but less employment compared to later
returnees.
2. Market size:
Early returnees will arrive to an economic market that was destroyed by the war and
needs to be rebuilt from scratch (Collier et al., 2003). Compared to the usually busy
economic areas that displaced households are residing in, war creates an economic
vacuum and a lack of opportunity (Valerie Cerra, 2008; Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Justino and Verwimp, 2013). Pre–war businesses are likely to have shut down,
so demand for labour will be low. This implies a downward shift in the labour
demand curve, as shown in figure 5.3, resulting in lower wages and lower employment.
Once more households return, the economy will start to grow. For example, returnees
will need to purchase vegetables and fruits and so street vendors will pop up and new
work opportunities will be created. Similar to the effect on labour supply, labour
demand will increase with time. This increase in labour demand increases wages and
employment. Once all households return we are likely to see labour demand equal
to that of the displacement market.
H2.1: Returnees have lower wages and employment compared to the displaced.
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H2.2: Later returnees have higher wages and employment compared to early re-
turnees.
3. Reconstruction:
There is one exception to the reduction in demand for labour. Due to the destruction
of buildings, roads and physical institutions there is an increased opportunity for
work in the construction sector (Collier, 2009). It is likely that we see an increase
in demand for labourers in the construction sector, resulting in higher wages and
higher employment as shown in figure 5.4. To test this hypothesis, the analysis will
be conducted separately for the construction sector.
H3.1: Returnees have higher wages and employment compared to the displaced
because of the construction sector.
4. Social capital:
In his classic study titled Getting a Job, Granovetter (1974) explains how information
asymmetries about job opportunities exist amongst job searchers. When jobs are
advertised informally and by word of mouth, individuals with a large network (not
necessarily a dense one) are those that are more likely to find jobs as they are
exposed to a larger set of individuals with potentially different information. The
effect of social capital is at the micro–level, i.e. it affects individuals rather than the
labour market as a whole. For this reason it is not usually represented as a labour
supply side or demand side factor, but rather as individual heterogeneous effects
on labour market outcomes. Since Granovetter’s seminal study there has been an
abundance of literature that show how social networks and social capital improve
the chances of finding work and increase wages (Montgomery, 1991; Munshi, 2003;
Calvo´-Armengol, 2004; Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Wahba and Zenou, 2005;
Buerkle and Guseva, 2002; Knight and Yueh, 2008).
The reason that both employers and job seekers rely on informal advertising is that
it is relatively inexpensive compared to other job search methods, there is a higher
likelihood of securing a job, and allows employers a “screening mechanism” (Holzer,
1988). This is especially true in Nahr el–Bared, where hiring and job search is usually
done through an informal network of contacts, and often an employer will hire a new
employee because of a favour owed or a family tie. This insight was supported by
anecdotal evidence gathered by the author prior to starting the survey. The network
of contacts, or more locally known as wasta, is a system of favours prevalent in Arab
culture. Wasta, similar to guanxi in China, refers to the ability of an individual to
pull strings, be it in government, at work, or at a nightclub. Belonging to different
groups and organizations, knowing enough people — and the right type of people —
greatly increases the chances of obtaining a wasta that can secure a job opportunity.
Knight and Yueh (2008) are able to show that guanxi has a positive effect on an
individual’s wages, but despite its prevalence in the Arab world, there has been no
study that quantifies the effect wasta can have on the probability of finding a job.
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The results of chapter 4 found a heterogeneous effect of return: Households who
had returned soon after the war ended have higher social capital compared to the
displaced, but households who returned 5 years after the early returnees have lower
social capital compared to the displaced. We would then expect early returnees to
have a higher probability of finding a job and being employed, but the opposite effect
for late returnees.
H4.1: Early returnees have higher employment compared to the displaced because
of higher social capital.
H4.2: Late returnees have lower employment compared to the displaced because of
lower social capital.
5. Norms and attitudes:
Caldero´n et al. (2011) find that displaced women in Colombia work longer hours
compared to non–displaced women because they possess the necessary experience
for low–skill work in urban areas. Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers (2015) and
Shemyakina (2011a) find a similar effect for women during the conflicts in Nepal
and Tajikistan respectively. While men are fighting, or if they have been killed or
abducted during the war, women are forced to become the main breadwinners for the
family. Additionally, it is usually easier for women to find work during displacement,
particularly in the low–skilled cottage industry sectors or domestic work. Anecdotal
evidence states that the labour force participation of women in Europe remained
higher after the World Wars because a change in behaviour and attitudes towards
the economic role of women was sustained.
Traditionally, Palestinian women are less likely to participate in the formal labour
force than men. Amongst Palestinians in Lebanon, the female labour force par-
ticipation rate is 13% compared to the male labour force participation rate of 65%
(Chaaban et al., 2010). Instead women usually take up housekeeping roles, and their
time is occupied with cooking, cleaning and taking care of the children. If we as-
sume that the traditional division of duties is challenged by displacement, as shown
by previous studies, we would be interested to learn what happens upon return.
Do women get used to their economic independence and continue working in the
labour force? Do attitudes on women’s work change once their added contribution
to household income is appreciated? Or do women return to their traditional roles
when life returns to ‘normal’?
This chapter tests whether the effect of displacement on increased female labour force
participation is long–lasting, by separating the sample into males and females. Figure
5.5 shows how labour supply of female workers can change upon return. In figure
5.5a female labour supply is lower upon return, indicating a reversion to original
attitudes, and higher wages but lower employment for women. If there is a sustained
behavioural change, female labour supply (as well as wages and employment) will
not be affected by return as shown in figure 5.5b.
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H5.1: Return will cause higher wages but lower employment amongst women because
of a reversion to traditional attitudes.
H5.2: There will be no significant effect of return because of a sustained change in
norms and attitudes.
It is worth noting that hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2 rely on the assumption of a change in
norms and attitudes during displacement. Unfortunately, given the context of this
chapter it is impossible to test for this due to lack of a relevant control group.
6. Demand for female workers:
Demand for female workers could be higher in the returnee market, because of the
flexibility of occupations predominantly associated with women, particularly cottage
type industries that can be done from home. While the literature shows this to be
the case during displacement (Caldero´n et al., 2011), there is also a potential for
this effect to dominate upon return because of the undeveloped market that requires
flexible skills. Demand for male workers will go down, as opportunities for specialised
work decreases. As shown in figure 5.6a and 5.6b this will imply an increase in
employment and wages of women, but a decrease of both for men.
H6.1: Return will cause higher wages and employment among women because of
their adaptable skills, but lower wages and employment amongst men.
7. Rejoining the labour force:
Displacement is usually seen as a temporary situation, where IDPs are stuck in a
strange limbo. There are certain fixed costs associated with starting a new job or
business, and the benefits might not be reaped if IDPs are expecting to return home
soon. Upon return, they might re–enter the labour force. This will represent a
rightward shift of the labour supply curve upon returning home, resulting in lower
wages but higher employment. The effect on labour supply is shown in figure 5.7,
wages increase but employment increases.
H7.1: Return will cause lower wages and higher employment when individuals re–
enter the labour market.
8. Quality of labour:
However, on that same note, during this period of inactivity there will be a deteriora-
tion of skills that are applicable in the labour market. During times of displacement
and conflict schooling and education are interrupted (Shemyakina, 2011b) and health
and other human capital indicators worsen (Justino, 2012), ultimately leading to de-
teriorating quality of labour amongst the displaced. Given that the slope of the
labour demand curve is greater when employers are willing to hire more workers at
a given wage rate, this implies a steep labour demand curve in the returnee market,
and a shallow labour demand curve in the displacement market. This is illustrated
in figure 5.8 and results in higher wages and employment amongst the returnees.
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H8.1: Returnees will have higher wages and employment compared to the displaced
because skills continue to deteriorate during displacement.
This section illustrates conflicting effects of displacement. For example, demand for male
labour could decrease because of their less adaptable skills, but at the same time increase
because of opportunities in the construction sector. The following sections will empirically
test to see which effect is strongest.
5.3 Context
The context for this chapter is the same as that of chapter 4 of my thesis. As a reminder, in
2007, a war broke out in Nahr el–Bared camp (NBC) in the North of Lebanon, and lasted
for 3 months. Nahr el–Bared camp is a Palestinian refugee camp, home to Palestinians
who fled after the Palestinian exodus of 1948. While this potentially makes Nahr el–
Bared camp a very unique case–study, only 4.6% of the sample were alive at the time of
the initial displacement from Palestine. Since returning to Palestine has been ruled out
by the Oslo Accords of 1993, Palestinians have set up home in Lebanon, even if Palestine
is not forgotten (Ramadan, 2010).
During the war, all residents of the camp were evacuated to nearby areas in the first
few days, while the Lebanese army conducted an aerial bombardment operation to wipe
out Fatah al–Islam militia fighters who were hiding in the camp. The aerial bombardment
completely destroyed all buildings and homes in one of two sections of the camp (section
A), but the damage in the second section B was sporadic and superficial. Households from
section B were able to return home soon after the war ended, if their houses were rebuilt or
undamaged. Because section A was completely destroyed, it was cordoned off and divided
into eight geographical plots. Once funding from international donors was received for
each plot, reconstruction took place and households were allowed to return home. These
households returned home later than those in section B, and I use the fact that the return
decision was out of the hands of the household to provide a plausibly exogenous return
effect. In section B, the damage levels are used as an instrumental variable to model the
return decision. The exogeneity of return and instrumental variable strategy are discussed
further in section 5.5.
5.4 Data collection and Data
The dataset used in this analysis is the same household survey which I collected in February
2012 in Nahr el–Bared Camp, Lebanon. The survey consists of 590 households and 3,059
individuals, stratified by current residential area. The sample was drawn from a database
provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA). Collected soon after the 2007 war and over the following year, the
aim of this database was to register and trace all households displaced from Nahr el–Bared
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camp. As displaced families approached centres throughout the country to receive aid and
rent subsidies, UNRWA social workers gathered concise demographic information on the
members of the households, the addresses of the household, and if possible a contact
number. This information is updated each time rent subsidies are disbursed to displaced
households, which at the time of the survey was three times per year. The version of the
database which was used to create the sample for this household survey was last updated
in December of 2012, i.e. one month prior to fieldwork.
The data collectors interviewed an available household member if he/she was above the
age of 15. The respondent answered certain questions about other household members (the
modules on employment, education and health), questions at the level of the household
(e.g. household expenditure on food), and questions related to the respondent him/herself
(e.g. How many times have you visited a friend over the last week to socialize?).
Based on the conceptual discussion in section 5.2, it is clear that changes to the labour
market can be measured along two main indicators: wages and employment. Employment
can be considered through the number of days worked per week, and a binary variable
indicating whether an individual is working or not. In addition, participation in the labour
force is a useful variable, since individuals might like to increase their labour supply but
not be able to find a job (at least in the short term). This makes a total of four dependent
variables:
1. Participates in the labour force: This is a binary variable equal to one if an
individual (older than 13) is working or looking for work, and zero otherwise.
2. Working: This is equal to one if the individual is working, and zero if they are not
working but looking for a job. This is calculated for those older than 13.
3. Wages: This is measured as the log of monthly payment in dollars. Workers can
be paid daily or weekly but this was transformed into a monthly variable post–data
collection. Some workers are paid a piece rate, so they were asked to estimate their
average monthly earnings.
4. Number of days worked per week: Since labour supply can be increased not
only by the number of workers, but also by the number of days each individual
works, it is also important to include this measure in the analysis. This variable is
only measured for those who were working at the time of the survey.
These dependent variables are described further in table 5.1. Summary statistics of
the main dependent variables and other employment variables are provided in table 5.2,
and show that 40% of the sample participate in the labour force, and 30% are currently
working. Of those who are working, 30% are skilled workers, average monthly income is
403 dollars, and on average work just over 5 days per week.
In addition to the main dependent variables, this section provides a descriptive picture
of the labour market for Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared camp.
Table 5.2 shows that the employment rate is 82.2%, or that the unemployment rate is
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17.8%. This is a relatively high unemployment rate, higher than the Lebanese national
rate of 9% and the Middle East and North Africa average of 10.7%. As Palestinians are
not legally allowed to be employed in many professions, and find difficulty entering the
Lebanese economy, economic opportunities are minimal (Sayigh, 1995). Knowing that
the informal sector is the main driver of employment amongst Palestinians, the question-
naire administered for this survey contained a detailed employment module with several
questions about different types of employment opportunity to ensure that employment
is fully captured. Previous research had put the unemployment rate as quite high, but
no formal measurement of unemployment was taken until the Socio-Economic Survey of
Palestinian Refugees conducted by UNRWA and The American University of Beirut took
place in 2010 (Chaaban et al., 2010). This study revealed the unemployment rate of all
Palestinians (not just those from Nahr el-Bared) to be 8%, but there was some contention
as to whether these figures were forcefully changed by the Lebanese Government.
Figure 5.9 breaks down the unemployment rate by age, and table 5.3 separates the main
labour market variables by sex. There is a clear concentration of unemployment amongst
the youth, and there is also a significantly larger proportion of men who participate in
the labour force compared to women. In fact, 54% of men participate in the labour force
compared to only 14% of women.
Figure 5.10 shows the main occupation categories of Palestinian workers, and we see
that daily workers, builders and manual labourers are the most common occupations. In
second place comes sellers, which refers to those who sell products in a shop or as a street
vendor. It is clear that the most common professions are those that are unstable and
often dangerous. Figure 5.11 shows the sector that these individuals work in. As is often
the case in a post–conflict economy, the building sector seems to be the largest producer
of employment. This is followed by the sales and distribution sector, which is interesting
to observe given Nahr el–Bared’s pre-conflict reputation as a bustling market place that
attracted Lebanese, Palestinians and even Syrians for its cheap and plentiful produce.
According to figures 5.12a and 5.13a, most workers work full–time and are paid in cash
either monthly, weekly or daily (compared to being paid piece rate or in kind).
Looking for a job through a contact is popular amongst the unemployed, it is also the
predominant mode of job search for those who have successfully found a job as shown in
figure 5.12b. This supports the explanation provided by Granovetter (1974) — while a job
seeker might not actively approach a contact in hopes of securing a job, it is more likely
that contacts approach job seekers if they hear of an appropriate job opportunity.
Figure 5.13b shows the effect of the 2007 war on individuals between the ages of 21 and
70. In the majority of cases the individual was not working in the first place, but if the
individual was working quite a large number had to stop working — 453, or 30% of those
aged between 21 and 70, and 77.5% of those aged between 21 and 70 who were working
at the time. Of those who had to stop working, the majority found another job. 37% of
those who were forced to stop their job because of the war were able to resume it either
after the war ended or upon returning. A small number are still searching for work, and
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roughly the same amount stopped searching for a job.
As is the case in chapter 4, the main explanatory variable of interest is return. The
return status of the individual is determined by whether their household is living in the
same dwelling they were living in prior to the war (even if it was reconstructed or rebuilt).
Table 5.4 shows how many individuals have returned and how many are still displaced in
each of sections A and B. Table 5.5 compares labour market outcomes between returnees
and displaced in each of sections A and B. We see that most variables are not different
between returnees and the displaced except for the percentage who are working. 97% of
returnees from section A are working, compared to 81% of the displaced. This implies that
there is a highly saturated employment market upon return, with most returnees being
able to work compared to a large percentage of unemployment amongst the displaced. I
have addressed any potential concerns of splitting the sample this way in chapter 4.
5.5 Identification Strategy
The relationship that this chapter aims to causally estimate is the effect of return on
labour market outcomes. By looking at the simple bivariate analysis in table 5.5, we see
that camp A returnees are more likely to be working compared to the displaced. While
this is indicative of greater opportunities for returnees, we have not controlled for any
potentially confounding factors, addressed potential endogeneity nor applied the correct
specification for the types of variables under study.
Equation 5.1 displays the relationship between returning home for individual i and
labour market outcome j. The reduced form regressions that estimate this equation are
found in table 5.9 in the appendix and support the bivariate results that show return
increases the probability of working for those originally from section A.
Labour outcomei,j = α+ β1Returni +  (5.1)
There are a range of individual and household variables that could affect the four labour
outcome variables, including age, gender, marital status, intermediate schooling, whether
the household is nuclear and the household sex ratio, which are summarised in table 5.6.
The location of the individual, or the labour market that the individual belongs to, is
likely to play a role in labour market outcomes, but including the current location of
each individual is impossible when estimating the effect of return, as these fixed effects
will be wiped out by the return variable. Standard errors are robust to account for any
interdependence among residuals. The multi–variate equation becomes:
Labour outcomei,j,k = α+ β1Returni + β2Individuali + β3Householdk +  (5.2)
Estimating this equation as is would not account for any potential endogeneity between
return and labour market outcomes. Deininger et al. (2004) find that there are systematic
differences between households who return home after conflict and those who remain
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displaced, in particular the return decision is influenced by economic opportunities at the
displacement and return sites. As an example of this endogeneity, individuals who were
unable to find work during displacement have an incentive to return home to look for
better economic opportunities. This endogeneity concern is addressed in the same way
as in chapter 4. As a reminder, the dynamics of the return process were different for
households originally from section A and section B of the camp, so I have divided my
sample in two: households who originate from section A and households who originate
from section B. In each of sections A and B I address the potential endogeneity of return
and labour markets.
5.5.1 Section A
As previously explained, in section A the camp was geographically partitioned into pack-
ages by UNRWA, and then rebuilt when international funding was received. The partition
of the camp was not random, instead the camp was partitioned into four quadrants and the
far right quadrant was rebuilt first alongside neighbourhoods closest to the sea. UNRWA
did not disclose any reasoning behind this choice, and it is thought that they expected
to receive funding for all the reconstruction at once, and while they started work in one
corner of the camp it was not envisioned that packages of the camp would be finished
before others. As it happened, there were delays to construction because of lack of fund-
ing and due to the discovery of an ancient archaeological site, so UNRWA allowed those
whose dwellings were rebuilt to return home. This made the decision to return outside
the hands of the household and therefore uncorrelated to any socio–economic characteris-
tics and independent of labour market outcomes. For this sub–sample I simply estimate
equation 5.2. In chapter 4 I constructed pre–war characteristics based on the dataset and
compared households and individuals who had returned and found little difference. I rule
out the possibility that households with connections to UNRWA are able to have their
dwelling rebuilt by controlling for a contact with UNRWA as part of the robustness checks
in section 5.8.
5.5.2 Section B
In section B of the camp, households did make a decision to return, but this largely
depended on whether their house was destroyed or not. If a household’s dwelling was
not completely destroyed after the war, they were able to return home. If not, households
struggled to find the funds to rebuild their houses and have remained displaced. As I worry
that an individual’s labour market outcomes might predict the decision of returning home,
I use the destruction of the household’s original dwelling as an instrumental variable to
predict return.
The destruction of the dwellings in section B of the camp is a sporadic spill–over
from the aerial bombardment that completely destroyed section A. As households were
evacuated from NBC before the Lebanese army began the aerial bombardment operation,
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it is unlikely that the destruction of dwellings was a targeted attack based on socio–
economic characteristics of the residents of the dwellings. This makes the destruction of
dwellings an exclusive instrumental variable.
As justification to the exclusivity, table 4.9 in chapter 4 provides a balance table of
pre–war characteristics between households whose dwellings were destroyed and house-
holds whose dwellings are not destroyed. We find no significant differences in these char-
acteristics.
Despite this, it can be argued that there are potential challenges to this exclusivity.
Firstly, dwellings that were of poorer quality could be those that did not withstand the
bombardment and were razed to the ground. These dwellings are likely to belong to
poorer and more vulnerable households. This confoundment is not likely because the
power of rockets used by the Lebanese army would have destroyed any building no matter
its foundations, but nevertheless I control for household wealth by including an index of
household assets and consumption as a robustness check with little difference to the main
results. Secondly, it could be that destruction of dwellings directly affects labour force
participation because of a loss of assets and decrease in wealth. If households increase
their labour supply to compensate for this loss then the instrumental variable is no longer
exclusive. This possibility is ruled out by controlling for household assets and consumption
as a robustness check and finding little difference in results. Thirdly, it could be argued
that households who supported Fatah al–Islam were targeted by the Lebanese military,
which would play a role in determining labour market outcomes if these individuals are
discriminated against. While this is unlikely because Palestinians had since evacuated the
camp, as a robustness check I also control for trust in ‘local forces’, a proxy for Fatah
al–Islam.
The second criteria for a valid instrumental variable is its relevance, i.e. whether
destruction is a good predictor of return. After the war ended, some Palestinians from
section B found themselves in a difficult situation. These households arrived at the camp
to find their houses razed to the ground. With insufficient funds to rebuild their dwellings
and no help from the Lebanese government, UNRWA or other NGOs, most households
waited it out. They either tried to save enough money for construction costs, or thought
that UNRWA would pick up the pieces (ultimately they did not, and at the time of writing
many of these households remain displaced). But households who were lucky enough to
not have their dwellings destroyed returned as soon as the war ended. The first stage of
the instrumental variable regression estimates the following equation:
P (Returnj = 1) = α+ β1Destructionj + β2Individuali + β2Householdj +  (5.3)
Where the return, individual characteristics and household characteristics are the same
as those described previously. Destruction is a binary variable equal to one if the household
reported their dwelling as being completely destroyed during the war, and zero if their
houses were not destroyed or only superficially damaged.
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In chapter 4 this equation was estimated using a linear probability model, because the
main outcomes of interest were continuous (in that case it was an index of social capital).
Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggests using a linear probability model in the first stage
because the residuals of the first stage will be inserted into the second stage regression —
therefore the residuals of the first stage should be uncorrelated with the predicted values.
Using a non–linear estimation such as a probit or a logit can produce residuals that are
correlated with predicted results. However, if the dependent variable is binary, as in the
case of participation in the labour force and working, an IV probit model will assume a
continuous endogenous regressor. Since return is a binary variable, the two stages are
estimated simultaneously using a bivariate maximum likelihood estimation as suggested
by Wooldridge (2010). When estimating the effect of return on continuous labour market
outcomes, as is the case for wages and days worked per week, a linear probability model
is applied in the first stage. The following two equations are estimated:
Returni,k = Φ[β1Returni + β2Individuali + β3Householdk + ] (5.4)
Labour outcomei,k = Φ[β1Return
∗
i + β2Individuali + β3Householdk + ] (5.5)
The results of equation 5.4 are reported in table 5.7 when the probit maximum likelihood is
estimated separately. This gives evidence of quite a relevant instrument, if an individual’s
dwelling was completely destroyed, they are 76 percentage points less likely to return home
to section B. Table 5.8 provides further statistics that show the relevance of destruction as
an instrument because the F–statistic is higher than the rule of thumb of 10 (Stock et al.,
2002).
The computation of marginal and impact effects in the bivariate model are slightly
complex because the covariates included in the first equation are also included in the
second, meaning the marginal effect from one equation will be related to the marginal
effect from the other. In Stata, I apply a non–linear method to calculate the standard
errors of the marginal effects.
5.5.3 Regression specifications
The first relationship I aim to estimate is the effect of return on labour force participation.
This is a binary variable equal to one if the individual is participating in the labour force,
either by working or looking for work, and zero otherwise. I estimate this relationship
with a probit function Φ, or the inverse standard normal transformation:
Labour force participationi, k = Φ[β1Returni + β2Individuali + β3Householdk
+β4Household sizek + β5Age oldest memberk + ]
(5.6)
As in chapter 3 of this thesis, the marginal effect of continuous variables such as age, and
the impact effect of binary variables such as return, are calculated as equations 5.7 and
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5.8 respectively:
δLabour force part
δAge
= Φ[β∗1Returnavg + β
∗
2Invidualavg + β
∗
3Householdavg]× β∗3 (5.7)
∆ = Φ[β∗1Returnavg + β
∗
2Invidualavg + β
∗
3Householdavg]
−Φ[β∗2Invidualavg + β∗3Householdavg]
(5.8)
The second dependent variable of interest is whether the individual is working or not.
This variable is only observed for those who are part of the labour force, so selection into
the labour force needs to be addressed. I use a Heckman probit two stage estimation to
correct for this potential selection bias. This involves estimating the probability of selection
into the labour market using equation 5.6, which includes two identifying instruments for
selection: household size and the age of the oldest household member. The pseudo–
residuals from this equation are then stored (called the inverse–Mills ratio or IMR1,i),
representing unexplained selection into the labour force. I then estimate the following
regression using a Heckman probit:
Workingi,k = Φ[β1Returni + β2Individuali + β3Householdk + β4IMR1,i + ] (5.9)
If β4 is significant this will indicate the presence of non–random sample selection, which
if not accounted for could have biased the estimates of the other coefficients.1 In equation
5.9, I do not include household size and age of oldest household member as this will cause
multicollinearity and large standard errors. The marginal and impact effects are calculated
in the same way as 5.7 and 5.8.
The last two dependent variables are wages and number of days worked per week which
are only observed for those who are working. In this case I also use a Heckman two stage
estimation to correct for selection, however for these variables it is to correct for selection
into ‘working’ rather than the labour force. The selection identifying instruments are also
household size and the age of the oldest household member, and the Heckman first stage
is as follows:
Workingi,k = Φ[β1Returni + β2Individuali + β3Householdk
+β4Household sizek + β5Age oldest memberk + ]
(5.10)
After storing the pseudo residuals, IMR2,i, I estimate equations 5.11 and 5.12. Again,
these equations do not include household size and age of oldest household member as this
will cause multicollinearity and large standard errors.
Log wagesi,k = α+ β1Returni + β2Individuali + β3Householdk + β4IMR2,i +  (5.11)
Since wages are transformed using the natural log, the effect of covariates are interpreted
differently. The effect of an infinitesimal change in continuous variables is equal to the
1If β4 is significant then the standard errors will also need to be corrected using bootstrapped or
Heckman standard errors.
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exponentiated coefficient, or [eβ × 100]% change in wages. The effect of a binary variable
is [(eβ − 1)× 100]% change in wages.
Days workedi,k = α+β1Returni+β2Individuali+β3Householdk +β4IMRi+  (5.12)
In equation 5.12 coefficients are interpreted as the change in the number of days worked due
to an incremental change in the explanatory variables, ceteris paribus. If the explanatory
variable is binary, such as Returni, then β1 is interpreted as the differential in days worked
between returnees and the displaced.
In section B, the estimation of these equations is further complicated by the endogenous
explanatory variable (return). Wooldridge (2010) suggests estimating a two stage least
squares (2SLS), no matter the type of endogenous variable (i.e. continuous or binary),
and including the inverse mills ratio obtained from the first stage selection equation. This
is because we only use a linear projection of the endogenous variable.
5.6 Results
Table 5.10 produces the results of equations 5.6, 5.9, 5.11 and 5.12. The dependent
variables are participation in the labour force (columns 1, 2 and 3), working (columns 4, 5
and 6), number of days worked (columns 7, 8 and 9) and wages (columns 10, 11 and 12).
Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 show the results for section A of NBC. In section B, results
are included without correcting for an IV (columns 2, 5, 8 and 11) and when correcting
for an IV (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12). For each of the dependent variables ‘working’, ‘wages’
and ‘days worked’ table 5.10 shows the results with the inclusion of the inverse mills ratio,
which is actually statistically insignificant, indicating any selection into the labour force
has already been controlled for through individual and household covariates.
Participates in Labour Force
There is no effect of return on participating in the labour force for both sections A and B.
Males are unsurprisingly more likely to participate in the labour force. In both sections A
and B, age significantly increases the likelihood of joining the labour force up to a certain
point, but as shown by the negative coefficient of ‘Age squared’, age starts to reduce the
probability of belonging to the labour force. Married individuals from section B are less
likely to join the labour force. Individuals from larger households and households with
older family members are less likely to join the labour force. As an individual household’s
ratio of males to females increases, the likelihood of joining the labour force decreases.
Working
Returnees to section A are 117 percentage points more likely to be working. This result
does not hold in section B as the coefficient is smaller and thus statistically insignificant.
Males are less likely to be working in section B, despite the fact that they are more likely to
participate in the labour force. Married individuals are more likely to be working in both
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sections A and B. It is interesting to see how the individual’s sex and marital status have
opposite effects on the probability of participating in the labour force and working. While
single, male men are more likely to join the labour force, they are not necessarily seen as
more desirable to employers, and have a smaller probability of finding work compared to
married individuals, or women.
Wages
There is also no significant effect of return on wages in both sections A and B. In both
sections, having intermediate school education greatly increases wages by 44% in section
A and 66% in section B (calculated as [(eβ − 1)× 100]%). In section A, a small change in
the ratio of males to females in the household will increase wages but this effect is quite
small.
Number of days worked
Return has no effect on number of days working. If an individual comes from a nuclear
household, this reduces the number of days working per week.
These results show that the only effect of return is to increase the probability of an
individual working. Our conceptual discussion indicates that this could be due to in-
creased opportunities in the construction sector, better social capital, adaptable skills,
consumption smoothing, re–entering the labour market, or deterioration of skills during
displacement.
The conceptual discussion also proved a need to differentiate between the male and
female labour market and to control for the timing of return and social capital. This is
explored in the following section.
5.7 Mechanisms and Channels
In section 5.2 I put forward eight hypotheses that predict different effects of return on
the labour market, each caused by a different mechanism or channel. In this section I
try to test for the importance of these mechanisms empirically. Firstly, I study how the
timing of return can affect labour market outcomes. This could be related to a reduction
in labour supply (smaller pool of potential workers given the reduced population size),
or a reduction in labour demand (fewer business and economic opportunities in a post-
conflict setting). I also supplement this analysis with a proxy for both the population and
market size — the number of Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared in the individual’s vicinity.
Secondly, I see whether an expansion of the construction sector could be driving the results
of increased employment amongst returnees. Thirdly, I use a plausibly exogenous measure
of social capital to control for any changes to an individual’s social networks that could
increase the probability of finding employment upon return. Fourthly, I divide the sample
to analyse the results for men and women separately. Differential results by gender could
be related to either a change in norms or demand for low-skilled work that is associated
with women, so I test to see whether the proportion of skilled work differs by gender and
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by return status. Fifthly, I discuss the potential of an increase in labour supply due to
returnees rejoining the labour force. Lastly, I compare education levels of returnees and
the displaced to proxy for the quality of labour that could potentially deteriorate during
the displacement phase.
5.7.1 Timing of return and population size
As discussed in section 5.2, the timing of return could play an important role in how an
individual participates in the labour market. Assuming a war will drive the labour supply
down to zero, as waves of IDPs return home we will start to see a gradual increase in
labour supply. However, unless labour supply is greater than that in the displacement
market, employment will be lower and wages higher compared to the displaced. In this
section I analyse any differential effects depending on the timing of return: early returnees
can potentially claim the benefits of higher wages, but less employment. As labour supply
increases with more IDPs returning home, wages will decrease and employment increase,
until labour supply is equal to that of the displacement market (this is shown graphically
in figure 5.2). On the other hand, as more households return home aggregate demand
increases, thus increasing demand for labour and driving up wages and employment (as
shown in figure 5.3). In order to analyse these effects I first study the timing of return
and then use a proxy for the market size.
Unfortunately in section A there is not enough variation in the timing of return to
test this hypothesis empirically (see table 5.11), so I focus the analysis on section B.
Rather than include a variable on the return status, I have included three binary variables
indicating if the individual has returned within one year, two years and three years. I
have not included an independent variable for those who are still displaced, so coefficients
are analysed with respect to this base group. The results reported in table 5.12 are only
indicative, as the endogeneity of the timing of return with labour market outcomes cannot
be solved using the instrumental variable strategy employed previously.
Table 5.12 shows an interesting pattern. The effect of return on whether an individual
is working or not is felt greatest by those who have returned within 2 years. In this case
return increases the probability of an individual working by 43 percentage points. The
effect of returning within one year on the probability of working is small and insignificant.
For those who return within 3 years, the probability of working is large but insignificant.
All other dependent variables, namely participating in the labour force, wages and days
worked, are not affected by the timing of return.
In table 5.13 I use a proxy to control for the market size of the area that the individual
is living in. Based on my sample, I constructed a variable equal to the NBC population
size for each area. Ideally I would have a variable equal to the actual population size, but
this is difficult to obtain given the data scarcity in Lebanon. Also, given that Palestinians
mostly interact with each other, both for social and economic reasons, the number of
Palestinians from Nahr el–Bared living in the same area as the individual is a plausible
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proxy for market size. When including this variable in the analysis, the effect of returning
home to section A on the probability of working is roughly the same (a 116 percentage
point increase compared to a 117 percentage point increase), but now return has a positive
effect on wages, increasing them by 210% in section B.
These results are indicative of the market size hypothesis explained above, those who
arrive early face a decrease in demand for labour due to the diminished economic activity.
With the second wave of returnees there is a revival of economic activity and thus an
improvement in labour market outcomes. The last to arrive will find a saturated labour
market, thus having worse labour market outcomes.
5.7.2 Construction sector
In a post war setting, the construction sector is likely to play a unique role in the labour
market. While demand for labour in most markets is likely to dampen, demand for
construction labour is likely to be high. Table 5.14 tests whether employment in the
construction sector is higher for returnees or the displaced in each of sections A and B.
The first row looks at the entire sample and the second at men only.
There is no significant difference in the employment of individuals, or men in particular,
in the construction sector when comparing the displaced and returnees. However, the
percentage of individuals working in the construction sector is quite high (45% of men and
6.7% of women), which could indicate that both the displaced and returnees are involved
in the reconstruction of Nahr el–Bared.
5.7.3 Social capital
In this subsection I introduce social capital into the regressions. As highlighted by Durlauf
(2002), much of the research on social capital and the labour market suffers from endogene-
ity, specifically reverse causality. Simply regressing the number of people an individual
knows on the employment status is not a suitable analysis. It is very likely that an em-
ployed person knows more people simply because he is employed. For this reason, I use
variables that cannot be biased by reverse causality to measure social capital, as suggested
by Durlauf (2002). This includes the number of relatives, which asks “Without consider-
ing those who are living with you in your house, how many of your relatives live in this
community?” and the relative family size, which asks “Compared to other Palestinian
families, do you think your extended family is larger, smaller or equal to the average fam-
ily size?”. These measures provide a good measure and proxy for social capital but are
unlikely to be affected by a households welfare or labour market outcomes, we would only
expect causality to be one direction.
Table 5.15 produces the results of the main analysis when controlling for social cap-
ital. The effect of return on the probability of working is now larger, return increases
the likelihood of working by 122 percentage points (rather than 117 percentage points).
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Interestingly, in section B the number of relatives living in the community reduces the
probability of working, and in section A reduces the number of days worked per week. In
section A, perceptions of a large family increase the probability of working and wages.
These results indicate that social capital plays a role in the labour market, a role which
can sometimes be negative. In fact, there is some research which shows a ‘dark side to
social capital’ (Schelling, 1969; Hoff and Sen, 2006), and these results provide further
evidence for this. However, social capital is not the mechanism behind the increased
employment upon return.
5.7.4 Gender and skilled work
As mentioned earlier, the effect of return on labour market outcomes is likely to be dif-
ferent for men and women. Research has shown how conflict and displacement can alter
the household supply of labour because women’s skills are more adaptable and men are
occupied with the war. We are yet to understand how this can affect men and women’s
labour market outcomes upon return. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 show the regressions performed
separately for men and women.
The main result of return increasing the likelihood of working is actually driven entirely
by the female sample. Upon returning home, women are 674 percentage points more likely
to be working compared to the displaced. Men are not any more likely to be working (while
the return coefficient is still positive, it is not statistically significant). This is a major
divergence between the male and female labour market and the effect of return on it. The
earlier conceptual discussion considered two factors affecting the labour market outcomes
of women: norms and skills. If there was a reversion to traditional roles for women, we
would not see this result of increased employment. Instead, our results indicate that there
is an increased demand for female workers because of their adaptable skills.
This is further substantiated by the analysis in table 5.18, which compares the propor-
tion of skilled workers amongst the displaced and returnees. The categorisation of skilled
work is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ILO, 2012).
Namely, skilled labourers are: business men, administrators, managers, professionals, so-
cial workers, teachers, and health workers. In general, returnees work in less skilled sectors
compared to the displaced. In particular, there are more male skilled workers amongst the
displaced. This means that because of low demand for skilled work, men are unable to
find work upon return, but women, who have more adaptable skills, are able to find work.
This result falls in line with the literature on displacement, which finds that women are
more likely to be working in low–skilled, cottage type industries (Caldero´n et al., 2011).
This analysis expands that result to consider not only displacement, but also increased
demand for low–skilled work when an economy is recovering.
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5.7.5 Rejoining the labour force
It can be hypothesized that upon returning home those who left the labour market during
displacement will rejoin, leading to lower wages and higher employment. While an increase
in employment is observed, we do not see an increase in labour force participation, which
we would also expect if this were true. It is unlikely that rejoining the labour force is the
mechanism behind an increase in employment upon return.
5.7.6 Quality of labour
During displacement the quality of labour can deteriorate, either because of skills not being
used or because of a disruption to education. While the survey did not collect information
on skills or experience, I do have data on education. I consider the education of those
younger than 23, or those who would have been most likely to be affected by the war and
displacement. Table 5.19 compares education levels of returnees and the displaced, and
finds few differences: In section B returnees are more likely to have attended school, and
in section A returnees are less likely to be currently attending school.
In addition, I repeat the analysis in table 5.20 excluding those younger than 23, i.e.
those who would have been most affected by disruption to schooling during the war and
subsequent displacement. If a deterioration in the quality of labour is what drives the
result, then we would expect the effect of return to be smaller than for the full sample. In
fact, this analysis shows that the effect of return is stronger for this group than the full
sample, increasing the likelihood of working by 488 percentage points.
5.8 Robustness checks
In order to be certain of the results presented in this chapter, I have performed a range
of robustness checks and find little difference to the main results. These checks include:
removing households who do not want to return from the sample, combining section A
and B into one sample, and controlling for wealth and connections that could undermine
the identification strategy used for the main analysis.
Excluding those who do not want to return
In a similar way to chapter 4, here I exclude households from the sample who would not
like to return home. One could worry that households who do not return home are those
who have better employment opportunities during the displacement. If this were the case,
the coefficients obtained would be biased. However, since we see that return improves the
probability of working, it is unlikely that households who do not want to return are those
who have better economic opportunities. Nevertheless, I make use of a variable that asks
whether the respondent and his/her household would like to return to Nahr el–Bared if
possible. Unfortunately this variable was not collected at the individual level, and while
individual responses might differ to that of the main respondent, this check still provides
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evidence of the robustness of the main results given there is little change in coefficients in
table 5.21.
One sample
For this robustness check I increase the sample size by combining sections A and B into
one sample, and including a binary variable to indicate the section that the household has
originated from. If there were significant differences between the two sections that were
driving the main results, we would see a different picture when analysing the full sample.
Late return significantly increases the probability of working by 87 percentage points, a
slightly lower effect compared to the main result of 117 percentage points. Early return
has no effect on the likelihood of working, which is the same as the main result in section
B.
Controlling for connections
For this robustness check I have included two variables indicating that the household has
a connection with UNRWA and the camp’s popular committee in case these households
were able to return home before others. If these well-connected households have better
labour market outcomes, then the reported results would be biased. Table 5.23 shows
little difference to the main results, in fact the effect on working is slightly greater (a 126
percentage increase upon return).
Controlling for wealth
Since it could also be argued that damage of the dwelling during the war has a direct effect
on labour market outcomes because of a reduction in wealth, I have redone the analysis
controlling for household wealth, measured by an index of household assets and total
household consumption. I have not included these as controls in the main analysis because
of the probable endogeneity between these variables and the labour market (households
who have working members are likely to be wealthier as a direct result), which would cause
larger standard errors for all variables. Nevertheless table 5.24 shows little difference in
results, the effect of return on the likelihood of working is still significant.
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I have studied the effect of returning home on labour market outcomes.
Theoretically the effect of return is ambiguous, depending on changes in both the demand
and supply of labour. I empirically study the effect of return on four labour market
outcomes: participation in the labour force, working, wages and number of days worked.
I analyse a dataset of individuals originally from Nahr el–Bared camp in North Lebanon,
displaced within Lebanon after a war in 2007 between the Lebanese army and Fatah al–
Islam. I use an instrumental variable and exploit the exogenous nature of the return
process in order to estimate a causal effect of return.
The results show that return increases the likelihood of working by 117 percentage
points. This effect is greatest for those who have returned within two years, reaping the
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benefits of greater aggregate demand as the market increases. Women returnees are more
likely to be working compared to the displaced, but there is no difference in employment
between men who have been displaced and those who have returned. This could be
because women possess skills that are adaptable in labour markets, working in cottage
type industries from home, as opposed to the more specialised skills that men possess.
These results are signs of economic recovery upon return. However, one still needs to be
cautious, since these opportunities are mostly within the low–skilled markets, with limited
capacity for development.
This chapter has filled an important gap in the academic literature. In addition, the
conclusions from this chapter have important implications for the refugee crisis today.
Investments in better economic opportunities for men and women which require use of skills
should be a priority before sending IDPs and refugees back home. Rebuilding an economy
and labour market from scratch is not a simple task and will not happen automatically.
Coupled with investments to improve social capital, investments in businesses that require
skilled workers will be essential for post–conflict social and economic recovery.
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5.10 Appendix A: Labour Demand and Supply
Figure 5.1: Labour market demand and supply
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Figure 5.2: Population changes (decrease in initial post–conflict stages and then increase
with each wave of returnees) — shifts of labour supply curve
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Figure 5.3: Market size (decrease in aggregate demand in initial post–conflict stages and
then increase with each wave of returnees)— shifts of labour demand curve
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Figure 5.4: Construction sector — upward shift of labour demand curve
 
employment 
wages 
LDc 
Ec 
return 
displacement 
Wc 
LSc 
Figure 5.5: Norms and attitudes: Shifts of female labour supply curve
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Figure 5.6: Demand for adaptable skills — upward shift of female labour demand curve,
downward shift of male labour demand curve
(a) Female labour market
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Figure 5.7: Rejoining labour market: upward shift of labour supply curve
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Figure 5.8: Quality of labour: change in slope of labour demand
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5.11 Appendix B: Summary Statistics
Table 5.1: Dependent Variables
Dep. Variable Description Sample N
Participates in LF Participate in labour market by looking for work
or working
Older than 13 2032
Working Individual has been working over last week or
usually works in exchange for payment in cash
or kind
Participants of LF 825
Number of Days
worked
Number of days an individual was working over
the last week in exchange for payment either in
cash or in kind
Those working 583
Log Wages The log of monthly wages or income in US $ Those working 580
Table 5.2: Summary statistics: Employment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Participates in labour force2 0.406 0.491 0 1 2032
Working over last 7 days 0.28 0.449 0 1 2254
Currently working (including those on break) 3 0.301 0.459 0 1 2255
Employed4 0.822 0.383 0 1 825
For those who are working (first job):
Work as skilled labourer 0.304 0.46 0 1 678
Working for a family member 0.18 0.384 0 1 678
Number of days worked over last week 5.048 1.747 1 7 583
Business owner 0.097 0.297 0 1 678
Size of business (number of workers)5 1.818 3.774 0 30 66
Monthly income in USD 402.718 329.822 26.667 4000 580
Individual has a work contract 0.14 0.347 0 1 673
Individual has a seasonal job 0.271 0.445 0 1 667
Number of years individual has been at job 8.783 9.255 0.003 50 668
Individual works at home 0.064 0.244 0 1 677
Individual works in their own camp 0.514 0.5 0 1 677
Individual works within proximity of their camp 0.108 0.31 0 1 677
Individual works in other camp 0.062 0.241 0 1 677
Individual works outside camp 0.409 0.492 0 1 677
Individual found work through contact 0.46 0.499 0 1 676
Individual has another job 0.019 0.137 0 1 677
2For those older than 13
3As there was a big storm in Lebanon in the week prior to the survey, many were not able to go to
work.
4The variable employed is only constructed for those who are working or looking for work.
Page 185 of 223
Figure 5.9: Unemployment by age group
Figure 5.10: Occupation
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Figure 5.11: Activity sector
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Figure 5.12: Labour market descriptive statistics
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Table 5.3: Differences in employment variables by gender
Mean Diff.
Variable Female Male
Participates in labour force 0.14 0.68 −0.54∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Working 0.79 0.83 −0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Number of days worked over last week 4.54 4.31 0.23
(0.21) (0.1) (0.25)
Monthly income in USD 351.94 412.91 −60.97∗
(27.35) (15.47) (36.64)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.4: Return status
Section A Section B
Status Number Percentage Number Percentage
Return 165 7.28 568 71.81
Displaced 2,103 92.72 223 28.19
Table 5.5: Differences in employment variables by return in section A and section B
Section A Section B
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Variable Return Displaced Return Displaced
Participates in labour force 0.4 0.4 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Working 0.97 0.81 0.16∗∗ 0.82 0.81 0.011
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Monthly income in USD 375.96 379.08 3.12 465.39 491.74 26.36
(43.52) (16.51) (54.88) (33.43) (51.83) (63.36)
Number of days worked 3.74 4.29 −0.56 4.78 4.19 0.58
over last week (0.42) (0.11) (0.41) (0.18) (0.38) (0.38)
Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: Author’s dataset
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5For those who own a business
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Table 5.6: Summary statistics of controls
Ind. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Individual level controls
Sex (male=1) 0.494 0.5 0 1 3059
Age 26.46 18.977 0 100 3059
Married 0.34 0.474 0 1 3059
Attended intermediate school (at least) 0.52 0.5 0 1 3059
Household level controls
Household size 6.21 2.292 1 13 3059
Is household nuclear? 0.811 0.391 0 1 3059
Age of oldest household member 49.886 13.93 19 100 3059
Household sex ratio 1.319 1.095 0 7 3048
Live in refugee camp 0.845 0.362 0 1 3059
5.12 Appendix C: First stage regression results
Table 5.7: Linear probability model first stage results
Return
Dwelling completely damaged -0.766***
(0.026)
Constant 0.395***
(0.102)
Individual controls Yes
Household controls Yes
Observations 783
R2 0.4343
Degrees of freedom 9
F (9, 773) 147.87
Prob > F 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.8: First stage regression summary statistics
Variables R–sq. Adjusted R–sq. Partial R–sq. Robust F (1, 136) Prob > F
Return 0.5125 0.4803 0.4631 419.4 0.0000
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5.13 Appendix D: Main Results
Table 5.9: Reduced form regressions: Effect of return on labour market outcomes
Participates in LF Working Days worked Log Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B A B A B A B
Individual returned (d) -0.0000508 0.000287 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0113 0.0890 -0.148 0.0252 -0.0524
(0.999) (0.995) (0.000) (0.850) (0.800) (0.626) (0.844) (0.726)
Observations 1517 515 610 215 427 156 432 148
R2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000
Marginal effects; p-values in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.10: Effect of return on labour market outcomes
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A B B: IV A B B: IV A B B: IV A B B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0612 0.00677 0.0483 1.175∗∗∗ 0.233 0.0279 0.0407 0.119 0.331 0.0343 0.0255 0.159
(0.0609) (0.0583) (0.213) (0.451) (0.202) (0.374) (0.117) (0.141) (0.244) (0.354) (0.304) (0.490)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.615∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 0.159 -1.547∗∗∗ -1.700∗∗ -0.187 -0.239 -0.402 0.611 -0.177 -0.0225
(0.0214) (0.0369) (0.154) (1.532) (0.332) (0.711) (0.457) (0.312) (0.361) (1.022) (1.075) (0.743)
Age 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.0247 -0.0406 0.0165 -0.0224 -0.0121 -0.0401 0.0389 -0.0525 -0.0203
(0.00640) (0.0117) (0.0320) (0.202) (0.0409) (0.0871) (0.0601) (0.0573) (0.0706) (0.145) (0.211) (0.131)
Age squared -0.000831∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.00283∗∗∗ -0.000260 0.000525 -0.000139 0.000388 0.000326 0.000651 -0.000397 0.000902 0.000535
(0.0000794) (0.000138) (0.000377) (0.00256) (0.000449) (0.00102) (0.000756) (0.000678) (0.000812) (0.00183) (0.00246) (0.00151)
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Married (d) -0.0229 -0.279∗∗∗ -0.752∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗ 0.689∗∗ 0.223∗ 0.177 0.253 0.0572 -0.172 -0.208
(0.0407) (0.0845) (0.237) (0.167) (0.298) (0.349) (0.116) (0.184) (0.206) (0.257) (0.419) (0.402)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0169 0.0697 0.192 -0.152 0.364 0.416 0.367∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.211 0.106 0.106
(0.0296) (0.0590) (0.164) (0.146) (0.234) (0.258) (0.0762) (0.197) (0.178) (0.191) (0.336) (0.304)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0786∗ -0.00273 -0.00926 -0.206 -0.479 -0.433 0.00347 -0.111 -0.111 0.166 -0.793∗∗ -0.788∗∗
(0.0401) (0.0786) (0.209) (0.190) (0.342) (0.417) (0.0883) (0.191) (0.162) (0.233) (0.393) (0.371)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0367∗∗∗ -0.0594∗∗ -0.159∗∗ 0.0454 0.134 0.146 0.0564∗ -0.0107 -0.00571 -0.0298 -0.0280 -0.0382
(0.0125) (0.0247) (0.0658) (0.0893) (0.0840) (0.107) (0.0318) (0.0585) (0.0605) (0.0801) (0.125) (0.141)
Household size -0.0160∗∗ -0.0463∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.00631) (0.0128) (0.0344)
Age of oldest member -0.00267∗ -0.00569∗ -0.0152∗
(0.00139) (0.00313) (0.00834)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.603 -0.425 -0.163
(0.655) (0.348) (0.794)
mills
lambda -0.407 -0.306 0.629 -0.359
(0.409) (0.326) (0.921) (1.164)
Observations 1515 508 508 2265 783 211 2265 783 146 2265 783 155
R2 0.168 0.057
Pseudo R2 0.355 0.371
Degrees of freedom 10.000 10.000 20.000 8.000 8.000 18.000 8.000 8.000 9.000 8.000 8.000 9.000
Chi-squared 506.712 188.745 389.963 39.251 40.227 2601.674 57.777 22.750 36.800 3.444 9.597 14.895
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.904 0.294 0.094
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.14 Appendix E: Mechanisms
Table 5.11: Number of years of displacement for returnees in sections A and B
Number of returnees
Displaced for: Section A Section B
Less than 1 year 0 265
Less than 2 years 0 198
Less than 3 years 0 105
Less than 4 years 2 0
Less than 5 years 41 0
More than 5 years 122 0
Table 5.12: Effect of timing of return on labour market outcomes in section B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
Return within 1 year (d) 0.0312 0.0269 0.0397 0.109
(0.0668) (0.231) (0.345) (0.159)
Return within 2 years (d) 0.0101 0.428∗ 0.0959 0.0388
(0.0736) (0.245) (0.367) (0.181)
Return within 3 years (d) -0.0567 0.356 -0.140 0.238
(0.0845) (0.338) (0.427) (0.195)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.643∗∗∗ -1.525∗∗∗ -0.266 -0.187
(0.0370) (0.337) (1.112) (0.318)
Age 0.0960∗∗∗ -0.0437 -0.0625 -0.00571
(0.0119) (0.0397) (0.215) (0.0575)
Age squared -0.00108∗∗∗ 0.000561 0.00101 0.000248
(0.000140) (0.000438) (0.00251) (0.000681)
Married (d) -0.283∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗ -0.142 0.171
(0.0851) (0.305) (0.431) (0.183)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0761 0.330 0.113 0.470∗∗
(0.0593) (0.255) (0.337) (0.196)
Nuclear family (d) -0.00260 -0.457 -0.759∗ -0.128
(0.0784) (0.308) (0.398) (0.190)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0603∗∗ 0.171∗∗ -0.0193 -0.0172
(0.0248) (0.0848) (0.131) (0.0596)
Household size -0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0129)
Age of oldest member -0.00570∗
(0.00313)
mills
lambda -0.433 -0.249
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(1.193) (0.331)
Observations 508 783 783 783
Pseudo R2 0.373
Degrees of freedom 12.000 10.000 10.000 10.000
Chi-squared 188.262 38.633 9.904 24.133
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.449 0.007
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.13: Effect of return on labour market outcomes with proxy for market size
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0579 0.206 1.163∗∗ -0.409 0.0884 0.560∗ 0.245 0.0722
(0.0627) (0.386) (0.469) (0.751) (0.119) (0.306) (0.355) (0.778)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.620∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗ 0.276 -1.458∗ -0.245 -0.286 0.743 -0.0548
(0.0215) (0.157) (1.504) (0.785) (0.486) (0.350) (1.031) (0.745)
Age 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.0442 0.0356 -0.0347 -0.0451 0.0385 -0.0319
(0.00638) (0.0330) (0.195) (0.0892) (0.0627) (0.0647) (0.144) (0.130)
Age squared -0.000813∗∗∗ -0.00274∗∗∗ -0.000514 -0.000307 0.000533 0.000656 -0.000409 0.000675
(0.0000788) (0.000389) (0.00246) (0.00102) (0.000786) (0.000749) (0.00181) (0.00150)
Married (d) -0.0162 -0.728∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.573 0.252∗∗ 0.280 0.0997 -0.217
(0.0414) (0.239) (0.176) (0.421) (0.119) (0.192) (0.260) (0.411)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0118 0.184 -0.143 0.428 0.346∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.176 0.0961
(0.0301) (0.164) (0.151) (0.273) (0.0780) (0.170) (0.191) (0.308)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0938∗∗ -0.00569 -0.174 -0.430 0.0175 0.0362 0.0950 -0.822∗∗
(0.0413) (0.212) (0.188) (0.430) (0.0912) (0.153) (0.239) (0.385)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0345∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗ 0.0349 0.132 0.0641∗∗ -0.0122 -0.0393 -0.0356
(0.0125) (0.0654) (0.0918) (0.108) (0.0326) (0.0594) (0.0797) (0.142)
Household size -0.0175∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.00642) (0.0347)
Age of oldest member -0.00303∗∗ -0.0151∗
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(0.00142) (0.00837)
Number of NBCers in community 0.0000780 -0.000329 -0.000108 0.00106 -0.000377 -0.00254∗∗∗ -0.00134∗∗ 0.000329
(0.0000893) (0.00120) (0.000471) (0.00219) (0.000242) (0.000912) (0.000638) (0.00227)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.434 -0.386 -0.244
(0.689) (0.340) (0.802)
mills
lambda -0.464 0.768
(0.431) (0.925)
Observations 1484 499 2231 207 2231 144 2231 153
R2 0.274 0.060
Pseudo R2 0.359
Degrees of freedom 11.000 21.000 9.000 17.000 9.000 10.000 9.000 10.000
Chi-squared 497.602 . 39.339 . 61.286 58.268 11.347 15.669
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.253 0.109
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.14: Differences in employment in construction sector by return in section A and section B
Section A Section B
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Variable Return Displaced Return Displaced
Employed in 0.36 0.34 0.02 0.34 0.41 −0.06
construction sector 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.08
Males employed in 0.42 0.43 -0.009 0.39 0.47 -0.08
construction sector (0.05) (0.09) (0.097) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
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Table 5.15: Effect of return on labour market outcomes controlling for social capital
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0574 0.0612 1.216∗∗∗ 0.0764 0.0233 0.313 -0.0984 0.148
(0.0610) (0.214) (0.440) (0.391) (0.118) (0.242) (0.353) (0.481)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.609∗∗∗ 1.961∗∗∗ 0.208 -1.435∗∗ -0.428 -0.410 0.903 0.0175
(0.0218) (0.155) (0.936) (0.642) (0.478) (0.365) (0.999) (0.751)
Age 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.0324 0.108 -0.0512 -0.0433 0.0921 -0.00980
(0.00644) (0.0323) (0.128) (0.0825) (0.0642) (0.0720) (0.143) (0.133)
Age squared -0.000828∗∗∗ -0.00282∗∗∗ -0.000361 -0.00129 0.000737 0.000685 -0.00109 0.000406
(0.0000800) (0.000379) (0.00161) (0.000963) (0.000806) (0.000827) (0.00181) (0.00154)
Married (d) -0.0223 -0.748∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.273 0.152 -0.195
(0.0411) (0.237) (0.177) (0.365) (0.119) (0.216) (0.265) (0.401)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0182 0.213 -0.141 0.251 0.355∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.233 0.0967
(0.0299) (0.164) (0.146) (0.276) (0.0805) (0.180) (0.197) (0.306)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0835∗∗ -0.0140 -0.247 -0.277 0.0237 -0.104 0.0463 -0.776∗∗
(0.0403) (0.211) (0.173) (0.403) (0.0944) (0.162) (0.245) (0.375)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗ 0.0329 0.128 0.0665∗ -0.00135 -0.0811 -0.0371
(0.0129) (0.0660) (0.0803) (0.105) (0.0352) (0.0603) (0.0879) (0.141)
Household size -0.0158∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.00627) (0.0356)
Age of oldest member -0.00259∗ -0.0140∗
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(0.00140) (0.00830)
Number of relatives -0.000795 0.00449 -0.00479 -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.000792 -0.000896 -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.00294
(0.000821) (0.00402) (0.00377) (0.00845) (0.00242) (0.00366) (0.00549) (0.00816)
Family size 0.0138 0.0205 0.185∗ -0.0438 0.104∗ -0.0915 0.257 -0.0297
(0.0236) (0.109) (0.107) (0.196) (0.0613) (0.0920) (0.163) (0.201)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.208 -0.421 -0.104
(0.583) (0.348) (0.808)
mills
lambda -0.584 0.930
(0.430) (0.900)
Observations 1477 508 2213 211 2213 146 2213 155
R2 0.177 0.059
Pseudo R2 0.350
Degrees of freedom 12.000 24.000 10.000 22.000 10.000 11.000 10.000 11.000
Chi-squared 486.596 384.750 45.404 2233.576 57.943 40.266 15.843 15.229
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.104 0.172
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.16: Probit model: Effect of return on labour market outcomes for female sample
Participates in LF Working Number of days worked Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A B: IV A A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) -0.00165 0.527 6.736∗∗∗ 0.414 0.198 0.201 0.0388
(-0.05) (1.36) (3.12) (1.34) (0.42) (0.17) (0.06)
Age 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ -0.0262 -0.0674 -0.225 0.752 0.0104
(7.92) (4.17) (-0.08) (-0.18) (-1.64) (0.64) (0.03)
Age squared -0.000347∗∗∗ -0.00268∗∗∗ 0.000490 0.000915 0.00283 -0.00933 0.000176
(-8.13) (-4.09) (0.11) (0.19) (1.64) (-0.63) (0.04)
Married (d) -0.0900∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗ 0.564 1.155∗ -1.827 -0.197
(-3.74) (-3.51) (2.42) (0.63) (1.65) (-0.69) (-0.11)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗ -0.197 0.405 0.724∗∗ 2.802 -1.181
(3.24) (2.15) (-0.32) (0.47) (2.18) (1.00) (-0.80)
Nuclear family (d) 0.000976 -0.257 -0.236 0.306 0.360 -0.0800 0.719
(0.04) (-0.90) (-0.70) (1.20) (1.00) (-0.07) (0.98)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0106 -0.175 -0.0279 0.0427 0.186 0.00374 -0.900∗∗∗
(-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.09) (0.33) (1.48) (0.01) (-2.76)
Household size -0.00172 -0.125∗∗
(-0.45) (-2.35)
Age of oldest member -0.000125 0.00728
(-0.16) (0.66)
Inverse Mills ratio -1.360∗ -0.612
(-1.86) (-0.35)
mills
lambda -0.647 5.646
(-0.28) (0.84)
Observations 775 253 1163 1163 31 1163 32
Pseudo R2 0.128
Degrees of freedom 9.000 18.000 7.000 7.000 8.000 7.000 8.000
Chi-squared 55.611 138.583 545.348 17.374 52.355 1.518 23.944
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.982 0.002
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.17: Probit model: Effect of return on labour market outcomes for male sample
Participates in LF Working Number of days worked Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0873 -0.0903 0.800 0.141 -0.0363 0.288 -0.00377 0.504
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(1.26) (-0.26) (1.57) (0.38) (-0.21) (0.97) (-0.01) (0.85)
Age 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.116 0.0720 -0.118 -0.0117 -0.198 0.190
(5.77) (4.76) (0.97) (0.87) (-0.99) (-0.11) (-1.06) (1.19)
Age squared -0.000713∗∗∗ -0.00237∗∗∗ -0.00147 -0.000848 0.00170 0.000390 0.00272 -0.00192
(-6.81) (-5.07) (-0.95) (-0.84) (1.11) (0.31) (1.12) (-1.01)
Married (d) 0.244∗∗∗ 0.449 0.820∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗ -0.402 -0.226 -0.650 0.600
(3.33) (1.12) (4.15) (2.05) (-0.91) (-0.53) (-1.21) (0.75)
Intermediate school (d) -0.0907∗∗ 0.0650 -0.201 0.492∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.301 0.293 0.449
(-2.38) (0.26) (-1.33) (1.79) (2.93) (1.41) (1.09) (1.27)
Nuclear family (d) -0.111∗∗ 0.405 -0.216 -0.0423 -0.0425 -0.531∗ 0.267 -0.820
(-2.49) (1.40) (-1.34) (-0.09) (-0.28) (-1.89) (0.95) (-1.38)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0100 -0.0896 0.0332 0.0842 0.0320 -0.0410 -0.0475 0.0849
(-0.69) (-1.07) (0.50) (0.83) (0.65) (-0.69) (-0.54) (0.70)
Household size -0.0177∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(-2.07) (-3.11)
Age of oldest member -0.00382∗ -0.0203∗
(-1.78) (-1.72)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.316 -0.597 1.720
(0.43) (-0.77) (1.31)
mills
lambda -1.316 -1.353
(-1.46) (-1.02)
Observations 740 255 1102 173 1102 115 1102 123
Pseudo R2 0.228
Degrees of freedom 9.000 18.000 7.000 15.000 7.000 8.000 7.000 8.000
Chi-squared 126.040 177.321 47.018 . 19.574 35.667 3.253 33.959
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.007 0.000 0.861 0.000
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.18: Differences in skilled work by return in section A and section B
Section A Section B
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Variable Return Displaced Return Displaced
Skilled workers 0.38 0.40 −0.02 0.16 0.28 −0.13∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08)
Male skilled workers 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.1 0.24 −0.14∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08)
Female skilled workers 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.43 0.56 −0.13
(0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.06) (0.20)
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Table 5.19: Differences in education by return in section A and section B (those younger
than 23)
Section A Section B
Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Variable Return Displaced Return Displaced
Ever attended school 0.94 0.97 −0.02 0.98 0.93 0.05∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Currently attending school 0.75 0.84 −0.09∗ 0.70 0.65 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Attended primary school only 0.40 0.32 0.08 0.51 0.46 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
Attended intermediate school only 0.31 0.28 0.02 0.24 0.31 −0.07
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Attended secondary school only 0.08 0.11 −0.02 0.05 0.08 −0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Attended university or vocational school 0.17 0.19 −0.02 0.13 0.1 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
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Table 5.20: Effect of return on labour market outcomes excluding those younger than 23
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0648 0.0851 4.880∗∗∗ 0.413 0.0667 0.286 0.0226 0.287
(0.0652) (0.257) (0.275) (0.411) (0.132) (0.280) (0.381) (0.600)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.654∗∗∗ 2.121∗∗∗ 0.210 -5.546∗∗∗ 0.108 -1.154∗ 0.532 -1.161
(0.0248) (0.179) (1.598) (1.022) (0.431) (0.663) (1.097) (1.391)
Age 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.0256 -0.0600 -0.0240 -0.160∗∗ 0.0245 -0.0707
(0.00944) (0.0480) (0.116) (0.134) (0.0385) (0.0815) (0.115) (0.161)
Age squared -0.000624∗∗∗ -0.00307∗∗∗ -0.000264 0.000542 0.000352 0.00198∗∗ -0.000229 0.00118
(0.000105) (0.000534) (0.00158) (0.00156) (0.000496) (0.000937) (0.00148) (0.00185)
Married (d) -0.0357 -0.777∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.532∗ 0.105 -0.0528
(0.0487) (0.267) (0.193) (0.407) (0.132) (0.279) (0.286) (0.509)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0886∗∗ 0.318∗ 0.0486 0.381 0.355∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗ -0.0894
(0.0360) (0.191) (0.218) (0.337) (0.0968) (0.158) (0.234) (0.343)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0845∗ 0.131 -0.275 -0.403 0.00731 -0.220 0.108 -0.895∗∗
(0.0505) (0.255) (0.210) (0.560) (0.0960) (0.157) (0.257) (0.456)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0355∗∗ -0.185∗∗ 0.0466 0.0104 0.0547∗ 0.00984 0.0680 0.0262
(0.0157) (0.0789) (0.0950) (0.131) (0.0329) (0.0809) (0.0859) (0.173)
Household size -0.0193∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.00821) (0.0435)
Age of oldest member -0.00313∗ -0.00713
P
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(0.00171) (0.00971)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.362 -1.120∗ -1.352
(1.181) (0.607) (1.497)
mills
lambda -0.125 0.580
(0.384) (1.007)
Observations 1104 361 1106 170 1106 126 1106 137
R2 0.138 0.069
Pseudo R2 0.387
Degrees of freedom 10.000 20.000 8.000 17.000 8.000 9.000 8.000 9.000
Chi-squared 420.022 297.851 1108.933 . 36.954 34.768 7.018 13.443
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.535 0.144
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.15 Appendix F: Robustness Checks
Table 5.21: Effect of return on labour market outcomes excluding those who do not want
to return
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0506 0.0391 1.152∗∗ 0.0482 0.0262 0.388 0.00459 -0.0256
(0.0613) (0.213) (0.450) (0.376) (0.115) (0.249) (0.354) (0.480)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.630∗∗∗ 1.936∗∗∗ 0.176 -1.706∗∗ -0.309 -0.459 0.697 0.0965
(0.0217) (0.154) (1.362) (0.712) (0.480) (0.364) (1.089) (0.744)
Age 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.0173 0.0148 -0.0321 -0.0497 0.0565 -0.00137
(0.00660) (0.0320) (0.181) (0.0879) (0.0631) (0.0709) (0.153) (0.130)
Age squared -0.000860∗∗∗ -0.00281∗∗∗ -0.000175 -0.000118 0.000509 0.000766 -0.000622 0.000299
(0.0000817) (0.000376) (0.00229) (0.00103) (0.000792) (0.000817) (0.00193) (0.00150)
Married (d) -0.0395 -0.742∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗ 0.249∗∗ 0.265 0.0606 -0.221
(0.0418) (0.237) (0.176) (0.348) (0.109) (0.207) (0.251) (0.402)
Intermediate school (d) 0.00215 0.190 -0.118 0.414 0.351∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.178 0.122
(0.0303) (0.164) (0.143) (0.258) (0.0763) (0.178) (0.195) (0.309)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0664 -0.00633 -0.196 -0.439 0.00362 -0.113 0.200 -0.773∗∗
(0.0405) (0.209) (0.169) (0.419) (0.0871) (0.165) (0.228) (0.368)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0417∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗ 0.0473 0.147 0.0646∗∗ 0.00518 -0.0443 -0.0713
(0.0128) (0.0669) (0.0889) (0.109) (0.0322) (0.0636) (0.0806) (0.144)
Household size -0.0158∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.00642) (0.0343)
Age of oldest member -0.00286∗∗ -0.0150∗
(0.00141) (0.00832)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.611 -0.468 -0.0977
(0.660) (0.351) (0.798)
mills
lambda -0.476 0.688
(0.424) (0.968)
Observations 1462 504 2189 209 2189 144 2189 153
R2 0.161 0.063
Pseudo R2 0.368
Degrees of freedom 10.000 20.000 8.000 18.000 8.000 9.000 8.000 9.000
Chi-squared 502.899 386.274 37.182 2675.206 60.834 36.699 3.373 14.690
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.100
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.22: Effect of return on labour market outcomes for one sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
Early return (d) 0.0190 0.219 0.0901 -0.110
(0.0540) (0.222) (0.126) (0.312)
Late return (d) 0.0347 0.868∗∗∗ 0.0129 0.115
(0.0516) (0.287) (0.110) (0.294)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.620∗∗∗ -0.332 -0.217 0.300
(0.0185) (0.909) (0.300) (0.795)
Age 0.0705∗∗∗ -0.00476 -0.0219 0.00577
(0.00552) (0.126) (0.0427) (0.121)
Age squared -0.000866∗∗∗ 0.000106 0.000401 0.0000883
(0.0000672) (0.00155) (0.000527) (0.00149)
Married (d) -0.0726∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.00612
(0.0370) (0.149) (0.0918) (0.203)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0308 -0.0589 0.374∗∗∗ 0.172
(0.0268) (0.127) (0.0733) (0.162)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0631∗ -0.218 -0.0209 -0.00653
(0.0356) (0.155) (0.0792) (0.193)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0594 0.0349 -0.0302
(0.0111) (0.0603) (0.0279) (0.0673)
Household size -0.0211∗∗∗
(0.00563)
Age of oldest member -0.00355∗∗∗
(0.00128)
From section A (d) 0.0112 -0.170 0.0650 0.257
(0.0457) (0.190) (0.111) (0.278)
mills
lambda -0.380 0.374
(0.284) (0.750)
Observations 2023 3048 3048 3048
Pseudo R2 0.350
Degrees of freedom 12.000 10.000 10.000 10.000
Chi-squared 682.806 58.502 85.497 7.540
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.674
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.23: Effect of return on labour market outcomes controlling for contacts
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0648 0.0636 1.259∗∗∗ 0.135 0.166 0.348 0.172 0.143
(0.0614) (0.220) (0.483) (0.433) (0.116) (0.230) (0.359) (0.513)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.613∗∗∗ 1.952∗∗∗ 0.401 -1.757∗∗ -0.00186 -0.321 0.626 -0.254
(0.0215) (0.154) (1.492) (0.742) (0.426) (0.334) (1.018) (0.705)
Age 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.0586 0.0161 0.00243 -0.00916 0.0378 -0.0721
(0.00642) (0.0322) (0.199) (0.0890) (0.0568) (0.0651) (0.145) (0.126)
Age squared -0.000832∗∗∗ -0.00279∗∗∗ -0.000683 -0.000147 0.0000651 0.000302 -0.000395 0.00110
(0.0000796) (0.000380) (0.00252) (0.00103) (0.000713) (0.000750) (0.00183) (0.00146)
Married (d) -0.0225 -0.734∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.202 0.0705 -0.0337
(0.0406) (0.239) (0.192) (0.368) (0.111) (0.195) (0.259) (0.402)
Intermediate school (d) 0.0151 0.190 -0.171 0.426 0.326∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.149 0.128
(0.0296) (0.163) (0.150) (0.260) (0.0717) (0.176) (0.195) (0.305)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0688∗ 0.00912 -0.211 -0.437 -0.0313 -0.203 0.145 -0.733∗∗
(0.0406) (0.210) (0.169) (0.417) (0.0848) (0.168) (0.235) (0.372)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0383∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗ 0.0225 0.121 0.0470 -0.00239 -0.0446 -0.00186
(0.0127) (0.0664) (0.0977) (0.110) (0.0311) (0.0612) (0.0824) (0.138)
Household size -0.0159∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.00627) (0.0350)
Age of oldest member -0.00255∗ -0.0145∗
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(0.00139) (0.00847)
Contact with UNRWA (d) 0.0440 0.0277 0.188 0.623∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.273∗ 0.409 -0.179
(0.0403) (0.190) (0.175) (0.315) (0.0952) (0.162) (0.254) (0.346)
Contact with popular committee (d) -0.0511 -0.258 0.355 -0.336 0.0917 0.277 0.222 -0.303
(0.0440) (0.214) (0.233) (0.352) (0.0987) (0.175) (0.268) (0.466)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.628 -0.281 -0.428
(0.664) (0.322) (0.757)
mills
lambda -0.244 0.643
(0.383) (0.921)
Observations 1507 506 2251 210 2251 145 2251 154
R2 0.203 0.062
Pseudo R2 0.354
Degrees of freedom 12.000 24.000 10.000 22.000 10.000 11.000 10.000 11.000
Chi-squared 501.207 407.184 43.415 2260.979 86.156 44.277 8.127 14.302
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.616 0.217
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.24: Effect of return on labour market outcomes controlling for wealth
Participates in LF Working Log Wages Number of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV A B: IV
Individual returned (d) 0.0742 -0.118 1.250∗∗∗ -0.0562 0.135 0.194 0.152 0.0702
P
age
2
0
6
of
223
(0.0629) (0.217) (0.440) (0.404) (0.110) (0.236) (0.355) (0.480)
Sex (male=1) (d) 0.617∗∗∗ 1.970∗∗∗ 0.148 -1.644∗∗ -0.415 -0.542∗ 0.174 -0.00476
(0.0215) (0.157) (0.656) (0.727) (0.404) (0.303) (0.847) (0.697)
Age 0.0641∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.0302 0.0299 -0.0408 -0.0779 0.00195 -0.00999
(0.00642) (0.0319) (0.0912) (0.0844) (0.0539) (0.0594) (0.122) (0.120)
Age squared -0.000823∗∗∗ -0.00280∗∗∗ -0.000340 -0.000296 0.000549 0.00101 -0.00000313 0.000364
(0.0000800) (0.000377) (0.00116) (0.000977) (0.000679) (0.000683) (0.00155) (0.00139)
Married (d) -0.0155 -0.739∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.626∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.429∗∗ 0.0897 -0.136
(0.0406) (0.245) (0.170) (0.369) (0.111) (0.191) (0.251) (0.418)
Intermediate school (d) 0.00267 0.134 -0.229 0.335 0.224∗∗∗ 0.308∗ -0.0241 -0.0687
(0.0308) (0.170) (0.147) (0.272) (0.0760) (0.177) (0.197) (0.298)
Nuclear family (d) -0.0852∗∗ 0.0188 -0.235 -0.358 0.0158 0.0649 0.193 -0.675∗
(0.0403) (0.210) (0.170) (0.417) (0.0885) (0.156) (0.227) (0.356)
Hhd sex ratio -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗ -0.00421 0.113 0.00656 0.00632 -0.0854 -0.0454
(0.0132) (0.0667) (0.0743) (0.108) (0.0357) (0.0540) (0.0848) (0.138)
Household assets 0.0270 0.102 0.225∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0740) (0.0976) (0.129) (0.0619) (0.0595) (0.134) (0.112)
Household expenses 0.0000207 -0.0000236 -0.0000126 -0.000253∗ 0.0000548 0.0000710 -0.0000845 -0.000116
(0.0000222) (0.000101) (0.0000941) (0.000148) (0.0000598) (0.0000739) (0.000122) (0.000161)
Household size -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.00653) (0.0369)
Age of oldest member -0.00288∗∗ -0.0156∗
(0.00141) (0.00894)
P
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Inverse Mills ratio -0.534 -0.659∗∗ -0.149
(0.606) (0.279) (0.720)
mills
lambda -0.619∗ 0.259
(0.361) (0.757)
Observations 1502 500 2242 208 2242 144 2242 153
R2 0.283 0.081
Pseudo R2 0.358
Degrees of freedom 12.000 24.000 10.000 22.000 10.000 11.000 10.000 11.000
Chi-squared 500.444 462.063 41.991 2833.731 102.414 95.299 19.450 20.411
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.040
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has shown that the formation of social capital is a complex process. I have ex-
plored social capital in two contexts, amongst households living amidst communal violence
or riots in urban Maharashtra, and amongst IDPs and returnees from Nahr el–Bared camp
in Lebanon. I have also studied the economic implications of returning home through an
analysis of labour market effects, and tested to see if social capital is a mechanism behind
these changes.
There are four main conclusions that bring together the main results from the three
empirical chapters. Firstly, conflict, explored through riots and return after conflict in-
duced displacement, has different effects on the different forms of social capital. Secondly,
any positive impacts on social capital are fragile, depending on the social composition of
an individual’s neighbourhood and the timing of returning home after conflict induced
displacement. Thirdly, returning home can improve economic opportunities. And lastly,
social capital also plays an unexpected role in labour markets, where the number of family
and relatives an individual has living in their community decreases the likelihood of work-
ing and the number of days worked per week. In the following paragraphs I summarise
the main empirical chapters and how they tie in to these four conclusions.
Chapter 3 finds that households living in neighbourhoods that have experienced a riot
are more likely to be members of groups and organisations, consistent with the literature
that has found a positive effect between conflict and social capital (see, for example Bozzoli
et al. (2011)). However, we also find that these households are less likely to join commu-
nity discussions, which is consistent with the literature that finds a negative relationship
between conflict and social capital (see, for example Colletta and Cullen (2000)).
We also find that these effects are strongest in socially diverse but stable neighbour-
hoods. We interpret these results to indicate that households living in socially diverse and
riot prone neighbourhoods invest in bridging social capital through joining groups and or-
ganisations, which can serve as protection in case of future riots. If the new relationships
and networks that result from increased membership include individuals from other social
groups, which is most likely to be true in diverse neighbourhoods, then households can
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draw from these networks in times of need, particularly when faced with threats from other
members of opposing social groups. Because this potential pay–off to increased member-
ship is smaller when neighbourhoods are homogeneous, riots do not increase membership
in groups or organisations when fractionalisation and polarisation are low. This result is
further substantiated by the vignette analysis which finds that respondents in riot affected
neighbourhoods are no more and no less willing to give money in an emergency to some-
one with whom they share a social identity. By refusing to differentiate, these households
could be trying to build networks and establish a system of reciprocity. By giving money
to someone the respondent can claim a favour in the future, and if this person belongs to
a different social group, this favour could be protection during a communal riot.
While it is clear that riots cause an increase in membership in organisations, this posi-
tive relationship is not observed for other forms of social capital under study. Riots cause
a reduction in participation in community discussions, trust is reduced in fragmented and
polarised riot–affected neighbourhoods, and participation in festival preparation decreases
in riot exposed neighbourhoods with low out–migration. It is possible that we see these
opposite effects because membership in groups and organisations represent a ‘superficial’
level of social capital, whereas trust and community discussions/festival preparations delve
beneath this surface level to reveal the true sense of community.
This chapter has also revealed an interesting role played by migration. When neigh-
bourhood out–migration is low, the effect of riots increasing membership in groups and
organisations, as well as decreasing trust and participation in community discussions and
festival preparations, is greatest. When neighbourhood out–migration is high, we do not
see an effect of riots on forms of social capital, except for an increase in trust, an opposite
effect to what we have seen throughout the results of chapter 3. We explain these results
as a dis–investment in social capital by migration. Those who migrate were those whose
social capital was most affected by riots and left as a result, leaving behind the more
invested community members.
Chapter 4 finds that in section A of Nahr el–Bared camp returning home decreases
average social capital compared to remaining displaced (particularly lower bonding, non–
institutional and weak social capital). In section B of Nahr el–Bared camp returning
home increases non–institutional social capital. Again, we see that the unpacking of social
capital into different dimensions can yield different results. What is more interesting is
how these results are opposite in sections A and B of the camp. I find that this discrepancy
is caused by a difference in the return process, and that the positive effect of return is felt
most for those who return home early with friends and family, but if households remain
displaced for a long time, return will decrease social capital compared to the displaced.
Social capital proves to be a non–transferable asset, difficult to move across time and
space. One does not simply reconnect and re–establish social capital as it once was, but
it will take time to be rebuilt upon returning home. This conclusion might be somewhat
obvious, however I have illustrated that the destruction of social capital has taken approx-
imately five years to recover, a long time for households dependent on social support as
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a coping strategy during hard times. Displacement is a traumatic and damaging experi-
ence, and before imposing solutions, it is important to understand the coping strategies,
informal institutions and social dynamics that are in place, and the implications for return.
Chapter 5 finds that returning home after conflict induced displacement increases the
likelihood of working by 117 percentage points. Further analysis finds that this result is
greatest for those returning within two years, when aggregate demand and the economy
has picked up after the war. In addition, this chapter finds that women returnees are those
more likely to be working (by 673 percentage points), whereas return has no effect on men
finding work. I interpret this result as indicating that women, who possess more adaptable
skills than the specialised skills that men possess, are able to adapt to the labour demands
of a post-war economic market. This could involve cottage type industry work that can
be done from home. These results are signs of economic recovery upon return. However,
one still needs to be cautious, since these opportunities are mostly within the low–skilled
markets, with limited capacity for development.
In addition, this chapter has analysed the effect of two exogenous measures of social
capital, the number of family and relatives living in the community and the relative family
size, on individual level labour market outcomes. Perception of family size relative to
other Palestinians has a positive effect on the likelihood of working and wages, whereas
the number of family and friends living within the individual’s community has a negative
relationship with these labour market outcomes. Family is certainly an important factor
in finding work, but it could be that when they are too close to home they serve as more
of a distraction than an aid. This result ties into the literature on the ‘bad side of social
capital’, which shows that the social networks that you are born with can be one of the
factors leading to a poverty trap (Durlauf, 2006). Ultimately, chapter 5 did not find that
social capital was the mechanism causing an increase in the likelihood of working upon
returning home.
This thesis shows that social capital is fragile, and can be destroyed under certain
conditions. Policies that are targeted towards victims of violence and returning IDPs
and refugees will need to take some of the lessons learnt in this thesis into account. In
fragmented and polarised neighbourhoods, priority must be given to bridging social capital
beyond networks formed through groups and organisations. Underlying trust, and a sense
of a shared community, between Muslims and Hindus living in urban areas in India should
be built in order to prevent future communal violence. This can take the form of public
awareness campaigns that promote a shared identity rather than two opposing groups.
In addition, neighbourhoods that have had very high levels of out–migration need to be
further researched. If these neighbourhoods are those disproportionately affected by riots
and dis–investments in social capital, it could be that the minorities are forced out of
neighbourhoods, and support needs to be given to these migrant households.
Initially, social capital can suffer upon returning home after conflict induced displace-
ment, and although it will naturally revert to previous levels (if not higher), some support
can be given to speed up this process. For example, financial support can be given to local
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groups and associations that encourage individuals to meet, socialise and build networks.
Social spaces (in the form of libraries, cafes, and club houses ...) can be created to allow
returnee households to socialise and meet regularly if they do not have the space to do
this immediately. Fun activities and social events can be organised that bring together
returnees once they arrive home. Furniture can be provided to households to allow them
to set up house and entertain and socialise with friends and family upon return.
In addition, investments in better economic opportunities for men and women which
require use of skills should be a priority before sending IDPs and refugees back home.
Rebuilding an economy and labour market from scratch is not a simple task and will not
happen automatically. Coupled with investments to improve social capital, investments
in businesses that require skilled workers will be essential for post–conflict social and
economic recovery.
Victims of conflict and communal violence are slowly increasing in number, although
fortunately not yet reaching the levels of the early 1990s. However, intra–ethnic tension
remains a universal issue. For example, we have seen destructive relationships between
hosts and refugees in Europe, Shia’a and Sunni in Syria and Iraq, Hindus and Muslims
in India, and Christians and Muslims in France and Lebanon. This thesis has applicable
lessons for ways in which intra–ethnic or bridging social capital can be formed in each
of these cases. In addition, the number of refugees and IDPs is reaching levels higher
than those seen in World War II, and governments and agencies are offering varying levels
and types of support. As of writing, the revolutions and conflicts in the Arab world have
generated millions of refugees, and once the conflict ends, a top concern will be the return
of these households and support to the victims of violence. Whether living in camps, with
friends or family, or moving to a new city or country, conflict induced displacement is a
protracted, traumatic, uncertain and sometimes isolating process, with implications for
the social capital and economic opportunities of refugees, IDPs and returnees that ought
to be considered.
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